Power & Environmental Policy:
Tasmanian Ecopolitics from Pedder to Wesley Vale.

by

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Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

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Statements

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Abstract

It is argued that the realisation of ecopolitical values, interests and demands is inevitably constrained by material interests within advanced industrial societies. The policy environment in the state of Tasmania is examined, and both a traditional affirmation and accommodation of the goals of industrial development, and a resistance to the more recent ecopolitical challenge to established state interests is found. However, a review of four key environmental disputes finds that the politics of ecology ('ecopolitics'), despite routine constraint by material interests, continues to defy predictions of its inevitable demise as a 'single issue', and continues to gain ground as an ideological force in Tasmania.

In reviewing the capacity of environmentalists to realise their aims (i) the nature and significance of the ecopolitical challenge is considered; (ii) ideological contention as a constraint in the realisation of ecopolitical interests is examined; (iii) the limits of state response to ecopolitical demands are reviewed; (iv) the political expression of conflicting values over two decades of Tasmanian ecopolitical conflict are examined; and (v) the Tasmanian tradition of underwriting industrial development is found to have acted as a 'policy paradigm' confining state action on environmental issues. A policy based framework of analysis is adopted that acknowledges ideological, political and institutional constraints, and is informed by (i) ecopolitical theory, given the deficiencies of traditional policy analysis in capturing the nature of the ecopolitical challenge, and (ii) power analysis in addressing policy constraint. This framework recognises ecopolitics as a struggle between value contenders, and ecopolitical demands as potentially limited by the constraining influence of dominant values and industrial interests.

This framework is applied to analysis of the Lake Pedder, Franklin River, Electrona silicon smelter and Wesley Vale pulp mill disputes. These disputes are detailed in Chapter Four, then reviewed in Chapter Five in terms of the nature of the environmental values at stake, the accommodation or frustration of these values, and the actions of the state in resolving the disputes. Whilst the ecopolitical challenge is not found to have been contained in Tasmania, environmental demands are nevertheless found to have been constrained by material values, the accommodation of industrial interests, and the institutionalisation of the traditional pursuits of development and resource exploitation.

Acknowledgments

Peter Hay, Ralph Chapman and Peter Larmour have successively supervised me through this thesis with great interest and assistance for which I thank them.

I would also like to acknowledge a debt of gratitude to the staff and students at the Centre for Environmental Studies at the University of Tasmania, where I began my research, and where I enjoyed great companionship and intellectual challenge.

Bob Burton deserves warm thanks for his insightful critiques of my work, Peter Walker for his help both with my Electrona research and for his excellent proof reading, and Melva Truchanas for her enthusiasm and kind support.

My dearest thanks go to my family, and to my partner Jerry de Gryse.

Map preparation is by Jerry de Gryse.

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Dedicated to the inspirational memory of Dr. Richard Jones.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Greening of Tasmania?

On 23rd March 1972, history was in the making in the Hobart Town Hall. Tasmanian conservationists had formed the world's first green party, the United Tasmania Group (UTG), with two goals in mind. First was its goal of campaigning in the upcoming state election against the threat of the hydro-industrial inundation of Lake Pedder. Pedder was a natural whisky-coloured lake, exquisitely bounded by rugged mountains, glacial dunes, pink quartzite beaches and vast button grass plains high up in Tasmania's remote southwestern wilderness. Secondly, the UTG aimed to exploit Tasmania's unique Hare-Clark electoral system.[1] hoping for the election of at least one of their candidates, and, ambitiously, to capture the balance of political power in the House of Assembly (Johnson 1972:86; Rainbow 1992:327). Agreement between the Labor Government and Liberal Opposition to freeze the Pedder issue out of the 1972 election campaign had prompted the establishment of the UTG. Its formation was both in protest against the bi-partisan political neglect of ecological concerns, and in realisation that only 'a new political culture and a new movement' would ever achieve its ecological goals (Flanagan 1989:37).

In the impossibly short three weeks before the 1972 election, the UTG successfully raised national and international awareness of the Pedder issue, whilst extending its own political platform to embrace alternate ecological, industrial, economic and educational directions for Tasmania (Johnson 1972). Its principal opponent in both the election and the threat to Lake Pedder was the formidable Hydro Electric Commission (HEC).

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[1] 'The Hare-Clark method is a variety of proportional representation, and uses a single transferable vote'. The state is divided into five electoral divisions, each returning seven candidates, and allotting seats once a quota of the votes is achieved in each division. The system was designed in 1896, not for party purposes, but 'to give representation to small sections of public opinion' (Townsley 1976:20).

The HEC's notorious independence as a statutory authority was apparent in its hegemonic control over hydro-industrial development policy,[2] and its blatantly political, publicly funded, electoral campaign against the UTG (Tighe 1992:124; see also *4.2.2, fn 6*).[3] Although the UTG failed to achieve either of its immediate goals, these few weeks launched a political environmentalism in Tasmania that has changed forever its typically conservative, ideologically moribund, small island politics.

The tragic loss of Lake Pedder to hydro-industrial inundation[4] is widely credited with shocking Tasmanian conservationists into radical activism. Every one of the half dozen state elections since has been coloured to some extent by an environmental issue. The thwarting by the federal government of the proposed Franklin dam and Wesley Vale pulp mill, after bitter and unresolved state disputes, has focused world attention on the revolutionary practice of the 'new' politics of ecology in Tasmania. As Hay (1993:7) suggests, the state's conservation movement has grown increasingly effective, injecting ideological stakes back into its politics, and achieving a 'sophistication not matched anywhere else in the world'. In 1976, the establishment of the Tasmanian Wilderness Society marked a tactical shift by conservationists away from green political aspirations and towards activism aimed at securing the southwestern wilderness against exploitation (Walker Pam 1989:167). Whilst this goal was achieved by the 1984 World Heritage Area declaration, twenty years of green activism ironically realised the UTG's political ambitions as well, leading directly to control of the state parliament that delivered the effective doubling of the world heritage area (refer to Locality Maps 1).

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[2] The powers of the HEC are introduced in *1.3.3*, and discussed throughout Chapters Four & Five. Davis (1993:120) saw the HEC's hegemony as sustained by Premiers with infinite faith in hydro-policy, despite its failure to 'deliver' from at least the late 1960s.

[3] (Note - *fn* - throughout refers to 'footnote number').

[4] Pedder was drowned by Stage 1 of the 250 sq km Gordon Scheme impoundment in 1974 .





Locality Maps 1.1 - South West to World Heritage[5]

(Sources: Thompson 1981: 55 & DPW&H 1990 & Law 1994).

Whereas the Lake Pedder dispute spawned the world's first green party, each of the Franklin dam, Electrona silicon smelter and Wesley Vale pulp mill disputes returned at least one environmental activist to state parliament[6] (refer Locality Maps 1.2). In 1989, the signing of the Labor-Green Parliamentary Accord marked the historic realisation of the UTG's early parliamentary ambitions. A record five green independent parliamentarians, elected following the Wesley Vale dispute, entered into partnership with a Labor minority government, thereby gaining qualified balance of political power in Tasmania's House of Assembly

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[5] The first three maps from Thompson (1981:55) are intended to only diagramatically illustrate the impact of the Gordon Schemes on the southwestern wilderness region. The World Heritage maps, however, show actual boundaries. The 1984 WHA area essentially comprised, from north to south, the Cradle Mountain-Lake St Clair, Wild Rivers and South West Tasmania National Parks. National parks are not otherwise indicated.

[6] Respectively, Dr Bob Brown (Franklin), Dr Gerry Bates (Electrona), Christine Milne, Di Hollister and Lance Armstrong (Wesley Vale). Peg Putt, another active campaigner and Director of the Tasmanian Conservation Trust, recently replaced a retiring Dr Brown.

(Larmour 1990). The Accord was shortlived, however, and eventually foundered upon the irreconcilable clash of green principles with traditional development imperatives. The independents withdrew their support for Labor following one too many displays, in Westcombe's (1990:193) terms, of its dedication 'to a program of ecologically destructive economic expansionism', i.e. its attempt to legislate the hand over of Tasmania's native forests as a secure resource to its predominantly woodchip and pulpwood forestry industry (Hay & Eckersley 1993).



Locality Maps 1.2 - Ecopolitical Dispute Locations
(Source: Base Map Dept. of Environment & Land Management).

Despite the impressive achievements of over twenty years, I argue in this thesis that Tasmania's greening has actually seen bi-partisan antipathy to ecological interests entrenched in the state, and that the persistent clash between dominant industrial and alternate ecological values continues to constrain the efficacy of future environmental

demands. This clash of values lies not only at the heart of the Accord's failure (McCall 1993), but at the heart of routine and divisive disputes in which conservationists, environmentalists and development opponents are vilified as 'rat-bag greenie anti-Tasmanians', whilst development proponents are lauded as 'good corporate citizens' and 'pro-Tasmanian' (Crowley 1989:53). In a small island state of less than four hundred thousand people, with limited employment options, and an economy reliant upon resource exploitation, 'growthist-greenie' conflict, in Kirkpatrick's (1986:2-4) terms, has intruded deeply into Tasmanian life.

The 'greenie anti-Tasmanian' label was fashioned when state rights emotions were running high after the Franklin dam had been thwarted by federal government intervention that was upheld by the High Court. It affords rhetorical advantage to development proponents, and shapes not only environmental and land use disputes, but planning and urban conflicts, out of all context to the issues at hand (Crowley 1989:53). The danger of this sort of ritualised conflict, as Hay (1987:7) argues, is that it reinforces adherence to dominant ideology, heightening the stakes of conflict and operating against all but total victory. Liberal governments have used this ritual labelling since the dam dispute to vilify concerned citizens and green activists opposed to their development schemes, and also to stymie the Labor Opposition. Having lost much of its trade union constituency to the Liberals during the Franklin dispute for its own poor handling of the issue when in office, Labor will do nothing to antagonise the state's development clique.[7] So the 'greenie anti-Tasmanian'

[7] The state's development clique is described by conservationists as comprising the Hydro-Electric Commission, corporate consumers of bulk hydro-electric power, trade unions and the bi-partisan political backers of hydro-industrialisation (Crowley 1989:48).

rhetoric also captures bi-partisan political resentment at the green challenge to established politics, and betrays the bonding of old political adversaries into resisting the further greening of Tasmania.

This thesis questions the efficacy of ecological demands in a state that has traditionally affirmed industrial development imperatives and natural resource exploitation with bi-partisan political backing. It is divided into three key areas of inquiry, with Chapter Two theoretically considering the nature and significance of the ecopolitical challenge, Chapter Three discussing ideological contention as an obstacle to the realisation of ecopolitical demands, and Chapter Four reviewing four environmental disputes in Tasmania, to consider the role of values, power and the state in their resolution. Chapter Four details the disputes in these terms, whilst Chapter Five links analysis of these specific circumstances with the broader question of the routine accommodation of dominant values that is discussed in Chapters Two and Three. Whilst there is ample evidence in each of the case studies that Tasmania's greening has been constrained by dominant industrial imperatives, it is also paradoxically clear that environmentalism has thrived in protest at the circumstances of policy constraint.

1.2 Research Aims, Content and Limitations

1.2.1 Argument and Aims

The argument of this thesis is briefly that the realisation of ecopolitical values, interests and demands, i.e. those inspired by the 'new' politics of ecology, is inevitably constrained by material interests within advanced industrial societies.[8] It examines the policy environment in the state of

[8] For the purposes of this thesis, 'ecopolitics' is considered to be interchangeable with 'environmental politics'. Ecopolitics, or environmental politics, is considered to be a politics inspired by ecological concerns. Conservation is not considered interchangeable

Tasmania, finding both a traditional affirmation and accommodation of the goals of industrial development, and a resistance to the more recent ecopolitical challenge to established political interests. Despite evidence of Tasmania's 'greening' discussed above, a review in Chapter Four of the outcomes of four environmental disputes reveals evidence of the routine ability of industry to evoke state support to thwart ecopolitical demands. Without federal intervention to halt the Franklin dam and the Wesley Vale pulp mill, the outcomes of the ecopolitical disputes considered would have invariably seen environmental losses dictated by dominant development imperatives. Faced with the bi-partisan political priority of natural resource exploitation and hydro-industrialisation that was incrementally encroaching upon the south western wilderness, and encouraged by the Hare-Clark system of proportional representation, it was inevitable that Tasmanian environmentalists would seek not only federal intervention, but their own parliamentary representation.

The argument that environmental demands are subject to the routine constraint of prevailing materialism relies upon the conception of these demands as ideologically contentious, not as single issues struggling in a pluralistic way for attention in the policy arena. It is quite unhelpful to consider ecopolitical disputation in Tasmania as 'single issue' politics, not least because linking the disputes reviewed in this thesis is the common assertion of ecocentric values against exploitative hydro-industrial and industrial imperatives. The framework of analysis required for a review of the efficacy of ecopolitical demands in Tasmania is one that recognises the boundaries of ideological constraint upon a contending set of values. It is also quite unhelpful to adopt a narrow

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with these terms, since conservationists have been reluctant to become involved in the political process in Tasmania, as we shall see in 4.2.2. For the purposes of this thesis, green politics is considered to embrace a broader agenda than environmental politics, being inspired by ecological concerns to advocate environmental, social, political and economic agendas as an alternate political party.

policy focus excluding factors such as the constraining effect of dominant material values, the routine accommodation of industrial interests, and the institutionalisation of the traditional development pursuits. The policy based framework of analysis adopted by this thesis, then, is one that recognises ideological, political and institutional constraint. It is informed both by ecopolitical theory, given the deficiencies of traditional policy analysis in capturing the nature of the ecopolitical challenge, and power analysis in addressing policy constraint. This framework of analysis recognises ecopolitics as a struggle between value contenders, and ecopolitical demands, therefore, as potentially limited by the constraining influence of dominant values and industrial interests.

This thesis has a number of interrelated aims:

(i) *Chapter Two* draws upon ecopolitical theory to argue that ecopolitical demands are ideologically contentious, and therefore both constrained by dominant material interests, and requiring a radical distancing of the state from traditional growth imperatives before they can be realised;

(ii) *Chapter Three* examines environmental policy approaches capable of explaining the efficacy of ecopolitical demands in circumstances of policy constraint, and argues that analysis must account for the role of values, power and the state in environmental policy formation;

(iii) *Chapter Four* makes a co-ordinated presentation of four ecopolitical disputes in Tasmania, opening with the policy context and circumstances of policy constraint, before moving on to the detail of decision making, the role of the state and the aftermath of dispute;

(iv) *Chapter Five* reviews the disputes in a broader ideological, political and institutional sense, after Downey (1987:34), to explain the forces that have shaped policy, limited the efficacy of environmental demands, and influenced the state in its determination of policy outcomes; and

(v) *Chapter Six* finds that the achievement of key ecopolitical victories does not necessarily lead to the legitimation of environmental values, and that, until there is a paradigmatic shift sufficient to legitimise ecological concerns, analysis should acknowledge that the efficacy of ecopolitical demands is limited by the dominance of industrialism.

1.2.2 Thesis Structure and Content

The greater detail of the thesis chapters is as follows. *Chapter One* opens with an initial discussion of Tasmania's 'greening', and then discusses the thesis aims, content and limitations. The Chapter concludes with a brief descriptive account of the Tasmanian ecopolitical setting as the starting point for a consideration of environmental policy formation. Chapter One explains the thesis, introduces its argument, and establishes the Tasmanian context for later discussion. The Chapter introduces the argument that the capacity of environmentalists to realise their demands is routinely constrained by material interests in advanced industrial societies, and suggests that the thesis will provide empirical evidence to show that twenty years of ecopolitical struggle in Tasmania has failed to subvert a policy environment affirming dominant industrial interests over alternate ecological interests despite evidence of the 'greening' of other policy areas.

Chapter Two explains the ideological challenge of environmentalism, its efficacy in policy terms, and the limited response of the state to its demands. The chapter opens with an ecopolitical literature review, specifically literature addressing the ideological distinction between dominant (technocentrist) and alternate green (ecocentrist) positions - described by Cotgrove (1982:27; see Table 2.1) as counter paradigms. The Chapter examines the ways in which environmentalism is considered to challenge the established political order and argues that, despite the

persistence of the ecopolitical challenge and the achievements of the environmental movement, it is this challenge to established order that sees environmental demands constrained within industrial society. The Chapter turns to a discussion of environmental capacity and constraint in policy terms. It reviews environmental efforts and achievements that confirm the capacity, even of ideological contenders, to impact within pressure group processes of modern capitalist societies. Despite such capacity, however, the Chapter establishes the fundamental opposition of environmentalism to dominant perceptions of ecology, polity, society, nature and knowledge, and finds industrial society therefore a significant obstacle to the realisation of environmental policy goals.

Chapter Three considers the environment as a problem in policy terms. The aim of Chapter Three is to establish a framework of policy analysis capable of explaining opposing values, causality and the role of power in environmental policy making. The Chapter argues that to discuss the efficacy of environmental demands, analysis must explain ideological constraint as a policy variable and must, therefore, adequately address restrictive policy contexts. The Chapter considers the nature of the environmental policy problem, reviews frameworks of policy analysis, and finds, after Downey (1987), that analysis must indeed acknowledge the influence of broad determining factors upon the specifics of the policy making process. The Chapter examines the role of causality in policy analysis, and introduces power theory into policy analysis to explain capacity, constraint and bias mobilisation toward orthodoxy. The approach adopted for the purposes of this thesis is a synthesised policy model that explains the efficacy of demands in terms of prevailing ideology, structures of power and institutional constraint.

Chapter Four presents the empirical heart of the thesis, describing each of the Lake Pedder, Franklin River, Electrona silicon smelter and Wesley Vale pulp mill disputes - spanning a twenty year period in Tasmania that begins with the rise of contemporary environmentalism in the late 1960s in the state, and concludes with the historic, if shortlived, achievement of a Labor-Green Accord government in 1989. The Chapter aims to capture the political expression of conflicting value imperatives, and to review the efficacy of demands from an environment movement that is acclaimed one of the world's most successful (Hay 1993:7). The Chapter argues that each dispute involved ideological conflict over traditional development practices in a political context constrained by hydro-industrial policy imperatives, or by the industrial legacy of 'hydro-imperatives' after the South West wilderness was secured against further hydro-industrialisation. The Chapter finds that without federal intervention, each dispute would have been resolved by a state policy apparatus demonstrated to routinely favour entrenched development interests, whilst constraining or excluding alternate ecological interests.

Chapter Five undertakes analysis of the Tasmanian material presented in Chapter Four. It argues that the routine ability of industrial interests, in the disputes examined, to evoke bi-partisan political support confirms the limited efficacy of environmental demands within the state policy arena. The Chapter considers the dispute outcomes in terms of value clash, the power of prevailing interests to mobilise against challenge, and the politics of underwriting development. The Chapter examines the utility of values, power and the state in explaining environmental policy and the routine accommodation of industrial interests in Tasmania. The Chapter opens with the historical background behind later ecopolitical conflict from Pedder to Wesley Vale. It establishes the political tactics used by the Hydro-Electric Commission with bi-partisan

political backing to achieve its policy goals and to suppress emergent ecological concern. Chapter Five finds that these suppression tactics were also used in the 'post hydro-industrial' Electrona and Wesley Vale disputes, and that hydro-industrialisation has defined a 'policy paradigm' in Tasmania within which mainstream state political and economic action has been confined for almost a century.

Chapter Six concludes by reviewing the thesis of routine constraint upon ecopolitical demands in view of the Tasmanian empirical evidence. It finds that a broad framework of analysis is required to contend with the environmental policy challenge to dominant industrialism, and indeed with the mobilisation of bias in Tasmania against ecopolitical demands in each of the Pedder, Franklin, Electrona and Wesley Vale disputes. Environmental concern is found routinely constrained in these disputes by ideological antipathy between ecopolitical and conservative Tasmania - despite victory in the Franklin and Wesley Vale disputes, the demise of hydro-industrialisation, the achievement of World Heritage status for the South West wilderness, the greening of state parliament, and other significant achievements by the conservation and environmental movements. Analysis of the Tasmanian disputes finds that constraint is inevitable where ideological, political and historical factors favour development imperatives over ecological concerns. Only by strategically exploiting the overt democratic political arena, interweaving ecological values within the mainstream dialogue and politics of their opponents, have environmentalists ever prevailed over industrial interests in ecopolitical disputes in Tasmania.

1.2.3 Sources, Scope and Limitations

The sources for this thesis are both theoretical (ecopolitical, power and policy theory) and empirical (Tasmanian environmental and political

history and disputes). This thesis was inspired by the author's work on the otherwise undocumented Electrona silicon smelter dispute (Crowley 1989). This study established the inability of silicon smelter opponents to prevail in the formal policy arena to halt the project, despite its adverse environmental impact. It was also established that the broader policy context required examination in order to understand this constraint of environmental concerns. The contribution of this thesis to ecopolitical theory is its examination of the notion of the mobilisation of bias against environmental demands. Its contribution to environmental policy analysis is to adopt a 'multi-layered' explanation of the capacity of environmentalists to realise their policy demands (in *3.4*). Its contribution to Tasmanian environmental political analysis is to link the detail of the Lake Pedder, Franklin River, Electrona silicon smelter and Wesley Vale pulp mill disputes as no body of work currently does. This study is the first to capture, compare and contrast these disputes collectively, and to place them, in terms of policy analysis, within their broader ideological, political and institutional context. It presents, in Rainbow's (1993:323) terms, 'proper consideration' of the concrete issues 'that catalyse and motivate' green politics in Tasmania.

Several bodies of work were both relied upon and inspiration to this thesis. Initially, most inspirational were Crenson (1971), Blowers (1984) and Sandbach (1980) for their studies respectively of restricted decision making in pollution control, the decisive role of corporate power in environmental disputes, and the limitations on environmental policy and action imposed by power structures and dominant economic groups. In exploring ideological contention in environmental disputes, a range of authors were particularly helpful for defining the contrasting pattern of values at stake (Berman 1981; Cotgrove 1976, 1982; Eckersley 1992; Fox 1990; Hay 1988; Paehlke 1989; Porritt 1984; Satterfield 1983; Skolimowski

1981; Solesbury 1976; Walker K. J., 1985, 1988, & 1989). In determining a framework of analysis, a number of works were encouraging in adopting a synthesised values, politics and power approach (Cox *et al* 1985; Davis *et al* 1988; Downey 1987; Ham & Hill 1984; Simeon 1976).

In piecing together twenty years of ecopolitical dispute in Tasmania, and the historical legacy of resource exploitation and hydro-industrialisation, the sources relied upon were extraordinarily diverse and included: Bates 1983; Burton 1983, 1986; Chapman *et al* 1986, 1992; Davis 1974, 1975, 1980, 1981, 1984, & 1993; Economou 1990; 1992; Gee & Fenton 1978; Green 1981; Hay 1986b, 1987, & 1992; Herr 1984; Herr & Davis 1982; Johnson 1972; Kiernan 1990; Lowe 1984; McEachern 1990; Pybus & Flanagan 1990; Southwell 1983; Tighe 1989; & 1992; Thompson 1981 & 1982; USERP 1988 & Westcombe 1990. Primary sources uses to detail the Electrona silicon smelter dispute included Bates 1986, 1991; Burton 1983, 1985, 1986 & 1989; Gillies 1984; Stokes 1896; *Tasmanian Parliamentary Debates;* Walker P. A. 1988; the *Advocate, Examiner, Mercury, Sunday Tasmanian,* regional newspapers, and various press releases.

Hall (1984:87-90) appears to have undertaken the only other 'power analysis' of a Tasmanian environmental dispute with his discussion of the Hydro-Electric Commission's 'non-decision making' in the design and implementation of hydro-industrialisation in the context of the Franklin dispute. The considerable work of Davis (1974, 1975, 1980, 1981 & 1993) in reviewing hydro-industrialisation, project evaluation, energy politics and political economy in Tasmania provided invaluable analysis and political detail. Finally, for insight into the 'ideologically moribund' nature of Tasmania pre-environmental politics, Tasmania's apparent greening, the character of Tasmanian environmentalism and land use politics, and a grasp of ecopolitical theory, I am fortunate to have enjoyed

many discussions with Peter Hay, and a close reading of his work (i.e. 1994, 1993, 1992, 1989, 1987, 1987b & 1986b).

The scope of the case studies reviewed in this thesis is historically broad in covering twenty years of ecopolitical dispute in Tasmania. However, it nevertheless addresses four key disputes in specific terms that seek to establish the capacity of environmentalists to realise their demands in circumstances of demonstrated policy constraint. Whilst these disputes provide a reasonably representative picture of ecopolitics in the state, a limitation of the scope of this study is the range of other disputes beyond those considered in this analysis. The plethora of forestry disputes over the last twenty years in Tasmania, for example, is only briefly referred to in discussion of the Wesley Vale pulp mill proposal. The utility of the disputes reviewed, however, is their representativeness of the 'hydro-industrial era', (with the Pedder and Franklin conflicts), and the 'post hydro-industrial era', (with the Electrona and Wesley Vale conflicts). The comparative case study approach adopted furthermore overcomes the common limitation levelled at sole case studies. In defence of sole studies, as Blowers notes, is their assistance in 'sifting out and defining issues for comparative survey' and in the identification of universal factors (Blowers 1984:9-10; discussed also in *3.2.1*).

1.3 The Tasmanian Ecopolitical Context

1.3.1 'South of the Smallest Continent'[9]

As an introduction to Tasmanian environmental politics, it is important to understand the isolation of the island state, its economic vulnerability, its political parochialism, and its natural magnificence. So small is the small island state of Tasmania that only 'the Mountain', as

[9] As Bob Brown described Tasmania during the Franklin dispute (Bell & Sanders 1980).

locals call the sheltering Wellington Range, separates its capital city, Hobart, from the southwestern wilderness. So isolated is Tasmania, with its small and stagnant population, its limited domestic market, its high transportation costs, and absentee industrial landlords, that its economic vulnerability (Callaghan 1977:94-99) and, incredibly, the 'politics of crossing Bass Strait', have endured since settlement. Indeed, so 'endearingly provincial' is Tasmanian politics, that the failure of a candidate to identify with his own political party has routinely paid electoral dividends.[10] So uncertain of Tasmania's natural identity are these parochial old style politicians in Hay's 'Lilliput at the end of the Earth' (Hay 1992:87), that they applaud as 'novel tourism' the idea that everything possible should be done to make tourists think they are not in Tasmania but somewhere else.[11] Policeman should wear English 'bobby helmets', state forests should be planted with oaks, elm and other deciduous trees to create an 'English image', period costume should be worn in the hospitality and retail industry, and red 'London' double decker buses should roam mainland states promoting a 'distinctly different' Tasmania (Legislative Council 1993).

So 'well and truly forgotten' was this Tasmania by its own country before the Franklin Dam dispute, that it was often left off the map of Australia altogether (Thompson 1982:10). Yet it is no accident, Pybus declares, that

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10 For his twenty years in Tasmanian politics, Liberal MP Bruce Goodluck enjoyed a record approval rating on his very working class image of 'little Aussie Battler'. This was untarnished at election time by any conspicuous Liberal imagery (Thompson 1982:10).

11 A Legislative Council Select Committee inquiring into 'Tourism in Tasmania' endorsed this idea, included in the *Novel Ideas* section of its findings, as 'worthy of implementation where practicable'. The 'different image idea' 'strongly accorded' with the Committee's own view that everything should be done to make tourists feel they are in a different environment when visiting the state.

Further novel ideas were for cable cars to travel up Mt Wellington as they do in Banff, for example, and for a stone wall, complete with a finger sized hole, to be built across a small river in the state's north-west coastal town of Penguin. Visitors would then be drawn to recreate the Dutch hole-in-the-dyke-plugging that prevented Holland's flooding, just as they are drawn to kiss the Blarney Stone in Ireland (Legislative Council 1993).

from this periphery has come the inevitable challenge to the industrial state, a challenge moreover that is a proven paradigm for international political change (Pybus 1990:11). The island of Tasmania is remote, ecologically distinctive not for its long isolation from the Australian mainland, but rather, Kirkpatrick (*nd)* explains, for its proximity to Antarctica. It is a relatively unexploited island, scattered still with the artefacts of Aboriginal ancestry and European settlement, and bestowed by its southwestern wilderness with one of the few remaining sub-antarctic and mountain landscapes in the world (Kirkpatrick *nd;* Davis 1980:155). Early explorers were struck with awe at Tasmania's wild magnificence, unable to call its jagged mountains, brash cataracts and the dense rain forests of the south west 'beautiful', perpetrating instead the myth of a 'terrible waste land' (Flanagan 1985:63-70). A century later, the defence of Tasmania's wilderness changed forever its moribund politics, spawning the world's first green party, the United Tasmanian Group, a forerunner to the Tasmanian, (and subsequently the Australian), Greens. From this small island state has come the practice of revolution in political vision 'that human material needs do not have pre-eminence in the world' (Pybus & Flanagan 1990:11).

1.3.2 Hydro-industrial Dreaming

Faced with its own isolation, and with an enduring, fatal dependency upon external economies - dubbed by a federal inquiry 'the Tasmanian problem' (Callaghan 1977) - the poorest state in Australia turned early to hydro-industrialisation in a bid to offer cheap hydro-power as part of a package designed to attract industry to the state. The Electrolytic Zinc works at Risdon, Cadbury's chocolate works at Claremont, and the carbide works at Electrona were each established during the first world war on the basis of cheap hydro-power, after which Tasmania's economy again stagnated with its most vigorous export for the next thirty years

being its youth. Following the 1930 establishment of the Hydro-Electric Commission (HEC),[12] post-depression reconstruction championed by the Ogilvie Labor Government, saw cement, paper, newsprint, aluminium, ferro-manganese and pellet ore industries each enticed by cheap power to establish in Tasmania (Townsley 1976:3-4). In terms of state industrial development, hydro-industry attraction was Tasmania's sole strategy, upheld by successive state governments, and coupled, particularly from the 1960s and 1970s, to the exploitation of the state's natural resources. Tasmania's 'hydro-response' to its enduring economic problems swiftly developed into an hegemonic ideology, with the advocacy and cross party support of pragmatic politicians and entrenched administrators (Crowley 1989:48).

In its role as powerful de facto state planner (Herr & Davis 1982), the HEC regulated the pace and nature of industrial development in a manner critical to Tasmania's political economy (Thompson 1982:23). As one of the state's first 'hydro-industries', the Electrona carbide works established in North West Bay, Southern Tasmania, ironically only ever enjoyed 'success' as a state subsidised bulk user of power, lurching as it did from difficulty to difficulty until it was pronounced the state's worst corporate disaster on its final collapse in 1981 (Crowley 1989:46). It was in the nature of 'hydro-policy', however, that related industrial development escaped detailed empirical investigation until the late 1960s when hydro-industrialisation first threatened Lake Pedder, the exquisite 'jewel' of the southwestern wilderness that eventually succumbed to HEC inundation. Although the 'hydro-dream' of rapid economic growth for Tasmania has long encountered practical difficulties, it has always been, Davis (1981:53) notes, 'anti-Tasmanian' to

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[12] Initially the Hydro-Electric Department, established in 1914 (Sandercock 1983:16).

comment on uncomfortable realities. Dissent has invariably met with a terse state response (refer also to Appendix 1).

1.3.3 The Politics of Power

Before the advent of environmental conflict in Tasmania, politics in the conservative small island state notably lacked intellectual and ideological underpinnings, its population, Townsley (1976:41) observes, having 'no set views on any particular issue' (Chapman *et al* 1986:117; Hay 1993:1 & 1987:5). As the most decentralised Australian state, region and personality had long combined in Tasmania to inspire a 'politics of brokerage', that has served to eclipse doctrinal cleavages, leaving the policy differences between the State Labor and State Liberal parties 'all but indistinguishable' (Sharman 1977:22). In the absence of political doctrine, it was the 'deep-rooted ideology' of hydro-industrialisation, Hay (1987:4) argues, that went unchallenged for decades 'as the central unquestionable plank in what passed in Tasmania for political thought'. Meanwhile the practice of hydro-industrial development acted not only as a key policy and planning principle, but was fundamental to the domination by the Tasmanian Labor Party of the island's state politics.

Under successive Labor governments, a status quo arrangement evolved between government, industry and administration, further strengthened by the support of industrially quiescent trade unions, legitimating Labor's economic and industrial policy - the parameters of which were firmly fixed by the development imperatives of the Hydro-Electric Commission (HEC) (Crowley 1989:50). For as long as this arrangement remained in place (and under the control of an autocratic Premier) the Labor Party's political power had been unassailable. Although a state government instrumentality, the HEC was unaccountable - beyond ministerial control and the powers of parliamentary investigation, it

routinely escaped empirical analysis (Herr & Davis 1982; Davis 1981:5). Indeed until public discontent over the handling of the Pedder dispute saw Premier Reece lose office as the state's first 'ecopolitical casualty', hydro-industrialisation had delivered Labor unbroken rule from 1934 to 1969 (Crowley 1989:50-51; Crowley 1993; refer to Appendix 2). On the basis of Labor's experience, the electoral success of hydro-industrial proponents was believed to be guaranteed (Hay 1987:4).

1.4 Conclusion - Power & Environmental Policy Analysis

The 'greening' of Tasmania has been a complex achievement given the extraordinary circumstances of hydro-industrial policy constraint upon the realisation of environmental demands. Against the realisation of ecological demands has been unified political support for hydro-policy; entrenched bureaucrats and the administrators within the Hydro-Electric Commission; Tasmania's trade unionists - particularly those employed by hydro-schemes; and, the cultural myth that hydro-development was the key to the state's economic prosperity. The early conservationists ended up founding a radically new ecopolitical tradition in frustration at their routine inability to impact upon industrial policy. As the world's first green party, the United Tasmanian Group offered a political agenda so radical that it still remains threatening to industrial interests today.

The policy approach to the explanation of the efficacy of environmental demands in Tasmania is in three parts, as explained above. Chapter Two considers the nature and significance of the ecopolitical challenge, Chapter Three discusses ideological contention as an obstacle to the realisation of ecopolitical demands, and Chapter Four reviews the four Tasmanian disputes. The role of values, power and the state in the resolution of the disputes is considered in further analysis in Chapter

Five, before Chapter Six reflects back upon the ideological nature of the ecopolitical challenge in Tasmania as an explanation of policy constraint. By tracing ecopolitical events from the Lake Pedder to the Wesley Vale dispute, this thesis reveals the fundamental realignment of politics in Tasmania that has been inspired by environmental imperatives, and finds that beneath Tasmania's apparent greening is an antipathy between 'new' and 'old' style politics so bitter and entrenched that it continues to threaten the efficacy of future ecopolitical demands.

CHAPTER TWO:

THE POLITICAL CHALLENGE OF ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES

2.1 Chapter Outline

Chapter Two comprises three main sections: (2.2) *Environmentalism and its Political Imperatives;* (2.3) *The Boundaries of Ideological Constraint;* and (2.4) *Ecological Integrity & the Role of the State.* The Chapter discusses the ideological distinction between dominant growth based and environmental values in order to establish the boundaries of ideological constraint set by dominant values in the policy process, and to consider the distancing of the state from traditional growth imperatives required to respond to environmental demands. The Chapter examines the ecological challenge to the established political order, the 'mobilisation of bias'[1] against environmentalism as an ideological contender, and the growth based political priorities of the state. It argues that, despite the achievements of environmentalism, studies of environmental policy have identified a plethora of constraints upon the realisation of environmental values and demands. These paint a grim picture of democratic pluralist society, and lend credence to the mobilisation of bias theory whereby issues are organised into (or out of) politics according to the extent to which they conform or conflict with inherently capitalist values (Schrecker 1990:179).

The Chapter opens with a review of ecopolitical literature that specifically addresses the ideological distinction between dominant growth based and the alternate environmental values - described by Cotgrove (1982:27) as counter paradigms, or ways of viewing the world. The purpose of this review is to counter the notion of environmentalism as 'single issue'

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[1] Schattschneider (1960) coined the term 'mobilisation of bias' to describe how the crucial political problem - the management of conflict - is dealt with. Barach and Baratz (1970) used the notion to demonstrate the restricted scope of the pluralist political process, and the indirect exertion of influence (See *2.3.4 & 3.3.5* for discussion).

politics, replacing it with an appreciation of the ideological significance and persistence of ecological concern. The Chapter then identifies the constraining influence of industrial policy priorities upon the realisation of ecological imperatives, and finds constraint manifest as policy placebo, bias mobilisation and symbolic policy making. It reviews the role of the state in policy making, and finds the state response to the quest for ecological rationality in the policy process limited by its preoccupation with economic growth and industrial imperatives. The fundamental ecopolitical challenge to dominant perceptions of ecology, polity, society, nature, knowledge, and industrial society, it is concluded, remains a significant obstacle to the realisation of environmental policy goals.

2.2 Environmentalism and its Political Imperatives

2.2.1 Dominant & Environmental Values

Environmental conflict has been the subject of much analysis - political, sociological and philosophical. Though varied, most critiques subscribe to the notion of environmental opposition to a *dominant paradigm*, or worldview.[2] The dominant paradigm, Drengson (1980:221-5) suggests, is philosophically technocratic, conceptualises nature as a resource, and is essentially 'global, transpolitical, transideological', and 'closely connected with modern industrial technology and its specialised disciplines'. Not only does this worldview operate as a scheme for understanding and explaining certain aspects of reality, that is as a social paradigm (Boer 1984:235), but also as 'the collection of values, beliefs, habits, and norms which forms the frame of reference for a collectivity of people such as a nation' (Devall & Sessions 1985:42). As an ideological reference point,

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[2] See Boer (1984), Catton W. & Dunlap R., (1978); Cotgrove (1976; 1982), Drengson (1980; 1989), Dunlap R.E. & Van Liere K.D. (1978), Dunlap R.E. (1980), Henderson (1991); Jagtenberg (1985), Milbraith (1989:119); Miller (1985), O'Riordan (1981:85), Paehlke (1989:143-177), Papadakis (1993:20-24), Rodman (1980), and Routley (1983).

the dominant paradigm legitimates and justifies dominant institutions and processes (Cotgrove & Duff 1980:345).

	Dominant Paradigm	*Alternate Environmental Paradigm*
Core values	Material (economic growth)	Non-material (self actualisation)
	Natural environment valued as a resource	Natural environment intrinsically valued
	Domination over nature	Harmony with nature
Economy	Market forces	Public interest
	Risk and reward	Safety
	Rewards for achievement	Incomes related to need
	Differentials	Egalitarian
	Individual self-help	Collective/social provision
Polity	Authoritative structures: (experts influential)	Participative structures: (citizen/worker involvement)
	Hierarchical	Non-hierarchical
	Law and Order	Liberation
Society	Centralised	Decentralised
	Large-scale	Small scale
	Associational	Communal
	Ordered	Flexible
Nature	Ample reserves	Earth's resources limited
	Nature hostile/neutral	Nature benign
	Environment controllable	Nature delicately balanced
Knowledge	Confidence in science and technology	Limits to science
	Rationality of means	Rationality of ends
	Separation of fact/value, thought/feeling	Integration of fact/value, thought/feeling

Table 2.1 Counter Paradigms[3]
Source: (Cotgrove 1982:27).

[3] Conflict between the opposing paradigms represents what is described as the 'raiding' by each of their own respective cultural repertoire of beliefs and values, with which each attempts to authorise and provide acceptable reasons for their actions, and by which each attempts to gain support for their respective interests. Belief inevitably fuels acrimonious debate, explaining emotive attacks upon environmentalists (Cotgrove 1982:88).

Countering the dominant[4] worldview, or paradigm, with an entirely opposing 'way of seeing' the world is the *alternate ecological paradigm.* The ecological critique is characterised by a strongly negative evaluation of many of the central features of industrial society, with the essence of conflict between the dominant and ecological paradigm then being the creation of national wealth (Cotgrove 1982:27; Table 2.1). In all respects the ecological paradigm conflicts with the idea of progress currently dominating human society (Satterfield 1983:138;149). Whilst the dominant paradigm is characterised by objective procedure, rationality and science, the ecological paradigm emphasises subjectivity and natural order. As an emerging paradigm, environmentalism brings with it not only attitudes and goals, but a philosophical base with which to justify and direct patterns of behaviour (Cotgrove 1982:27). Ecological values prescribe behaviour which preserves and enhances the eco-system, whilst, Jagtenberg argues, inspiring a focus on issues of planetary survival, ways of life in harmony with nature, democracy and an individual freedom which does not depend on the exploitation of the natural and social environment (Skoliminowski 1981; Jagtenberg 1985).

The conceptual transformation of values into structured paradigms for the purposes of analysis is a convenient one. Nevertheless, it is fraught with problems and contradictions, though the intent here is not to pursue these. Briefly, paradigms are *abstracted distinctions,* describing, for convenience's sake, over simplified 'ideal types', and presenting 'a false picture of tidy and consistent positions' (Cotgrove 1982:10; Miller 1985:22). In reality, the boundaries are much more blurred and difficult to sustain (Papadakis 1993:22). Certainly difficulties arise whilst holding

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[4] Cotgrove qualifies the term 'dominant' as 'not dominant in the statistical sense of being held by most people, but in the sense that it is the paradigm held by dominant groups in industrial societies, and in the sense that it serves to legitimate and justify institutions and practices of market economy' (Cotgrove 1982:27).

ecological values in a material world (Paehlke 1989:155; Cotgrove 1982:50), with implications for inconsistencies between belief and actions. A further difficulty of paradigmatic analysis, is its suggestion that values are contained within boundaries,[5] betraying positivist assumptions whereby reality is capable of being so ordered. It is rather more likely that values permeate and define, eventually to such an extent that one position emerges as distinct from another. Discussion here will focus on factors which may constrain the emergence of an ecological position, rather than wholly concentrating upon distinctions between the opposing paradigms. In considering power, environmental policy analysis, and the realisation of ecopolitical goals, the notion of opposing paradigms is nevertheless a useful one in identifying the fundamental conflict of values at stake.

2.2.2 Difficult Shades of Green

The contemporary Green movement is widely regarded as one of the most tactically advanced of the new political forces (Hay 1989:20). Based on the pillars of ecology, social responsibility, grass roots democracy and non-violence, Eckersley sees the ecological paradigm lending itself 'to a powerful critique of the *status quo* as well as providing a constructive vision of an alternative future' (Eckersley 1988:54-5). In political terms, the Green movement describes its own manifesto as - 'neither left nor right, but out in front', 'where a strong emphasis on conservation and spiritual values may be found nestling up to a commitment to redistribute wealth not merely between classes but between continents and between generations' (Parkin 1989:17; Cotgrove & Duff 1980:347). The political impact of new social movements[6] of which, Offe argues,

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5 Drengson suggests viewing paradigms as 'artforms' to then better appreciate the need to avoid conceptual rigidity (Drengson 1980:225).

6 To Offe these are represented by feminist, human rights, peace, environment, and alternative or 'dual' economy movements (1985:860).

'environmental protection' is one, has been to disrupt the linear model of the political universe.[7] In terms of parliamentary politics, neither 'left nor right' is neither liberal nor conservative but 'alternate', the linear model then becoming a triangle with new politics its apex (Offe 1985:857-860; Cotgrove & Duff 1980:347).

However, just as there are problems in idealising an ecological paradigm, so are there problems in defining 'environment protection' as the basis of a new social movement akin to the others described above by Offe. Firstly, as Porritt reminds us, it is quite wrong to assume that all environmentalists are green for there are 'almost as many shades of opinion within the environment movement as there are within politics itself' (Porritt 1984:4-5). Porritt illustrates this diversity argument with Cotgrove's (1982) three categories of environmentalists: (i) the *conservationist traditionalists* who do not oppose industrialism but hope to rescue or conserve remnant natural areas from the worst excesses of industrialism, and as such tend not to be green; (ii) the *reformists* who, as centrists support the dominant paradigm, do not oppose industrialism, are nervous about fundamental change, and would resent being called green despite their deep concern for a whole range of environmental issues; and (iii) the *radical libertarian environmentalists* who reject industrialism, bureaucracy, hierarchy and technological fixes to environmental crises, who advocate self-sufficiency and personal autonomy, and who are usually green (Porritt 1984:4-5).

Secondly, as Eckersley (1992b:160) has argued, 'theorists who apply new social movement typologies to the Green movement are more likely to locate the Green movement within the humanist tradition and thereby lose sight of its radical ecocentric component or at least mistake it for

[7] See also (Eckersley 1992:151) and Inglehart & Rabier (1986:473-9).

something else'. She suggests that the normative disagreement over the identity of the Green movement 'may be analyzed in terms of the different interpretations given to the *status* and *meaning* of the principle of ecology in Green politics' (Eckersley 1992b:158). Eckersley's analysis of green identity establishes: (i) the *rainbow interpretation* of being green held by some movement participants, including ecosocialists, who see the Green movement pragmatically as part of an alliance of new movements in which ecological concern is *anthropocentric* or human centred, and therefore not privileged vis-a-vis the concerns of other new social movements; and (ii) the alternate, *ecology first interpretation* held by participants and theorists that the Green movement 'ought to be deemed a new social movement in its own right' with an ecological perspective then providing 'the framework within which all social problems should be integrated and resolved'. The ecology first interpretation is itself further split by an 'anthropocentric' and 'ecocentric' cleavage, i.e. between arguments for environmental protection on 'purely human centred grounds' or on ecocentric grounds where wilderness and threatened species are protected 'for their own sake' (Eckersley 1992b:158-159).

The philosophical foundations informing the ecological paradigm have been as contested as its political and social characterisation. Eckersley (1992b:26) notes that 'the anthropocentric/ecocentric cleavage follows the ecophilosophical cleavage that is central to the relatively new but rapidly expanding field of environmental philosophy'. Ecophilosophical thought[8] ranges from the 'shallow', reformist ecological position, which

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8 Skoliminowski distinguishes *ecophilosophy* from *mainstream philosophy* by describing it as 'life-oriented' rather than 'language oriented', committed to human values, to nature and to life itself rather than committed to 'objectivity, to detachment, to facts', as 'spiritually alive' rather than dead, as 'comprehensive and global' rather than 'piecemeal and analytic', as 'concerned with wisdom' rather than the 'acquisition of information', as 'environmentally and ecologically conscious' rather than oblivious, as

focuses upon reforming dominant attitudes, to the 'deep' ecological self identification with nature and the equal valuing of all entities (Fox 1985:26). For ecophilosopher Warwick Fox, the study of deep ecological principles as propounded by Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess (1973) has resulted in Fox's own rejection of the term 'deep' in favour of 'transpersonal' ecology (Fox 1990:197). With this term Fox describes the expansion of the self beyond ego to the rest of nature, the consequence of which is necessarily ecologically ethical behaviour (Fox 1992:11). Within ecophilosophical circles, both the deep ecological principle of non-anthropocentric identification, and the more profound transpersonal ecological identification, will no doubt continue to be contested, to evolve, to inform debate over the characterisation of Green political identity, and to play a key role in the analysis of ecopolitical conflict (Fox 1989 and 1990; Nash 1989; Norton 1984; Sylvan & Bennett 1986).

2.2.3 Transforming Industrialism?

Since its political emergence, environmentalism has been characterised by a diversity of ideologies and utopias as Cotgrove suggests 'just beneath the surface of arguments about pollution, limits to growth, or the population explosion', and offering equally diverse solutions to ecological problems from anarcho-socialist communes to technocratic world government (Cotgrove 1976:23). Even the briefest overview of environmentalism suggests that the green project of transforming industrial society is in fact a *green reformist* or *anthropocentric ecology first* project rather than a *radical libertarian* or *ecocentrist* project. The ecocentrist project on the other hand is *emancipatory*, seeking not to *transform* but to *liberate* both human and non-human species from the domination of industrialism, relocating the 'human emancipatory

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aligned rather than unaligned with 'the economics of the quality of life', and as 'politically aware' (Skoliminowski 1981:28-52).

struggle' within an ecocentric context rather than remaining 'wedded to the long standing tradition of anthropocentrism - a tradition that is partly responsible for our present environmental problems' (Eckersley 1992b:159).

Inspired by ecocentrism, *emancipatory theorists*[9] (Eckersley 1992:21-6), see capitalism and communism similarly dedicated to growth, expansion, the materialist ethic and the domination of nature, uniting these opposing ideologies in an all-embracing super-ideology of *industrialism* (Porritt 1984:43).[10] Industrialism, Goldsmith argues, asserts *humanism* above *naturalism, individualism* above *communitarianism, materialism* as 'the opiate of the people', *scientism* above *culturalism, technologism* over *natural systems, institutionalism* over *self regulation,* and *economism* over *ecologism* (Goldsmith 1988:205).[11] In terms of planetary exploitation, emancipatory theorists see the ideological divide between liberalism and Marxism as overwhelmed by industrialism.[12] The modern ecological crisis is then 'the quintessential crisis of industrialism rather than just Western capitalism' (Eckersley 1992:22). Still dividing

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9 Eckersley (1990:769) describes '[t]he most widely recognised ecocentric emancipatory currents in Green political thought' as: deep/transpersonal ecology; bioregionalism; social ecology; and eco-feminism. Despite their differences, she says these schools share 'an ecological orientation and are critical of philosophical dualism (particularly human/nature dualism), the domination of nature, and instrumentalist approaches to social and ecological problem solving'.

10 Environmentalists, Porritt stresses, reject the 'staggeringly foolish' trade offs at the heart of industrialism - of the environment against material progress, and of the future against the present - trade offs which he claims fundamentally threaten our very survival. Furthermore only environmentalism, he claims, genuinely opposes the dominant world order (Porritt 1984:20;216).

11 Rudig and Lowe (1986:271) suggest that Goldsmith's 'counter idea of an ecological society' is sophisticated, complex and problematic - for leading to 'a number of proposals rejecting women's emancipation and the integration of foreigners, strengthening law and order, and courting the idea of authoritarian government'.

12 Nevertheless, Tucker (1992:201) argues, 'liberalism has better ecological credentials than Marxism precisely because the democratic processes it recommends provide the only feasible mechanism for environmental protection'. Walker notes that '[t]he most widely-accepted political philosophies, Marxism and Liberalism, assume abundance, and their internal logic is incompatible with conservationist, "steady-state", or "stewardship" approaches to environmental management' (Walker 1985:10).

theorists however, as Eckersley observes, is the way toward[13] 'an ecologically benign, conserver society' and toward the post-liberal social and political theory best addressing 'the interrelated social and environmental problems of the modern world', be it 'neo- or post-Marxism, democratic socialism, utopian socialism, anarchism, feminism or some revised combination thereof' (Eckersley 1992:25; also Cotgrove 1976:31 on the lack of consensus amongst utopian environmentalists about alternatives to industrialism).

Most opposed to the notion of ecocentrism and the ideological novelty of environmentalism are anthropocentric eco-socialists[14] and eco-Marxists to whom the environment movement offers no end in itself, but is merely 'a stage in the larger struggle' against capital. Environmental problems to these theorists are therefore 'epiphenomena of capitalism', rather than important in their own right (Walker 1979:29). Ryle's eco-socialist line against the ideological novelty of environmentalism suggests that 'the values of the Greens, their commitment to justice and liberty, cannot be adequately anchored in "ecology" but derive from a long tradition of progressive thought and struggle - liberal, libertarian and socialist' (Ryle 1988:12-13). More recently, Pepper reasserts the time honoured claim of elitism against ecocentrics, i.e. that their affinity is with the middle class whilst their suspicion remains of both capital and labour[15] - hence the ecocentric penchant for welfare liberalist, and

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[13] In fact this is a serious problem underlined by Frankel's (1989:25) comments that the environmental critique lacks 'detailed images of how to organise economic and social institutions which will not result in tyranny, mass unemployment, poor welfare services and so forth'. Unless combined with the insights of other movements, he warns, the green goal of planetary survival will do nothing to distinguish us from the stone age.

[14] Pepper (1993:58) argues that the 'red critique of ecologism is an attempt to pull it towards a more modernist outlook, involving: (i) a form of anthropocentrism; (ii) a Marxist-informed (materialist and structuralist) analysis of what causes ecological crisis; (iii) a conflictual and collective approach to social change; (iv) socialist prescriptions for, and visions of, a green society'.

[15] Whilst opposing material wealth, for example, environmentalists have been described as a 'bourgeois movement', predominantly middle class and therefore well

democratic socialist, policy prescriptions (Pepper 1993:46). Pepper's ideological taxonomy of political philosophy and environmentalism,[16] by his own admission, tends to blur the distinction between ecocentric and anthropocentric green politics. His claim is that whilst ecocentrists consider themselves a 'deep' 'radical' and 'bioethical' green, all greens make social policy prescriptions and there is, in his view, no evidence 'to distinguish ecocentrics from the rest, since there are, of course, traditional political philosophies which are equally as radical as ecologism, if not more so' (Pepper 1993:47-8).

Emancipatory theorists generally counter anthropocentric criticism by arguing that whereas eco-socialism and eco-Marxism would change and control the direction of ecologically destructive modern science and technology, only ecocentrism rejects the core values of industrial society responsible for ecologically destructive outcomes (Cotgrove 1976:25). Ecocentrists would furthermore assert Fox's five arguments against anthropocentrism:

> that it is empirically bankrupt, theoretically disastrous, practically disastrous, logically inconsistent, morally objectionable, and incongruent with a genuinely open experience (Fox 1990:18-19).

However, Cotgrove does not suggest that threat of ecological degradation or catastrophe acts to promote any *particular* alternative society. 'The same danger' he says, 'may be (and is) used as a lever to promote different remedies' (Cotgrove 1976:34). As an emancipatory theorist who

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entrenched growthists with the ability to literally pay for the consequences of environmental policies (Beresford 1977:104; Cotgrove & Duff 1980; Eckersley 1989b; Lowe & Goyder 1983:10; Morrison & Dunlap 1986).

16 Pepper's typology ranges from *anti-industrial, radical, traditional* and *conservative* greens to *mainstream* greens whose aims are radical but whose methods are reformist, and to green *anarchists* and *eco-feminists*, whom he claims share radical aims and methods. Mainstream, anarchistic and eco-feminist greens start from an ecological imperative but straddle liberalism and socialism. From the perspective of this typology, and for the purposes of 'settling social issues', Pepper sees the 'red-green debate' as divided into the two camps of modernism (red) and postmodernism (green) (Pepper 1993:46-7).

asserts environmentalism as ideologically distinctive, Satterfield (1983) argues, not for catastrophe as a lever for the collapse of industrialism, but for the inevitable decline of the 'progress ideology' given its weakness as a belief system, and structural dissimilarity to historically dominant ideologies. Whilst 'progress' merely rests upon the twin supporting pillars of growth and abundance (Satterfield 1983:136), environmentalism, he argues, addresses the four *historical, existential, destinational* and *ethical* questions of philosophy which an ideology will inevitably seek to answer, i.e.:

> (1) where did I and my society come from? (historical); (2) who am I and what is my society? (existential); (3) where are I and my society heading? (destinational); and (4) what is right and wrong? (ethical) (Satterfield 1983:138).

By contrast, the 'idea of progress', although successful in having moved humanity away from the world of primitive societies, attempts only to achieve higher and more complex systems, and to rise above natural constraints - the extent of the triumph over nature thereby acting as 'the yardstick of modernity'. Satterfield's argument is firstly that there are structural similarities between environmentalism, Marxism and Christianity, and secondly that the structural differences between these ideologies and the 'idea' of progress point to the increasing efficacy of environmentalism, and the abating of progress in the Western world (Satterfield 1983:136).

2.2.4 The Limitations of 'Issue Attention'

To summarise debate over environmentalism thus far, it would seem that ecopolitical analysts essentially agree on the emergence of an ecological belief system or paradigm in opposition to the dominant paradigm of industrialism. Theorists nevertheless readily identify many contested 'shades' of green political thought within this so-called new

ecological paradigm - from the 'light' green anthropocentric reformists to the 'dark' green ecocentric emancipists. Indeed healthy debate within the green political 'community' continues to rage on a number of issues from its own philosophical and historical underpinnings, through a plethora of alternate community visions, to differing prescriptions for green political action. Within such debate, the anthropocentric/ecocentric cleavage is emerging to preoccupy theorists as they respond[17] to Eckersley's charge that this cleavage has been largely overlooked in particular by social movement theorists. Such theorists have then either missed or underplayed, she argues, 'the significance of the contribution of the radical ecocentric stream within the environment movement', and have thereby failed to identify the 'most novel and distinctive current' feeding into the Green political movement (Eckersley 1992b:160). As Hay (1988:27) observes:

> It might be concluded that environmentalism is nothing more than a diffuse set of precepts that can be put to the service of all strands of contemporary political thought. Such a conclusion is erroneous. There *is* a set of core values to environmentalism - the values of the ecological paradigm which cluster around the key value of ecocentrism. Ideological interpretations of environmentalism that do not acknowledge this view of the [hu]man-nature relationship fail to identify the essential tenet of environmentalism.

Despite the significance of this emergent and divisive theoretical debate, the ecological worldview is widely heralded as ideologically distinctive - indeed by Paehlke 'as coherent as any of the three classical ideologies of

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17 For recent response see: Weale (1993:342) who argues that Eckersley is caught in a contradiction, (when she seeks to spell out the programatic implications of her position), that 'democratic and environmental aspirations', in her preferred model of social organisation, 'may fall apart if the demos fails to be as committed to ecocentrism as she supposes'; Wells (1993) who argues for an anthropocentric environmental position on the grounds that humans cannot logically hold an ecocentric position and that this in any case promotes an ethos 'without clear guidelines for human action'; and Pepper (1993:246) who argues for the privileging of humans to achieve ecocentric material and spiritual outcomes whilst avoiding the 'slippery slope' ecocentrism threatens to misanthropy.

See also Fox (1990:19-20) for his critique of authors such as Pepper whom he argues commit *the fallacy of misplaced misanthropy* in equating the ecocentric critique of human-*centredness* with a critique of humans *per se.*

liberalism, conservatism and socialism', and with 'the potential to become the first original ideological perspective since the middle of the nineteenth century'[18] (Paehlke 1989:3). Historical, philosophical, political and scientific attention to environmentalism belies predictions made over twenty years ago that 'ecology' was a single issue that would, as Schrecker reminds us, succumb to the vagaries of Downs's 'issue attention cycle' (Downs 1972:43; Schrecker 1990:165). Despite 'pernicious and persistent' convention, it is then wrong, Hay argues, to describe 'environment' as 'mere issue', or indeed 'a single issue' that will fit within a broader issue-context (1993:8).[19] Indeed, even as Downs relegated environmental issues to the ranks of domestic issues that would, after initial alarmed discovery and the realisation of the cost of solution, gradually lose the public's attention, the 1973 Ninth World Congress of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) had determined otherwise.[20]

Twenty years ago, the 1973 IPSA Congress addressed the environment as a political problem with long term effects and catalysing properties that had in policy terms already begun to influence and threaten institutional structure and behaviour (Milbraith & Inscho 1975). 'Environment' was identified, not as a conventional domestic issue, but as (i) *novel* in public affairs and therefore slowly assimilated into the normal processes of politics particularly given its threat to 'cherished assumptions and

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18 See Hay (1988:27) who argues that 'environmentalism is probably most appropriately seen as a new and separate ideological stream, in competition with the older contenders, and stemming from radically different base principles'.

19 It is rather a comprehensive system of interlocking and mutually reinforcing values, a fully-fledged tool (that is) for interpreting social existence - a competitor not with other *issues*, but with the other great ideological systems; socialism, liberalism, conservatism (Hay 1993:8). See Warhurst (1983) for a discussion of the impact of conservation on 'single-issue politics.'

20 See L. W. Milbraith and F. R. Inscho - Chapter Two "The Environmental Problem as a Political Problem", and L. Caldwell - Chapter Six "Environmental Policy as a Catalyst of Institutional Change" in Milbraith and Inscho (1975) which compiles a selection of papers presented to the Congress.

personal economic interests'; (ii) *general* in that 'environment represents qualities accessible to entire populations and is not easily reduced to specific, individual, personal interests'; (iii) *expansive* with ultimate boundaries that remain obscure in advance of experience and with policy therefore directed at 'moving targets', and; (iv) *incompatible* with 'the specialised institutional hierarchies and professionalism that characterises modern industrial society', given the 'interdisciplinary or holistic approach of ecology' (Caldwell 1975:98-100).

The limitation of Downs's (1972:39-41) issue cycle, on the other hand, is that it is narrowly focused upon the stages of public attention to discrete environmental issues without any reference to greater contextual debate over the character of the ecopolitical challenge or the emergence of a global environmental movement. Instead, Downs describes: (1) *the pre-problem stage*: where a problem exists, is recognised by experts and groups in the field, and is usually far worse than when it finally receives public recognition; (2) *alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm*: where the general public is alerted to an issue and there is enthusiasm for dealing with it; (3) *realising the significant cost of progress*: people realise that the cost of actually solving the problem is likely to be very high; (4) *gradual decline of public interest*: new issues drive out the old, which in any case has suffered from the 'hurdle' of cost realisation, and; (5) *post problem stage*: where the issue loses its primary position on the agenda, receives only spasmodic attention, and is just ahead of (1).

Rarely quoted[21] by supporters or detractors, however, is Downs's (1972:43) concession that unlike many other social issues, environmental issues may well endure despite the vagaries of his issue attention cycle. Indeed Downs expected concern about the environment to linger rather than to

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21 Sandbach (1980:33) appears to be a rare exception in his critique of Downs.

expeditiously complete the attention cycle. Certain features, he conceded, protect 'environment' from 'the rapid decline in public interest typical of many other recent issues', - such as the broad nature of environmental problems, and the potential for broad public concern over such problems to overcome political divisiveness. He also concedes that the hurdle of cost realisation may be overcome where blame for a problem, pollution for example, can be easily attributed to industry, and where the cost to industry of resolving the problem can be defrayed by higher prices to the consumer. Indeed, by his own analysis, ecology fails the test of Downs's issue attention thesis, particularly with his projection of the growth of an environmental protection industry and the institutionalisation of related bureaucratic programs. Downs concludes with an unconvincing and, in hindsight, a flawed qualification that, despite signs of issue sustainability, the American public's capacity for easy boredom will hasten the demise of ecology as a public concern (Downs 1972:46-50).

2.2.5 Legitimation and the Clash of Values

Sandbach argues that the apparent decline in environmental concern in the early 1970s could never be accounted for by Downs's pluralist view of issue attention. Inflation and unemployment had brought about a swift end, at this time, to a period of unparalleled economic expansion and social change. In this climate, Sandbach argues, there was more than a shift of public concern away from environmental issues. Anti-growth and limits to growth concerns were dismissed, he suggests, for their clash with dominant economic imperatives (Sandbach 1980:33-34). To comprehend this, a materialist understanding is required stressing 'the importance of the economic and social base for concern', and the processes by which conflict and conflicting interests are accommodated through debate, institutional change and legislation. Sandbach's (1980:35-36) *conflict-accommodation* model describes: (1) a *pre-issue stage;* (2)

political agitation and *proposals;* (3) a *clash with capital interests;* (4) an *accommodation of differing interests* with the development of new institutions, legislative compromise, explanation and apparent solutions; and (5) subsequent *issue decline* as the process of accommodation reduces the threat of the social problem, either comprehensively or in an ineffective, piecemeal fashion.

In 1980, when Sandbach was reviewing Downs's model, there appeared to be declining environmental concern, and indeed a shift of attention to other issues. It was not then apparent that environmentalism would persist as a social issue and intensify as a political force, although not for the reasons outlined by Downs in the qualifications to his attention cycle, as will be discussed shortly. Downs offers a superficial analysis of issue politics from a mainstream pluralist perspective that his supporters embrace uncritically, for example in 'writing *environment* off' as having declined into the *post-problem* period (Richardson & Jordan 1985:90). In Eckersley's terms, these supporters 'miss or underplay' environmental politics which they describe as a 'loosely arranged bundle[22] of causes and controversies' commanding cyclical attention that existing institutional structures then adequately accommodate by processes of adaption (Kellow & Moon 1993:245, 252-253). This analysis misses what Leiss (1979:258) describes as the dual 'demand-perspective' significance of environmental issues, where explicit demands may be made for governments to resolve single issues, however motivated by a broad ecological critique of society.

In Sandbach's terms, there are critical problems with Downs's pluralist attention cycle. Firstly, it ignores the fundamental conflict of interest between environment and capital underlying issue emergence, (which, as we have seen, contributes to the distinctive characterisation of the

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[22] From Downs' (1972:50) 'bundle of issues' called *improving the environment.*

Green movement); secondly it fails to identify pressure from capital to 'confine issues to safe areas of debate' in accommodating concern; and, ultimately, it fails to account for the support by economic interests of ideologies ('comprising beliefs, theories and ideas') that 'serve their own interests'. Issue analysis consequently fails to identify the dominance of ideas that marginalise environmental concerns whilst appearing to resolve them (Sandbach 1980:36-38). An alternate critique would, as Cotgrove and Duff's does, emphasise the essence of conflict between the dominant industrial and the alternate environmental paradigms, and the consequences of this in terms of the realisation of opposing value imperatives, emphasise that is: (i) the fundamental difference in belief about nature, economy, politics and society; (ii) the hegemony of dominant ideology which 'legitimates the institutions and politics of industrial capitalism'; and (iii) because of its 'taken for granted character', the ability of the dominant social paradigm to 'systematically repress the articulation of alternate viewpoints' (Cotgrove & Duff 1980:345-347).

The hurdle that environmentalism faces, in the light of a broad critique that acknowledges environmental opposition to industrialism and the hegemony of economic imperatives, is the hurdle of *issue legitimisation*. The struggle for legitimisation is a struggle to revise the power relations between prevailing economic and contending environmental values. An issue achieves legitimacy, Solesbury argues, where it is *generalised* beyond a particular instance, attracts party political support, prompts a government policy response, becomes associated with wider values, and, in the process of gaining legitimacy, stimulates the evolution of new values. Environmental demands face particular ideological difficulties in seeking legitimacy, however, given the preoccupation of political parties with economic growth and exploitative ideology, and their shying away from environmental ideology and its anti-growth imperatives (Solesbury

1976:388). Giddens argues that, within advanced capitalist societies, it is prevailing ideology that sets the boundaries within which decisions will be made, influencing the kinds of issues that may develop, and limiting the possible policy options for consideration (Giddens 1981:200). In these terms, groups in tune with dominant values will have a significantly greater chance of gaining attention, influencing policy and achieving legitimacy than environmentalists, who are antagonists of dominant economic goals, and relative political outsiders in the policy process (Cotgrove & Duff 1980:341).

2.2.6 The Persistence of Ecopolitics

It may not have been apparent twenty years ago that environmentalism would transcend single issue politics, persist as an ideological force, and, in Fox's terms, 'unfold'[23] in a plethora of directions - historic, scientific, ethical, social, political and global. 'Single issue' or 'issue attention analysis' explains neither the persistence of ecopolitics nor indeed the enduring inspiration and complex policy demands of ecocentrism. In search of a simple solution to a difficult political phenomenon, issue analysis simply fails to engage with the turbulent debates within contemporary green political theory and so totally misses the significance of the ecological struggle for legitimacy in a material world. It misses as well the transition of environmental concern from reform to radical change driven by the enormous difference that Porritt (1984:14) describes between ecological and industrial values, and the powerful opposition to any real change that Cotgrove and Duff (1980:335) argue has led environmentalists to challenge the central values and ideology of

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[23] Fox advocates a cosomological, 'transpersonal' basis for the identification of all identities as autonomous modes of a 'single unfolding process' i.e. as leaves on the 'tree of life'. The realisation of such a sense of commonality then leads to identification more with the tree than with the individual 'leaf' of our own 'self', and a recognition therefore of the freedom that each entity should enjoy to unfold in its own way (Fox 1992:13). In this sense, environmental history, science, ethics, politics, societal and global imperatives are each unfolding facets of the evolving tree of environmentalism.

industrial society. Kellow and Moon (1993:227), nevertheless, dismiss environmental issues as 'relating to mundane human wants', and return them to the 'linear' politics of redistribution alongside mainstream policy areas such as health and education. In doing so, they misrepresent the character of environmental issues, and the capacity of mainstream systems to accommodate them.

Behind the persistence of ecopolitics is the persistent failure of policy processes to satisfactorily resolve ecological concerns. Ecology remains novel and problematic in policy terms for its recognition of 'the ecological interrelation of so many environmental elements hitherto regarded separately' (Solesbury 1976:380). With such recognition of the principles of wholism, interconnectedness, ecological integrity and quality of life, Leiss explains, emerges a 'new way of seeing connections among different concerns' that is fundamentally incompatible with established interests:

> Neither our market economy nor our methods of public decision-making were "designed" with environmental concerns in mind (Leiss 1979:259-260).

Historically, the terms of ecological analysis are not seen by its critics as new, but are argued to have roots in, for example, Malthus's warnings about population, in the romantic critique of 'mechanistic reason characteristic of the Enlightenment', and even, for its apocalyptic tone, in 'countless messianic movements' (Dobson 1990:35). To such critics, ecology will eventually be submerged as its antecedents have been 'by their dominant and opposed counterparts', by governments, that is, that have managed to reconcile such demands before (Dobson 1990:35; Kellow and Moon 1993:238). Dobson, however, argues that the 'ecologism' born of the early 1970s is indeed novel, not for its terms of analysis, but for its historical specificity - i.e. for 'being posited here and now' and for paying

ecological attention to the 'potentially terminal state' to which the 'slavish usage' of mechanical reason has led us (Dobson 1990:35). Hay explains that '[t]hough conservation and preservation movements have long been with us, the *modern* environment movement is a historical discontinuity', ... 'born to action, inspired by science and led by scientists' (Hay 1988:27).

Leiss argues that many divergent sources came together in the 1960s to turn environmental problems into social issues, and that it was both inevitable and necessary that our political economy would respond by seeking to contain the emergence of ecological concern within its own limits, a process captured by Sandbach as the *accommodation* phase of his 'conflict-accommodation' cycle, with those limits being:

> the capacity of existing institutions to manage problems in such a way that the general alignment of established social interests - such as the distribution of wealth and power - is not unduly threatened (Leiss 1976:259).

That environmentalism has failed to be contained[24] is testimony to its 'unfolding', and to the evolution of the politics of ecology from its early 'limits-to-growth' and 'doomsday' origins (see further discussion in *2.4.1*). Hay observes that this shift was one from 'scientific doomsdayism'

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24 The proof that environmentalism is persisting is readily available. By the mid 1980s, more than one million Australians had joined a total of 800 registered environmental organisations (Jagtenberg 1985), reflecting a growing community interest in political action - commensurate to a loss of faith in decision making by traditional politicians and governments as being in the best interests of citizens (Tighe & Taplin 1989). The combined membership of 1 in 10 Americans who belong to environmental groups is further more larger than any of the nation's political parties, and has equally created a social phenomenon of the discontent felt by citizens there against customary societal values (Lowe & Goyder 1983). In Britain, Lowe and Goyder estimate that nearly three million people belong to an environmental group, a larger number than the membership of any political party or trade union, with a 1983 poll establishing that 12 per cent of the population would vote for an ecology party if it were given the choice. A comprehensive survey of international green politics by Parkin finds that Greens have contested elections, with mixed success, in at least twenty countries, on political platforms which she sees as proposing the most radical redistribution of power and wealth ever contemplated - sharing it not merely between classes but between continents and with future generations (Parkin 1989:216).

to a contemporary focus on questions of ethics and political theory and practice, with the environment movement turning 'hard about' in the mid 1970s when its scientific spokespersons were superseded by 'a new breed of social theorist' (Hay 1988:22; 1989:20). The irony of this 'shift', Paehlke observes, is more recent environmental opposition to many of the institutional practices inspired by earlier generations of consensual, conservative ecologists as mechanisms for resolving their conservation concerns (Paehlke 1990:43). Cotgrove describes this as the environment movement being forced from a consensual to a conflictual framework, and from a concern with reform within a framework of consensual values, to a radical challenge of societal values and the very institutions and practices of the market economy (Cotgrove 1982:10,27). It is to a consideration of why the movement was 'forced' into this reorientation that we now turn.

2.3 The Boundaries of Ideological Constraint

2.3.1 The Difficulty of Influencing Policy

To understand the practice of ecopolitics, one must understand not only the diverse and problematic character of the ecological imperative, but also the policy constraint of dominant industrial ideology. As we have seen, ecological demands within advanced capitalist societies are made where the expression of dominant growth-based, rather than alternate, ecological goals have shaped the structures and processes of decision making, and indeed underpin the nature of the entire political system. As Drengson (1980:227) argues, the technocratic mindset of the dominant paradigm sees 'the systematic application of technology to all levels of human activity, including government and economic policies which have growth as their central aim'. Policy is then not the product of an objective system but of a process that 'assumes, expresses and helps create a whole system of human values' (Vickers 1972:29), in this case the 'web of decisions and actions' that favours industrial over ecological values (Ham & Hill 1984:11).[25]

The industrial system maintains its 'monopoly in social purpose' in the event of a dispute between opposing ideologies, Cotgrove suggests,[26] by routinely favouring the dominant ideology, and must be appreciated in environmental policy analysis. Having established, in 2.2, the complexity and persistence of ecopolitical demands, this section establishes the

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25 Chapter Three is dedicated to the problem of environmental policy analysis given the subversive nature of ecological demands. However, policy in Chapter Two is discussed as an end goal sought by environmentalists.

26 Cotgrove (1982) cited in Miller (1985:25). The maintenance of a built-in bias toward orthodoxy in the political process represents 'norm holding', in Vickers's terms, or the keeping to the centre line and away from threatening boundaries or critical thresholds, beyond which norms suffer radical, self exciting and thereafter irreversible change. To experience such change would also be to witness, or partake in, the dissolution of the existing system, in this case industrialism. Norm holding acts as the necessary control in averting that eventuality (Vickers 1972:34-5).

difficulties that environmentalists face in seeking to influence policy. As value contenders in the policy process, environmentalists additionally face the challenge of weakening the growth-based paradigm, its political structures and its ideologically sustained legitimacy. Such a task would involve refocussing the vision of every day life and transforming the social world away from the interests of capitalism (Gouldner 1976:24). 'Unsocialised outsiders' unwilling to respect the 'rules of the game' within the dominant paradigm, however, find little or no attention is paid to their arguments, and that legitimacy is achieved only by those groups whose demands accord with conventional procedure (Giddens 1981:199-201; Gouldner 1976:249; see also *2.3.3*). The dilemma for environmentalists is whether to resist the political mainstreaming of the 'green vision', or to work within the bounds of conventional politics at the risk of reinforcing the societal status quo which is perceived to be the root cause of ecological concern. Whilst there is strength in resisting the mainstream and playing the ideological politics, as Gouldner (1976:249) suggests, of an outsider,[27] there is equally an urgency to 'rescue the remnants of non-human nature' by political participation in environmental affairs (Livingston 1984:61-62).

The response of environmentalists to the difficulties of realising their demands in a material world has scarcely been uniform. As Vincent (1993:248-251) argues, ecological political practice is indeed as complex and as resistant to type as ecological thought, even more so for failing to follow the ground rules of its own philosophy.[28] Vincent [1993:251; see

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27 'Ideological projection' may afford an outside interest its own unique base of power (Gouldner 1976: 24; 249) to which the evolution of green politics, for example, may well be testimony.

28 Here Vincent is referring to Dobson's (1990:70) view that 'although political ecologists might publicly give human-instrumental reasons for care of the environment, they are likely to have been motivated to do so by considerations of the intrinsic value theory'. See also Eckersley (1993:124) where, in reviewing recent developments in environmental political theory, she argues that:

also Hay 1992(b) in Hay & Eckersley] discusses a serious lack of contact between eco-philosophers and the practitioners of ecopolitics, explained by the former as 'professional rigour and academic compartmentalisation' and by the latter as 'fine words butter no parsnips'. His own typology attempts to address both the diversity of approaches within the ecological perspective and the relationship of ecophilosophy to ecopolitical practice. Both ecophilosophy and ecopolitics range, to add Eckersley's insight to Vincent's terms, from 'light' green reformist to 'dark' green emancipist, with a 'middle position' that is described by Vincent as 'intermediate'. Light green reformist ecopolitics embraces conservation, preservation, single issues, and recreation. It may be 'divorced from the ecology perspective altogether', and it 'characteristically works within existing institutional frameworks and political processes' (Vincent 1993:263). The intermediate ecopolitical position embraces eco-capitalism, social ecology and eco-socialism, and is essentially reformist, however with greater ideological and philosophical commitment than light green reformism. Vincent's final 'deep' ecopolitical position embraces the 'dark' green advocates of 'total value change in society' - such as bioregionalists, eco-feminists, the 'eco-right', eco-fascists and the Earth First! movement (Vincent 1993:264-265).[29]

That there is no consensual ecopolitical response to the policy problem of 'environment' is seen both as the environmental movement's strength and weakness, whilst highlighting the problem of ideological contention within mainstream policy processes. The strength in the environment

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While politics and ethics are clearly connected to, and informed by, particular ontologies, such connections are neither logical nor necessary ones. Both inclusive and dualistic conceptualisations of nature can be used to ground different environmental ethics carrying different social and political consequences.

29 Vincent (1993:256) depicts ecophilosophy in 'light', 'intermediate' and 'ecocentric' terms, from anthropocentric to non-anthropocentric and deep ecological positions.

movement's diversity is apparent in Vincent's typology of ecopolitical forces for change operating from a range of 'light', 'intermediate' and 'dark' green philosophical positions, with change then possible at a variety of levels. Whilst Goodin prefers a rather unlikely single moral vision, or green theory of value,[30] to 'the confluence of various different theoretical commitments and practical emphases' that is green politics, he notes that 'incoherence and inconsistency' is indeed seen by some as the virtue of green political programs (Goodin 1992:86-87). Hay explains, in his own plea for diversity 'at the level of theoretical input', that, 'in generating a green praxis, a respect for the dynamics of internal difference should be the touchstone - just as the preservation of *bio*diversity should be a prime *external* goal of political action'. That 'contradictory activist impulses have damaged the movement' is, in Hay's (1992b:227) view, no cause for a 'single theory' or a 'canon of approved orthodoxy' to inform it.

Diversity is problematic, however, when recriminations and enmity erupt between ecopolitical groupings at times threatening to overwhelm ecopolitical opposition to industrialism:

> Social ecologists attack the deep ecologists for engaging in mystical claptrap. Deep ecologists, amongst others, attack the ecosocialists as still at root being tied to industrial growth, and therefore being part of the environmental problem. Reformists attack the social ecologists as redreaming the hopelessly nostalgic utopias of nineteenth century anarchism (Vincent 1993:263).

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[30] Goodin (1992:15) argues that a *green theory of value* is '[a]t the core of green political theory's public policy choice', providing unified moral vision by virtue of which 'the green agenda can legitimately be thought to form something akin to an all-or-nothing package'. To this he adds a 'green theory of agency' to advise how one is to go about pursuing those values identified by his 'theory of value'.

Eckersley (1993:116-117) identifies a number of problems with Goodin's approach which briefly she calls 'a radical and distinctive environmental theory but an uncritical and conventional political response that takes the institutions and regulative ideals of liberal democracy as "givens"'. Of interest here is Eckersley's (1993:119) claim that '[n]o analysis of power or structural constraints is offered' by Goodin 'and no attempt is made to forge any theoretical links between social and ecological concerns'.

The potential for enmity exists between theoretical positions along any number of axes, principally along the ecocentric-anthropocentric axis - to which Vincent quite blithely makes no reference despite evidence, as we have seen, of its increasing significance. In terms of ecopolitical practice, the differences between his 'light', 'intermediate' and 'dark' greens, is complemented by historically distinctive greens, (from the early conservationists, through the single issue environmentalists, to green political activists), and problematic groupings of diverse interests endeavouring to thrive as green alternate political parties within mainstream political systems, with the most infamous tension being that between the 'fundis' and 'realos' of the West German Greens, or Die Grunen, before German reunification.[31]

2.3.2 The Power of Industrialism

Equally as problematic as the diverse response of environmentalists to the difficulties of realising ecological demands in a material world, is the task of identifying and reviewing the mechanisms acting to constrain them. Ecological critiques of humanism, industrialism, materialism and capitalism, although suited to this purpose, are not necessarily suited to the greater task of prescribing ecologically sound future societies. The intention here, however, is to review ideological constraint and the power of prevailing ideas for subsequent empirical analysis, rather than to engage in debate over contested paths to *eco*-topia. Paradigmatic analysis is a useful starting point for identifying dominant industrial and alternate ecological worldviews and the mobilisation of bias toward 'conforming' rather than 'contending' values. We may ask how, and

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31 'Fundis' or 'fundamentalists' oppose coalitions, consider green politics to be extra-parliamentary and geared at undermining the existing order, and may be Marxist, socialist or spiritualist. 'Realos', 'realists' or 'radical reformers', however, favour pragmatic politics and coalitions (Porritt and Winner 1988:213). For an important update on the fate of the West German Greens since reunification, in particular the obstacle of the new national electoral system, the rise of material over post material values and the emergence of the *Alliance 90/The Greens* political successor to Die Grunen see Jahn (1993).

how well a political economy can respond to environmentalism, given its challenge, in Berman's (1981:49) terms, to the mental framework of a world defined by capital accumulation. Will the political economy then seek to contain environmental concerns, as Leiss suggests, with its institutions managing environmental problems only without detriment to material interests such as the established distribution of wealth and power? (Leiss 1979:267). Or are there perhaps exclusion rules and mechanisms, as Offe argues, built into the institutions and structures of capitalism which, contrary to democratic political theory, constrain political events and screen out non-capitalist demands? (Ham & Hill 1984:74;177).

Studies of environmental policy and conflict have certainly identified a plethora of constraints upon the realisation of environmental demands, lending weight to the mobilisation of bias argument, (discussed in *2.3.4*) and illustrating how it might operate, for example by: consultative processes suppressing proper consideration of environmental concerns; administrative hostility to the environmental challenge to economic affairs (Cotgrove 1982); tendencies to define environmental problems as narrowly as possible (Leiss 1979:262); prevailing elite control of policy making that sustains industrial interests (Miller 1985); developers keeping their intentions secret to facilitate the success of their operations, whilst denying environmentalists access to information (Sandbach 1980:107); corporate resistance to environmental hazard regulation; legislative controls of limited effectiveness (Schrecker 1985); manipulative participation processes; ineffectual environmental bureaucracies (Paehlke 1989); loss of crucial environmental information in the decision process (Socolow 1981:163); efforts to upgrade pollution control thwarted by a conspiracy of delaying tactics (O'Riordan 1981:246);

and legislation which lulls and contains environmental conflict rather than properly resolving it (Dempsey & Power 1973).

Lindblom (1982:334) now relies upon bias mobilisation to assert the power of the market and to question the validity of liberal democratic theory, given the way that the market, through the power of business, can constrain policy options available to governments.[32] In a view close to determinist Marxism, he (1982:332) declares that 'no market society can achieve a fully developed democracy because the market imprisons the policy process'. The market is consequently treated not as a variable, but a fixed element around which policy (including our thinking on environmental protection) is fashioned. Lindblom argues for the need to identify mechanisms of constraint that imprison thought and vigorously frustrate social change (Lindblom 1982:333). He suggests that one such mechanism protecting market interests is an 'automatic punishing recoil' whereby reform, pollution control for example, is suppressed by market threats, such as industry threats to relocate to avoid compliance. The power of the market, Schrecker argues, is the power 'to shape the overall economic context and agenda of government policy into which environmental protection must fit'. To describe environmental policy and to fail to 'acknowledge the uniquely powerful position of business in political life' is then to describe Frankenstein 'with the monster left out' (Schrecker 1985:10).

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[32] Once one of the leading proponents of pluralism, Lindblom (1983:384) recently conceded that his arguments on the privileged position of business and on 'circularity through indoctrination' are antagonistic to the pluralist concept 'that while many social groups are involved in political activity, this activity is constrained because the political agenda is biased in favour of corporate power' (Lindblom in Cox *et al* 1985:224-231).

Galligan (1984:87) notes that Lindblom now argues that politics is pluralistic on secondary rather than primary issues, with even many secondary issues settled between business and government officials.

Perhaps the most influential study of agenda control, bias mobilisation, non-decision making and politically enforced neglect of environmental concern is Crenson's study of the 'unpolitics' of air pollution, (discussed below, also in *3.2.3*). This demonstrates empirically the relative power of industrial interests in Gary and East Chicago, USA, to prevent air pollution from becoming a political issue (Crenson 1971). Crenson finds politically imposed limitations upon the scope of decision making, which is then channelled and restricted by the process of non-decision making, or enforced neglect. He identifies the power reputations of people and groups in the community as potentially deterring action on sensitive environmental or political issues. Power in these circumstances is then not only of the ability to influence existing political issues, but to define and control issue emergence, whilst stunting the political consciousness of the public by excluding certain issues such as pollution from the agenda, and, incidentally, by occasionally denying would-be leaders their opportunity to achieve prominence (Crenson 1971:21; see *3.2.3* for further discussion). Blowers (1983:407) finds similar evidence of suppression of the air pollution issue in his case study of the London Brick dispute discussed in *3.2.4*, whilst Schrecker (1985:10) suggests corporate polluters are protecting their own privilege by resisting the 'opening-up of access to information and of participation in the regulatory process'.

2.3.3 Communicative Distortion as Policy Privilege

The ecological imperative is further impeded by a failure of discourse within industrial societies to appreciate and accommodate core ecological values, a failure that Cotgrove argues threatens the legitimacy of the political system. He explains that whilst communication problems have, in the last two decades, been couched in terms of the need for improved access and attention to more meaningful participation, the problem of understanding is in fact deep rooted between the opposing values of the

industrial and ecological paradigms - within which '[f]acts are interpreted and acquire meaning':

> It is because protagonists to the debate approach issues from different cultural contexts, which generate different and conflicting implicit meanings, that there is mutual exasperation and charges and counter charges of irrationality and unreason. What is sensible from one point of view is nonsense from another. It is the implicit, self-evident, taken-for-granted character of paradigms which clogs the channels of communication (Cotgrove 1982:82).

Fundamentally at issue are competing values, with rationality a policy privilege of the dominant rather than the ecological paradigm. As Table 2.1 shows, 'knowledge' in the dominant paradigm is characterised by confidence in science,[33] the rationality of means, and the separation of fact/value and thought/feeling, whereas the ecological paradigm sees 'knowledge' characterised by belief in the limits to science, the rationality of ends, and the integration of fact/value, and thought/feeling.

The objections of environmentalists to natural resource exploitation, to the nuclear power industry, to the terms of public debate and inquiries, or to environmental decision making processes which fail to accommodate ecological concern, are typically seen as irrational from the perspective of the dominant paradigm, by which 'reason' is a technocratic, scientifically based concept. Science is then a privileged concept in debate about the environment, employed to 'get the facts right' and to find a technical solution, whilst values remain the preserve of 'eco-maniacs', 'eco-nuts' and the 'irrational'[34] (Cotgrove 1982:81). Rational explanation of the persistence of ecological concern then points to the failure of technology, whilst deeper analysis points to a failure of discourse. In his analysis of

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33 Although it is beyond the scope of this discussion to pursue, it is worth noting the debate about the role of science in the domination of nature captured in Eckersley's (1992:104-106) discussion of the failed promise of critical theory from the perspective of ecocentrism.

34 This is a classic tactic for weakening or ignoring a group's demands, i.e. by defining them as 'extremist', 'unpatriotic', 'Reds', or whatever, and heading off the legitimacy of their challenge, or even a basic demand for rights (Giddens 1981:200).

the controversy surrounding the proposed Tocks Island Dam,[35] Socolow (1981:152) explores these themes and concludes that:

> The failure of technical studies to assist in the resolution of environmental controversies is part of a larger pattern of failures of discourse in problems that put major societal values at stake. Discussions of goals, of visions of the future, are enormously inhibited...[P]ublic debate is clothed in a formality that largely excludes a large part of what people care most about.

The dilemma for environmentalists mentioned above of whether to resist the mainstreaming of the 'green vision', or to work within the bounds of the societal status quo, thereby reinforcing the root cause of ecological concern, is heightened by the exclusion of ecological discourse from mainstream policy processes. To 'gain entry' into the dominant discourse, Socolow notes, environmentalists must assume self-censorship and talk in the language of their avowed opponents.[36] Dialogue then proceeds under false pretences, causing participants great bitterness and losing valuable ecological information in the decision process (Socolow 1981:163). In such terms, the environment movement was perceived to have 'come of age', Evernden argues, when it replaced its 'shrill emotionalism' of the late 1960s with 'hard nosed research' and

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35 Briefly, Socolow (1981:152-153) argues for a re-orientation of technology to one responsive to an environmental ethic. He expresses the dissatisfaction of environmentalists with the way in which discourse precludes the articulation of concerns that move them, and of the alternatives envisaged by them to exploitative land use.

36 In discussing Naess's 'formal sense of deep ecology' (which will not be pursued here), Fox illustrates the difficulty of 'a minority group' communicating a radical challenge within 'a dominant tradition':

> The views of any group that offers a radical challenge to a dominant tradition appear distinctly odd, to say the least, from the perspective of the dominant tradition. The consequence of this is that if a minority group wants the views that they advocate to become dominant, then they are more or less *forced* to argue their case from the level of basic assumptions ... in order to demonstrate to members of the dominant tradition that the minority group's more specific views are actually quite sensible when viewed within this alternative (and, the minority group hopes, more appealing) context. In contrast, however, members of a dominant tradition are not forced to do this. The very fact that their tradition is the dominant one means that almost everyone in that society (whether supporters of this dominant tradition or not) will have at least a tacit understanding of the basic assumptions that underlie the more specific views that are expressed by members of that society's dominant tradition (Fox 1990:132-133).

'careful planning'. This shift in tactics may have worked in terms of appearing 'more reasonable', but it also made it difficult to speak of value and meaning whilst balancing objective facts. Any decisions taken to preserve the environment on these grounds enslave nature to human use, and are inherently reversible 'for as soon as its worth is greater as tin cans than as scenery, the case for the mountain vanishes' (Evernden 1985:11). Where environmentalists tacitly acknowledge the societal goals they had initially challenged, they fall neatly into Ehrenfeld's 'humanist's trap' where utility to industrialised society is the sole justification for the existence of anything on the planet. To enter such discourse, Evernden concludes, is to pay a rental fee of 'a kind of emotional lobotomy' for the use of the 'tools of respectability', and so become 'that contradictory being, a dispassionate advocate' (Evernden 1984:11-12).

Communicative distortion, where status quo values skew ecological debate, and discourse failure, where ecological values are lost in decision making processes, represent the kind of evaluation permitted by our societal institutions as simply too narrow to accommodate the concerns of the environmentalists.[37] Socolow proposes a 'more playful discourse', fully expressing the diversity of preferences and emotional commitments of its participants, whilst Dryzek suggests, after Habermas, 'freely discursive institutions' and a new 'communicative rationality' in an autonomous public sphere if 'instrumental rationalisation' is to be undermined, and discourse is to be rescued from the state, capital and the market (Socolow 1981:169; Dryzek 1990:102-106). Dryzek furthermore argues that nature merits resurrection by 'the right kind of rationality'

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[37] McCall (1993:27) presents an excellent case study of this point in arguing discourse failure as the reason for the collapse of the Tasmanian Labor/Green Accord Government in which the Green Parliamentary partners to the Accord found themselves saddled with 'dubious' decision making mechanisms hostile to their own agenda.

rather than by any 'particular spirituality' such as deep ecology. He rejects the so-called 'spiritual' approach to rescuing ecological discourse on two grounds, firstly that it is incapable of addressing the complexity of ecological systems, and secondly, that it offers no effective 'theory of transition ... let alone any practical political program' (Dryzek 1990b: 199; 201; see also discussion in *3.3.5*).

2.3.4 Rationality, Domination & Bias Mobilisation

The difficulty facing Dryzek's project is that the *ecological rationality* he is seeking is logically inconsistent. This is because Dryzek appears to lose sight of Cotgrove's 'deep rooted' opposing industrial and ecological worldviews. He fails, that is, to capture the core motivating values of ecocentrism that he describes as neither rational nor 'enamoured by spirit and suspicious of any kind of reason' (Dryzek 1990b:198). Rationality lends no legitimacy to ecological values, and holds little promise of the 'integration' rather than the 'separation', in Cotgrove's (1982:27) terms, of 'fact/value' and 'thought/feeling' in mainstream policy processes. Whilst ecocentrists seek the liberation of nature from human domination, their terms are such as would rescue ecological discourse from, rather than enmesh it in, the 'instrumental anthropocentric orientations' upon which Dryzek models his own ecological rationality (Eckersley 1990:757). In this, Dryzek follows Habermas and his theoretical break, identified by Eckersley, from early Frankfurt School theorists whereby 'the rationalisation process set in train by the Enlightenment' is welcomed 'as a *positive* rather than a negative development'. Lost to both Dryzek's and Habermas' critiques, furthermore, are the 'utopian excesses' of the early Critical Theorists and their argument for healing

'the rift between humanity and nonhuman nature that has been brought about by the rationalisation process' (Eckersley 1992:100; 107).[38]

Dryzek's pursuit of communicative competence is, in Solesbury's terms discussed above (in *2.2.5*), intended to *generalise par excellence* '[t]he continuing integrity of the ecological systems on which human life depends' (Dryzek 1987b:675). In policy terms, however, he offers ecological concerns legitimacy within the mindset of the very rationality to which such concerns are attributable, albeit in 'freely discursive institutions'. Eckersley (1990b:757) argues that Dryzek undermines his own project by conceding that 'there is no *guarantee* that individuals in a communicatively rationalised society would necessarily agree to give any primacy to ecological values'.[39] His approach is equally flawed for retreating, after Habermas, from a consideration of the lack of ecological rationality within a constraining, dominant discourse, back into a rational anthropocentric framework, in which he abandons domination and conversely the liberation of nature, as a policy concern (Dryzek 1990:101). Habermas's account of communicative distortion suggests that domination rests precisely upon the ability of anthropocentrism to co-opt ecocentric concern, mobilising bias toward orthodoxy with any consensus the product of *systematically distorted communication* within the context of unequal power distribution (Habermas 1970). Eckersley, on the other hand, argues for a grounding of ethics in recognition of 'the dignity of both human and nonhuman beings':

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38 Eckersley (1992:97-98) argues that the enduring contribution of the early Critical Theorists, notably Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse, 'was to show that there are different levels and dimensions of domination and exploitation *beyond* the economic sphere and that the former are no less important than the latter'. They sought 'human' reconciliation with nature by its liberation from human mastery.

39 Similarly, Eckersley notes that '[f]rom an ecocentric perspective, there is clearly nothing in Habermas's communications ethics that would redeem the instrumental character of the technical interest in control *vis-a-vis the nonhuman world*' (Eckersley 1990b:579).

> We need to revise and extend Habermas's communication ethics to a full-blown ecocentric ethics that is informed not only by the internal relatedness and reciprocity imbedded in human speech, but also by the internal relatedness and reciprocity imbedded in ecological relations in general, which, in a very literal sense, sustain us all (Eckersley 1992:111-112).

The utility of the domination thesis for the purpose of this discussion is its recognition of ideological constraint upon ecological discourse. Its difficulty, Goodin (1992:75) argues,[40] is that domination is perpetrated 'by very many different sorts of agents and forces' and indeed by very many different mechanisms, leaving the argument for the liberation of nature 'parasitic on arguments against domination'. However the ecocentric perspective cuts a swath through the various eco-feminist,[41] eco-socialist and eco-anarchist conceptions of domination, and rests the argument for nature's liberation on the freedom of nature *for its own sake,* not for the sake of humankind. To liberate nature for its own sake, or in policy terms, to realise ecopolitical values, interests and demands, invariably is to encounter the agents, forces and mechanisms of domination such as raised above (in 2.3.2), and to experience the counterveiling mobilisation of pressure toward the preservation of the market system. The capacity of environmentalists to express their motivating concerns and to achieve

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40 His own understanding is, somewhat disparagingly, [and seemingly ignorant of Eckersley's (1992) thorough critique of emacipatory ecopolitical theory], that the 'liberation of nature' is a phrase figuring 'more frequently as chapter headings than as the subject of sustained analysis' (Goodin 1992:75).

41 Eco-feminism, in particular demonstrates important connections between the domination of women and the domination of nonhuman nature. Warren (1990:127-128) argues that an *oppressive conceptual framework* 'explains, justifies, and maintains relations of dominance and subordination'. When such a framework is *patriarchal,* she adds, 'it explains, justifies and maintains the subordination of women by men'. Plumwood (1986:120) suggests that whilst much of the literature 'lumped together' under the eco-feminist label must be rejected, what can be salvaged is the valuable light that eco-feminism sheds upon the conceptual structure of domination which represents an important contribution to the western philosophical tradition.

See also Fox's discussion of the dominance of the anthropocentric frame of reference in his (1989b) rebuttal of the eco-feminist charge against the ecocentric, deep ecological critique for its focus on anthropocentrism (human-centredness) rather than androcentrism (male-centredness). Fox argues that deep ecology unmasks 'the ideology of anthropocentrism so that it can no longer be used as the "bottom line" legitimation for social domination and ecological destruction by *any* class of actors' (Fox 1989b:25).

their policy goals in such circumstances is inevitably constrained, for example by their rejection of the ecological trade offs at the heart of industrialism. The setting of environmental standards, for example, Leiss argues, is traded off 'among a wide range of considerations' with the outcome usually 'a rough compromise among vested interests, balancing science, politics, and economy on the knife-edge of potential catastrophe' (Leiss 1979:264). Ecocentric sentiment holds that such trade offs are staggering lunacy that undermines our security, fundamentally impairs our quality of life, and threatens our very survival (Porritt 1984:20).

2.3.5 Greening the Policy Margins?

Dryzek recognises that his aspiration for ecological rationality to inform environmental policy-making from the centre rather than the margins, is unlikely to be realised. Even in the anthropocentric terms that he adopts, Dryzek (using Lindblom's punishment analogy) concedes that the market would automatically constrain policy making if 'environmental mediation' and 'regulatory negotiation' were, for example, to become centralised, lest these processes upset market confidence (Dryzek 1990:105). In Schattscheider's terms, this is mobilisation of bias in action, as a set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals and institutional procedures (i.e. the rules of the 'game') operates systematically and consistently to the benefit of certain persons and groups at the expense of others (Bachrach & Baratz 1970:43). For environmentalists who choose to work within the boundaries of conventional politics, (in the hope of greening policy - if only at the margins), the risk is heightened of their inadvertently reinforcing the societal status quo, and thus exacerbating the root cause of ecological concern discussed earlier (in *2.3.1*). The threat to their essential concerns is made explicit in Amy's identification of an *illusion of participation* in explaining the treatment of environmentalists who participate in mainstream policy processes, most

particularly within recent environmental mediation and dispute resolution arrangements:

> Environmentalists and community activists will be seduced into becoming mere agents of the state and capital .... the very fact of sitting down on equal and reasonable terms with capitalists implies devaluation of *moral* concerns (for example, on behalf ecological integrity as a basic value) to the status of mere particular interests, fit for tradeoff against the profits of polluters and developers (Amy as discussed in Dryzek 1990:105).

To illustrate that environmental mediation is the latest in a long list of 'placatory and symbolic' resolution processes that have co-opted activists and devalued ecological concern, Amy (1990:59-80) reviews policy making techniques over the last decade, revealing that their use has not measured up to expectations in protecting the environment,[42] whilst often serving powerful political interests inside and outside the state. His critique is intended to address the analytic neglect of the *politics* of environmental decision making in a debate so far dominated, he suggests, by concern over the 'intellectual and scientific validity' of various approaches (Amy 1990:59). Amy argues that the *environmental impact statement*, an assessment approach that originated in the 1970s, emerged as the quickest way to silence critical 'eco-freaks' by allocating a small proportion of funds for the ecological study of proposed engineering projects (Amy 1990:63). Amy finds the original intention of making better ('i.e., more scientific and rational') environmental decisions ultimately thwarted, *technically*, through the adoption of a simplified scientific approach to complex subjects that obscured the 'real impacts and issues', and *politically* whereby a political decision was first

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42 Amy (1990:59) begins by noting that much of the responsibility for protecting the environment has been handed over to administrative agencies in the United States. These agencies then developed decision making techniques to 'enable government to manage and protect water quality, air quality, forests and wilderness in a rational and professional manner'.

taken and then the environmental impact statement shaped to justify it (Amy 1990:61-62).[43]

Whilst impact analysis emerged initially to appease environmentalists, *cost-benefit analysis* emerged in the 1980s, Amy suggests, as part of the conservative Bush/Reagan deregulation agenda aimed at appeasing an increasingly powerful business lobby.[44] Cost-benefit analysis simply sought to transfer 'the economic rationality of the marketplace from the private to the public sector', reviewing 'all proposed new [environmental] regulations to ensure that their costs did not exceed their benefits' (Amy 1990:65). An immediate consequence of cost-benefit analysis was its use 'to argue against a wide variety of environmental regulations including the control of acid rain, the safe disposal of dioxins, the control of disease causing cotton dust in the workplace' and so forth (Amy 1990:65). Amy finds cost-benefit analysis to be an arbitrary decision making technique that routinely underestimates the benefits of environmental regulation, whilst discouraging public participation and appealing to the pro-growth administrative agenda. He finds it technically, politically, morally and philosophically flawed (Amy 1990:69). Of interest to this discussion is Amy's view that cost-benefit analysis attempts to rationally put a market price on social and environmental impacts for which there are no markets, whilst actually manipulatively serving political rather than environmental objectives (Amy 1990:66-67).

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[43] One of the most useful functions of the EIS, Amy concedes (1990:63), is in revealing the often indirect and hidden social and environmental costs of development. Information revealed can serve to mobilise opposition, and the process itself has opened up an avenue of participation where none previously existed.

[44] See Vogel (1983:19-43) for a description of the negative impact of the rise of environmentalism in the 1970s upon the business lobby in the USA, and the subsequent resurgence in business control of the national environmental agenda in the 1980s through various factors including the adoption of environmentalist tactics, the impact of the worldwide recession and the shift toward political conservatism.

In Cotgrove and Duff's terms (1980:347; quoted in 2.2.5), the purported 'rationality' and 'objectivity' of the environmental impact and cost-benefit analysis techniques identified by Amy serves to systematically repress the articulation and realisation of ecological goals in favour of market imperatives, thereby confirming mainstream policy processes and power relations within dominant discourse. *Environmental dispute resolution*, the last of the decision techniques considered by Amy, is also found to legitimise corporate rather than environmental objectives, and indeed to bolster the 1990s corporate drive to in fact *discredit* environmental initiatives.[45] Despite the early access this technique offers environmentalists to the decision process, Amy argues that bargaining in dispute resolution is basically a search for middle ground that will *neutralise* environmental activism and not impede economic growth as ecopolitical disputes have in the past. Equally neutralised are ecological values, which, as a cost to environmentalists for participating in the bargaining arena, are seen as no more valid than the right to pollute. Indeed, the moral stigma of polluting or destroying irreplaceable ecosystems is automatically lifted on entering the dispute resolution process (Amy 1990:72-73).

Amy (1990:76) concludes that the decision making techniques he reviews are 'flawed', 'biased', 'far from neutral', politically motivated and 'largely useless unless the distribution of power in society ensures that these techniques will be utilized properly in both the public and private

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45 Basically *environmental dispute resolution*, as considered by Amy, involves a neutral mediator bringing together the various parties to an environmental dispute and seeking an agreeable compromise. *Regulatory negotiation* occurs where a resolution process is formalised as part of the environmental regulation-setting process in United States federal bureaucracies.

Regulations established by negotiation then follow normal administrative procedures of public comment and amendment before they are issued as law (Amy 1990:70). The difference between regulatory negotiation and both *impact* and *cost-benefit analysis*, Amy notes, is that '[i]ts legitimacy rests not on claims to be scientifically or economically rational, but on claims to be procedurally neutral and democratic' (Amy 1990:70-71).

spheres'. Symbolic, placatory political rhetoric about the environment appears matched by a routine favouring of market values and concerns from each of these techniques (for a discussion of symbolic policy making, see Edelman 1964). The ecological imperative then fails to survive these decision processes as environmentalists are drawn onto the anthropocentric turf of their ideological opponents, ironically on the basis of technocratic objective rationality that Amy finds in these instances to be the blatant tool of political manipulation. The 'symbolic legitimacy' sought by governments that establish such policy processes, O'Riordan notes, is evidence of their preference for keeping environmental issues off the public agenda and for non-decision making 'delay tactics' to be adopted where they are forced by public interest groups to deal with them. O'Riordan's (1981:247)[46] own preference is for participatory decision making based upon the translation of community consensus into policy, Yet this approach can prove equally as manipulative, as McEachern argues, for example, where a participatory process promising to 'green' policy making generally, based upon principles of ecologically sustainable development, serves merely as a 'symbol of political concern', indeed designed 'to allow as much economic development as possible within a strategy of resource conservation' rather than to solve essential ecological problems (McEachern 1993:24-25; 1993b:180; see also *2.4.6* for discussion).

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46 O'Riordan (1981:245-248) argues that environmental decision making is a far from rational process. He suggests that most decisions only take place in response to public concern, and identifies four typical government responses: *non-decision making* or the deliberate attempt to keep issues off the agenda, *routine decisions* or the shifting of the onus for resolving an issue onto an administrative agency in line with the limits of its legislative mandate, *non-routine decisions* where the identification of a previously unknown threat requires extensive studies, consultation and innovative decision making with an uncertainty of outcome, and *participatory negotiation* where policy represents the outcome of community views following participatory problem identification, goal setting, discussion of alternatives, and ideally, co-operatively made decisions.

2.3.6 Beyond Ecopolitical Constraint

Whilst 2.2 of this discussion reviewed the environmental challenge to established political order and therefore the hurdle of issue legitimisation facing the ecopolitical project, 2.3 has sought to identify the manner in which the hegemony of dominant ideology may serve to legitimate, in Cotgrove and Duff's terms, 'industrial capitalism', whilst marginalising environmental concerns. The incompatibility of ecological integrity with economic interests established in 2.2,raised the question (addressed in 2.3) of the capacity of mainstream policy processes to accommodate the values, interests and demands of environmentalists. Obstacles discussed to the legitimation of the ecopolitical challenge began with the risk that the political mainstreaming of the 'green vision' may act to reinforce the status quo cause of ecological concern. The lack of ecopolitical consensus on political action, given this risk, not only highlights the ideological contentiousness of ecology within mainstream policy processes, but, as we have seen, is both the environmental movement's strength and weakness. In Gouldner's (1976:24;249) terms, ideological 'projection' has indeed afforded the movement great strength and a unique base of power that continues to 'unfold' historically, scientifically, ethically, socially, politically and globally, as discussed in 2.2. Ideological 'projection' by environmental activists wishing to transform industrial imperatives in the long term, however, may alienate activists who are prepared to accept ideological conformity and mainstream political participation on a short term, issue-by-issue, basis in order to meet the urgent need Livingston (1984:61-62) describes of rescuing the remnants of non-human nature.

Nevertheless, radical ecocentrism remains 'the most novel and distinctive current' characterising Green politics (Eckersley 1992b:160; discussed in 2.2.4). Its critique of human-centredness, the legitimating ideology of anthropocentrism, the assertion by industrialism of

humanism over naturalism, and the domination of nature, indeed often motivates reformist environmentalists prepared to work within the mainstream and to adopt anthropocentric terms of reference in the pursuit of their goals. The danger of such action, as discussed, is not only in the communicative distortion that privileges dominant industrial interests, but in the suppression of core ecological values by a range of measures such as non-decision making, enforced neglect, the protection of corporate interests, the illusion of participation and placebo policy responses, i.e. where the state responds not as an impartial mediator, but in the defence of economic against ecological interests. That environmentalists have impacted upon policy processes regardless is argued by some as well documented,[47] and by others as unconvincing, the easiest wins, according to Dempsey and Power's 'hierarchy' of environmental issues, being those where ecological demands least threaten capital interests:

> [T]he wider the ecological significance of an environmental problem, the greater are the political difficulties entailed in tackling it. These difficulties are so daunting that governments are usually keen to keep the politics of the environment on as symbolic a plane for as long as possible (Dempsey & Power 1973:616).

As Dempsey and Power infer, the greater the ecocentric challenge to the industrial imperative, the more constrained the realisation of ecological goals.[48] This analysis does not rule out the potential for gain by environmentalists, but acknowledges the mobilisation of bias toward the

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47 Richardson and Jordan (1979:11), for example, claim that previously powerful political and economic pressure groups in Britain have to an extent been displaced by environmental groups, and that these have subsequently impacted upon transport planning, urban renewal and redevelopment, and nuclear power. They are confident in the ability of pressure groups in modern democracies to force issues onto the public agenda, whether or not governments or established elites like it, and whether or not they are insider groups with insider status (Richardson & Jordan 1979:83-4).

48 The greatest political difficulties for conservationists were seen by Dempsey and Power to be environmental problems with wide ecological significance - such as the protection of the planet's life support system from air, land and water pollution, the greatest source of which they cite as heavy industry, against which all governments are similarly reluctant to take vigorous action.

maintenance of the 'progress ideology' at the expense of the basically 'subversive' ecological imperative. Inherent in such mobilisation, Sandbach (1980:135) suggests, is access to power and resources enhancing the capacity of the interest of capital to realise its own objectives and secure these against threat. The industrial imperative constraining the ability of environmentalists to achieve their goals may be explained as a *structural power imbalance* that limits their capacity to communicate or resolve their ecological concerns contrary to democratic principles. Such imbalance may operate where access to power is determined by orthodoxy constraining ecology as ideologically contentious; where political debate mobilises bias toward orthodoxy, defining legitimacy exclusively in terms of dominant growth based values; where contenders drawn into such debate experience a distortion of their core ecological values by dominant discourse; and, where the pursuit of pragmatic environmental politics may therefore be at the cost of ecocentrism.

The boundaries of ideological constraint then follow the identification of ecocentrism as a 'contending' rather than a 'conforming' value position within the dominant industrial paradigm. The potential for bias toward orthodoxy to contain the ideological challenge of ecology, whilst frustrating the *generalisation* of ecological integrity as a policy concern within orthodox politics, does not necessarily negate the potential to achieve a broad range of other ecological goals. Having reviewed the ideological challenge of ecology (in 2.2), and concluded that ecopolitical demands are necessarily constrained by dominant values within the policy process (in 2.3), it remains to examine (in 2.4) the distancing of the state from traditional growth imperatives required to respond effectively to ecological concerns.

2.4 Ecological Integrity and the Role of the State

2.4.1 The Logic of Ecological Integrity

Whilst 2.3 finds environmental demands ideologically constrained to the extent of their conflict with established industrial goals, and indeed state[49] response to such demands often a defence of economic against ecological interests, environmentalists nevertheless rely implicitly upon the state to respond to their concerns. In practical terms, Victor (1979:48) claims, it is the state to which they turn to resolve disputes, albeit 'with varying degrees of scepticism' about its impartiality, and highlighting the dilemma, that Walker (1985:2) describes, between expectations that the state should 'create and maintain economic growth' on the one hand, and, on the other, that it should conserve the natural environment and 'husband resources'. This section considers why it is that the response of the state may be constrained when faced with ecopolitical demands.

As Neo-Marxists (O'Connor 1973; 1984, Offe 1985; Habermas 1975) have argued, the state is caught in contradictory roles of sustaining both capital *accumulation* through the creation of the conditions for private profit, and mass *legitimacy* through the satisfaction of human need, promoting 'economic efficiency', that is, whilst protecting 'social equity' (Blake 1986:5). To this tension, the *logic of ecological integrity* adds a further demand upon the state, the satisfaction of ecological expectations, and a further contradiction, an implied radical distancing of the state from capital interests. A brief, historical reflection upon the fate of competing economic and ecological imperatives since the early 1970s, however,

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[49] The state may be defined in terms of its *roles*: i.e. developer, protector, regulator, arbitrator, and distributor, organiser, and producer; its *bodies*, i.e. legislative, executive and judicial; or its *levels* of government, i.e. national, regional and local. Davis *et al* ascribe no life, certainty or logic to the state but suggest it is a 'hydra-headed complex of organisations', and its actions are as much determined by, as indeed they are determinants of, public policy, which often merely reflects the disjointed and sectional problems that emerge from the structure of society itself (Davis *et al* 1988:22; 33-35; Ham & Hill 1984:22-26).

confirms that the ability of the state to adopt the logic of ecological integrity is constrained by the priority it accords both material interests and the growth imperative within capitalist societies.

In the early 1970s, the state faced conflicting pressures. There was pressure from ecologists with the publication of *The Limits to Growth* (Meadows *et al* 1972) and *Blueprint for Survival* (Goldsmith *et al* 1972) to recognise the ecological limits of economic growth and adopt an anti-growth 'equilibrium' steady state in order to avert certain *eco*-catastrophe as 'ecological limits' are reached. Ironically this debate coincided with both O'Connor's (1973) Neo-Marxist critique of the 'fiscal crisis' of the state, and the emergence of the conservative New Right[50] market liberalist critique of the 'overloaded' state and expansionary state policies (Head 1984:37,38; Emy & Hughes 1988:105). O'Connor predicted the fiscal crisis of the state would occur as the expansionary trend of spending on *both* capital support and social investment is no longer affordable, with state expenditure outstripping state revenue, and the state finding itself required to either cut spending or raise taxes. Either choice would lead to a *crisis of legitimation* or loss of faith in the actions of the state. Spending cuts would threaten social harmony by depriving society of state services on the one hand, and increased taxation would burden capital by adding to its operating costs and eroding its profit margins on the other. To this dilemma, market liberalists have added what has become the most constraining pressure on state activity by advocating the minimisation of state intervention in favour of market outcomes, risking legitimation crisis in order to avert a crisis of capital (Emy & Hughes 1988:105).

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50 Emy & Hughes explain that what is 'new' about the New Right is 'the attempt to resuscitate and combine conservative social values with the principles of classic liberal political economy, notably the faith in the market and economic individualism'. The dual goals of individual freedom and economic rationality are achieved by 'reducing the role of government while applying market principles to as many spheres of social life as possible' (Emy & Hughes 1988:105,106).

In the twenty years to follow the emergence of the limits to growth debate, as state fiscal crises have intensified around the globe, the New Right market liberalist agenda has gained political ascendancy,[51] whilst ecological demands for a no-growth 'steady' state have either stalled completely and been abandoned by their advocates as unrealistic and utopian, or increasingly clashed with mainstream economic priorities and thus have made little ground into the recessionary 1990s. Ecological demands in this climate have succeeded only to the extent that they have posed no threat to the 'laws of motion of capital' by which, Emy and Hughes (1988:502) observe, capitalist society ensures its own smooth functioning, with its contradictory processes dovetailing so neatly that 'the whole looks like a "natural" order' (Emy & Hughes 1988:502).

Theoretically the state acts autonomously in responding to demands, its links to capital being to assume a steering role in the facilitation of private accumulation only to the extent that this does not threaten its own legitimacy in the eyes of the electorate (Frankel 1992:23). Given the structural constraints that Bell (1992:210) argues operate on ecological policy under capitalism, however, 'only limited reforms' compatible with capital accumulation, and conforming rather than conflicting with the dynamically balanced imperatives of capital accumulation and mass legitimacy, will ever be achieved. The adoption of a 'steady state' plainly requires major reform in the observation of physical, biological and moral *first principles* that would undermine economic growth if

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51 Australia in the 1980s has been particularly captive of the New Right push for lower taxes, deregulation and smaller government, as evidenced by the extent of government spending cuts, the prioritising of free market objectives, the integration of state interests with those of the market, and the shift of politics generally to the Right and away from non-market priorities (Emy & Hughes 1988:105,136; Davis *et al* 1988:31-33).

As Australia's recession has deepened, environmental initiatives have furthermore suffered from government attempts to 'get the economy moving'. The litany of broken federal promises includes: the failure to act on its 1992 Rio Earth Summit undertakings; the watering down of both endangered species legislation and targets for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions; and the stymieing of the sustainable development process (O'Reilly 1992:16).

observed, yet threaten ecological crisis, such as the potential collapse of life supporting ecosystems, if ignored (Daly 1977:108-110).

2.4.2 Crisis and the Neo-Hobbesian Response

The 1972 *Limits to Growth* study commissioned by the Club of Rome appeared ten years after the publication of Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring,* described by Fox (1990:4) as 'an indictment of our arrogant conception of our place in the larger scheme of things'. The 1972 study argued explicitly that:

> If present growth trends in world population, industrialization, pollution, food production, and resource depletion continue unchanged, the limits to growth on this planet will be reached sometime within the next one hundred years. The most probable result will be a rather sudden and uncontrollable decline in both population and industrial capacity (Meadows *et al* 1972:23)

Although the sophisticated computer modelling upon which the *Limits to Growth* study relied was subject to criticism and subsequent revision,[52] Leeson suggests the crucial point is that for the first time humankind was asked by its authors to restrain economic growth. But their message of ecology (i.e. interdependence, complexity and limitation), she concludes, runs contrary to liberalism and its belief 'that nature could and must be dominated', (in Fox's terms, contrary to 'human-centredness') and has not, therefore, been well received (Leeson 1979:309-310; Fox 1990:9). Two decades after its release, the *Limits to Growth* study has been reworked, and again argues 'that the exponential growth of human population and economic production threatens to go beyond the limits of nature', and that unless the 'social system' responds to limit growth,[53] then collapse in

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[52] Beder (1993:17) explains that debate over the limits to growth was discredited and largely discarded, even by many environmentalists, due to: (i) its exaggerated pessimism; (ii) its focus on resource depletion that failed to manifest itself; and (iii) the debunking of 'limits' arguments by well financed think tanks such as the Hudson Institute.

[53] Specifically, response would require 'a series of measures' were put in place - 'effective birth control, increases in the efficiency of resource use, a decrease in pollution emissions per unit of output, control of land erosion and increasing food yields from land' (Meadows *et al* 1992 discussed in Weale 1993:341).

the 21st century is inevitable (Meadows *et al* 1992 discussed in Weale 1993:340-343). Weale's criticism is that this analysis 'degenerates into an *ad hoc* collection of institutional changes', fails 'to engage with the complexities and contradictions of democratic politics', and so offers an 'indeterminate' politics of change (Weale 1993:341; 343). Weale is not alone in his criticism, not of the ecological crisis that the thesis predicts, but of its lack of attention to political and institutional details in proposing a solution,[54] This is despite the urgency, according to Meadow *et al's* own calculations, for political response. O'Riordan (1981:60) argues that whilst the authors were aware that the accelerating trends identified by their *Limits* model would raise issues that would inevitably go beyond the realm of science and enter the realm of the community debate at large (Meadows *et al* 1972:23), they nevertheless avoided any discussion of their proposed equilibrium state, and so avoided tackling the contradiction of having to draw appropriate solutions to avert ecological crisis (necessarily based upon human perception and choice) from their own deterministic scientific analysis (O'Riordan 1981:61-3).

In the 1970s, the most influential responses to the crisis of ecology were those of the 'Neo-Hobbesians'[55] - i.e. Garrett Hardin, Robert Heilbroner, and William Ophuls (Walker 1988:67). The Neo-Hobbesians, Orr and Hill (1978:458-60) note, 'agree that the combination of resource scarcity, overpopulation, and the lack of a long lead time for measured changes threaten to overwhelm the capacities of both physical and social systems'. In Hardin's 'tragedy of the commons', self-interest and naivety prevents

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54 See also Orr and Hill (1978:457), and Paehlke (1990:48) for similar criticism.

55 In 1651, political philosopher Thomas Hobbes proposed absolute sovereign authority as the resolution to the problem of social order and indeed it is to Hobbesian State authoritarianism that the Neo-Hobbesians turned in the early 1970s as, in their view, the tragic yet necessary alternative to potential environmental 'oblivion'. Whilst Hobbes' inspiration for overarching sovereignty was the fear of chaos and disorder provoked by the religious intolerance and civil strife of his own era, the Neo-Hobbesians concluded that the solving of the environmental crisis required the unfortunate submission to a Leviathan State (Torgerson 1990:19).

the individual from recognising the physical limits of the commons, and only 'mutual coercion mutually agreed upon' can save it from over exploitation and collapse. Heilbroner advocates a Hobbesian state 'as the condition for peaceful survival' given the otherwise 'ultimate certitude' of environmental destruction and the unlikelihood of humankind adopting no-growth economics, limiting industrial and technological processes, and redistributing income to the extent required to preserve the environment. For Ophuls again the sustainable society requires a move along the spectrum from libertarianism toward authoritarianism if the requisite controls are to be successfully imposed upon population growth, land use and resource consumption. The only workable solution to impending ecological crisis seen by these authors, albeit regretfully, is 'authoritarian government capable of imposing strict limitations'[56] (Leeson 1979:311). For the most part, responses to the authoritarian prescriptions of the Neo-Hobbesians have been negative, earning its proponents a reputation not only for 'doomsdayism', pessimism, and a 'lack of faith' in human response, but for anti-democratic elitism (Leeson 1979:312-314; O'Riordan 1981:61; Paehlke 1990:37).

Whilst Hobbesian authoritarianism drew a negative response for its depiction of 'self-centred man who is incapable of acting in the larger community interest and incapable of deciphering the complexities of ecological problems', it was equally criticised for prescribing the 'rather blunt instrument of the myopic, centralized, administrative state' to a 'subtle, complex and long term' though inevitable ecological crisis (Orr & Hill 1978:462; 466). Torgerson argues that whilst in the seventeenth century it may have suited individuals to forsake their personal power to

56 Orr and Hill (1978:459) note that '[d]espite difference in emphasis all three agree that: (1) we are at the threshold of an unprecedented planetary ecological crisis; (2) reliance on individual good will, conscience, and/or education is not sufficient; and (3) democratic institutions are inadequate to meet the challenge'.

a single authority, in the twentieth century the sovereignty concept advocated by Neo-Hobbesians represents the Weberian 'iron cage' - imprisoning the autonomy of the individual out of all proportion to any threat to the prevailing order (Torgerson 1990:20-21). Such an approach, Paehlke (1990:49) and Lauber (1978:217) argue, undervalues the protection of democratic institutions and the purpose for which liberal democracy is designed. Additional criticism of the Neo-Hobbesians is made of their philosophical determinism, the 'reactionary and right wing ideological messages' it conceals (described as 'eco-facism' and 'new scientific racism'), the 'deterministic natural laws' it would prescribe for government, and indeed the confidence of the Neo-Hobbesian project in autocratic rationalism and the capacity of the authoritarian state to cope with the problem of ecology (Pepper 1985:13; Orr & Hill 1978:461).

2.4.3 Beyond the Leviathan State

Criticisms of authoritarian state solutions to the crisis of ecology, its 'politically reactionary flavour', and the elitism of Neo-Malthusianism,[57] championed by limits to growth ecologists in the 1960s and 1970s, has been swept aside by a more positive green image (Pepper 1985:11). 'No-growth vanguardism' faded in the 1980s, Paehlke (1990:51) observes, not because the immediate threat of ecological crisis is thought to have receded, but in part because of difficult economic times, and in part due to the evolution of the environment movement's tactics in pursuit of ecological goals, for example, via democratic participation and the formation of green political parties. This is not to suggest, Walker argues, that the Neo-Hobbesian approach does not offer some powerful insights,

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[57] Contemporary environmental solutions fashioned upon Malthusian determinism remain hampered by its implicit, reactionary elitism as well as its popularly denounced political fascism, for the Malthusian concept of limits was inspired not, as environmentalists had hoped, by an interest in steady state economics, but rather by the desire of Malthus as an apologist for the owners of property 'to protect the interests of the privileged minority in a world of shortage' (Pepper 1985:12-13; O'Riordan 1981:44).

nor that the ecological perspective itself is invalid. Indeed, '[e]nvironmental limits do have implications for the problem of social order', and 'the impact of scarcity on human social behaviour is worthy of serious thought'. However, Walker concludes, '[t]he problem of ecology and its political implications are far broader than the Neo-Hobbesians recognise, and as a result has been dominated for over a decade by hasty prescriptions based on poor problem definitions and inadequate thought' (Walker 1988:80-81). Whilst notions of scarcity and ecological limits continue to preoccupy environmental critiques (Birch 1993:110-158; Brown *et al* 1993:3-21; Milbrath 1989:9-38; Young 1991:1-22), Pepper (1985:14) suggests that the emphasis now is on progressive solutions rather than those dwelling, as the Neo-Hobbesians do, 'on the general hopelessness of man's plight'.

Although criticised for its lack of attention to political detail, Goldsmith *et al's* (1972) *Blueprint to Survival* offers to avert ecological crisis with an alternative decentralised solution to state authoritarianism, on the basis that 'the ecological crisis, in its present acute form, originated partly in the transfer of power and wealth from smaller units in society to larger ones, particularly the modern corporation' (Orr & Hill 1978:465). As O'Riordan (1981:54) observes, *Blueprint* is an 'ecocentric document' based upon 'the ecologically harmonious concept of the preindustrial tribe', and would reverse centralisation with a return to appropriate scale and meaningful purpose, achieving quality existence, biotic rights, low impact technology, state equilibrium, conservation, social well being and full participation in decision making by societal decentralisation into autonomous, human scale units (Orr & Hill 1978:465-6). In the spirit of ecocentrism, *Blueprint* equally departs ideologically from *Limits to Growth* with its lack of faith in technological solutions to the problem of ecology. It proposes zero population growth, community self reliance in

utopian settlements, and a bevy of taxes that Young (1991:7-8) guarantees would cause hesitation from even the most determined of dictators, yet with scant regard for their implementation by the state. Though decentralisation remains, as Goodin (1992:147) argues, a guiding principle of contemporary green politics, Goldsmith *et al's* particular brand is nevertheless condemned for the authoritarianism inherent in its appeal to conservatism, tradition, hierarchy and reductionism (Pepper 1993:191).[58] In the final analysis, *Blueprint* appears as determinist in its decentralisation of state authority as the Neo-Hobbesians are in their centralisation, with neither approach offering, in O'Riordan's (1981:65) terms, 'a peaceful and orderly pathway' toward worldwide *social and ecological justice*.[59]

Beyond the authoritarian Leviathan state and its decentralised utopian alternative, Orr and Hill (1978:466-9) argue, is scope for 'a creative combination of centralized coordination with selective decentralisation' to promote social stability, resilience, enhanced participation in decision making and an approach to averting ecological crisis that is nevertheless planned, regulated and administered by the state. However, given the ideological contentiousness of ecocentrism in a material world, and the structural constraints of accumulation based upon economic growth and resource exploitation in capitalist society, the quest for ecological justice from the state remains complex. Whilst the limits to growth debate has generated no imperative upon state action in terms of the preservation of ecological integrity as a means of avoiding *eco*-catastrophe, unrestrained economic growth enjoys precisely the primacy into the 1990s sought for

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58 Pepper (1993:24,52-53) particularly objects to Goldsmith's championing of India's caste system as a model for attaining a socially and ecologically sound society, his argument for 'absolute', i.e. undisputed, belief systems and common values stemming from the eco-systems model of society as a key to social unity, and his advocacy of the family and *whatever* preserves it as essential to social organisation.

59 Goldsmith (1988) himself retreats even from decentralisation in his later work.

planetary survival by both *The Limits to Growth* and *Blueprint for Survival*. Although ecological determinism has been rejected as contrary to natural freedom, determinism in the economic sphere, Pepper (1985:12) explains, is very much a part of conventional wisdom to which behaviour must conform. We can no more flout the laws of economics, he suggests, than 'we can fly in the air'. Given the difficulties of defining ecological crisis, the notion of an imperative based upon ecological uncertainty, however much more apparently valid or morally appealing than an imperative based upon economic growth and accumulation, has met with minimal success. The difficulty is compounded by the lack of coherence in the differing prescriptions embraced by contending green political philosophies, that offer equally contending, indeed often merely implied, views of the state.

2.4.4 Environmental Theories of the State

Eckersley's (1992) map of ecopolitical thought provides invaluable insight into the diversity of positions beyond the authoritarian leviathan state by reviewing critiques such as ecomarxism, critical theory,[60] ecosocialism and ecoanarchy. Of these, the role of the state is most explicitly discussed by Eckersley in terms of the latter two. In addition, Eckersley's description of thematic evolution in modern ecopolitical thought, reflects rather than explicitly addresses several key strands of state debate. In historical terms, her themes[61] of *participation* and *survival*

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60 Ecomarxists are divided by Eckersley into *traditionalists* and *humanists*, the latter critical of the 'scientific socialism' of the former. Eckersley's discussion is to demonstrate that an ecocentric perspective can be wrested from neither, since neither acknowledge the 'unfreedom of the nonhuman world under *industrialism*' (Eckersley 1992: 75-95). Eckersley describes Critical Theory as a 'relatively distinct subset of humanist Marxist thought', and of later Critical Theory under Habermas as essentially straying 'very little from the structure of the basic Marxist response to the environmental crisis' (Eckersley 1992: 116).

Although not explicitly discussed, the state solution of traditionalist and humanist ecomarxists and Critical Theorists (with the exception of Dryzek, discussed earlier in 2.3.5) would logically be fashioned upon anthropocentric, communist notions.

61 Participation emerged with the 1960s civil rights movements, the crisis of survival theme rose to prominence as we have seen in the 1970s, whilst the emancipatory theme emerged into the 1980s (Eckersley 1992:7).

respectively evoke democratic and autocratic states, whilst *emancipation* evokes the transformation of the state, although Eckersley insists that these themes only 'roughly' characterise the last three decades respectively of ecopolitical preoccupations, with the temporal association a loose one not to be pressed, she claims, too far. Briefly, ecosocialism advocates key distributive, planning and regulatory roles for the state. State expansion would, in the ecosocialist state, be offset by the facilitation of community empowerment, and extended opportunities for democratic participation in all tiers of government.

Ecosocialism offers a stark contrast to the 'strongly anti-statist position' of ecoanarchism.[62] Eckersley notes that ecoanarchists refer, in their use of the collective 'we', to the local community rather than the state, and hold that society is best transformed through 'popular struggles, exemplary action, and local self-help initiatives'. Ecoanarchists generally 'wish to see the abolition (rather than just the shrinking) of the modern [s]tate on the grounds that it is inherently hierarchical in usurping the decision-making power of the local community'. Although many ecoanarchist theorists examine economic and political change 'in only a cursory way', Eckersley observes that their experimentation with the establishment of decentralised small scale 'exemplary ecological communities within the "shell" of existing society', may well serve to facilitate 'what Rozak has called the "creative disintegration" of society' (Eckersley 1992:132-133;182). Nevertheless, Eckersley (1992:182;185) is unconvinced that an anti-statist ecoanarchist framework would best serve ecocentric goals. The handing

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62 Eckersley notes that the tension between ecosocialism and ecoanarchism 'is currently being played out in day-to-day Green politics between the realist and the fundamentalist wings of the Green movement and Green parties, that is, between those who want to take the electoral route and gain political power and those who want to bring about change at the grassroots level and thereby avoid being corrupted by what is seen as the "power politics" of hierarchical institutions '(Eckersley 1992:183; see also *2.3.5 ,fn 6*).

over of power to local communities will not necessarily, she argues, 'make them Green, like-minded and "good"'.

Whilst Eckersley examines the implications for the role of the state of contending strands of ecopolitical thought, Buttel and Larson (1980:339-344) examine the various environmental ideologies likely to dominate under three competing 'leftist', 'centrist' and 'rightist' state structures, after Stretton's (1976) 'socialist', 'liberal' and 'conservative' typologies. Though schematically useful, this method continues to offer a crude characterisation of ecopolitical thought and the ideological basis of conflicting positions. In terms of state structures, environmentalism 'of the left' then advocates 'a decentralised and egalitarian society' as best able to respond to 'resource scarcity and environmental problems'. Environmentalism 'of the centre' advocates 'reformist intermediate' green measures in terms of the 'light', 'intermediate', 'dark' analogy, holds government 'primarily responsible for environmental control', and sees the state as needing to 'balance competing demands made by environmentalists, capital and labour'. Environmentalism 'of the right', finally, advocates 'centralised, relatively authoritarian control', frugality in adapting to environmental/resource constraints and resource decisions to be made by 'by a managerial elite which understands sophisticated technology and complex ecological processes' (Buttel & Larson 1980:339).

The utility of the 'leftist', 'centrist', 'rightist' schema, despite its crudity in view of contemporary ecopolitical analysis, is its warning that 'customary political relationships between classes and groups forged in eras of resource abundance' may well fail to deal with resource scarcity. In the event of scarcity in the coming decades, it is then 'crucial to recognise that

this juncture may yield progressive or regressive changes'.[63] The authors argue that such a recognition may ensure that:

> [any] crisis of ecological scarcity might actually be turned into a grand opportunity to build a more humane post-industrial society; the alternative is to let the shape of the steady-state paradigm be decided for us by accepting the outcome of current needs toward technocracy (Buttel & Larson 1980:344).

In terms of the ecocentric project, Eckersley argues that 'none of the political and economic reforms offered by the various Green political theories examined [are] likely to realise ecocentric objectives in the foreseeable future in the absence of extensive revision'. In the tradition of Lauber (1978) and Paehlke (1988), Eckersley advocates a revitalisation of 'the institutional gains of parliamentary democracy and the (however imperfect) checks and balances they provide against the abuse of power' in order to democratise society at large and to ensure mutilevelled (international, interregional, and intercommunity) decision making at least theoretically compatible with an ecocentric perspective (Eckersley 1992:181-183). Her ecocentric polity reflects Paehlke's (1988:308) call for the 'continuous enhancement of democratic participatory values and opportunities', and Orr and Hill's suggestion for both coordinated reform and democratisation of central government and its ecological decision making processes (Orr & Hill 1978:466-9). Such democratisation would conform to the 'deeply democratic instincts' that Paehlke (1988:292) argues characterises recent environmentalism, with its emphasis upon 'greater openness and greater public involvement in administrative decision making', and the impact of its organisation and mobilisation over the last twenty years in revitalising and expanding participatory opportunities.

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63 Paehlke (1988:305) agrees suggesting '[t]hat it does not necessarily follow, of course, that the potential next wave of resource limitations on economic prosperity will not seriously weaken the democratic hopes and efforts of contemporary environmentalists'.

Eckersley's 'democratic state legislature' would operate as part of a multilevelled decision making structure. It would be 'less powerful then than the existing nation state' and more responsive to the local, regional, and international political determinations taken by 'democratic decision making bodies'. Political and economic power both within and between local communities would be more greatly dispersed in such a polity than under the existing nation state, macro-controls would more extensively guide market activity, and an 'ecocentric emancipatory culture' would, therefore, inevitably flower (Eckersley 1992:185).

Young (1981:3-4) explains that market free enterprise has no adequate incentives for the minimisation or the regulation of environmental impacts. He envisages multi-tiered responsibility generated by the state for protecting the ecosphere and maintaining ecological balance.[64] It is necessary, he argues, 'to go beyond the liberal conception of the state as a modest actor endeavouring to correct for occasional market failures and to contemplate a more activist state taking vigorous steps to protect the ecosphere from the ravages that are an inevitable, though often unintended, result of the unrestricted operation of free enterprise' (Young 1981:4).

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[64] Young claims that political theorists have neglected the role of the state in what he calls the realm of 'natural resources', and describes this as responsible for 'a general lack of sophistication regarding the nature of the state and the capabilities of government' in natural resource management (Young 1981:5). Young simply proposes an ecological perspective as an alternative framework to the market rule, philosophically laissez faire state approach to natural resource usage.

State intervention, for instance, then 'guided by the dictates of maintaining ecological balance' would take one of three, not entirely mutually exclusive, forms:

devolution (where the transfer of natural resources into private hands is desirable);
operation (where the state intervenes, setting itself up as an operating authority with a monopoly over the use of resources); and
regulation (where state intervention restricts the activities of private actors).

2.4.5 The Contradictions of Ecology

Just as ecopolitical philosophies may be criticised for their contending, often implied utopian state and anti-state societies, so the revitalisation and enhancement of the democratic state advocated by *participatory* ecopolitical theorists may be treated with caution where it fails to address the obstacle of economic constraint discussed in *2.4.1* upon the 'flowering' of ecocentrism. Bell (1992:209) argues that 'ecology's emphasis on limits, on non-material needs, and on careful economic planning, strike at the heart of capitalism's expansive thrust and its individualistic economic practices'. The 'fundamentally anti-capitalist and subversive' nature of the doctrine of ecology that Bell describes must be addressed before the difficulty of squeezing the *logic of ecological integrity* between the state's *accumulation* and *legitimation* functions can be appreciated. Simply put by Walker (1989:38), the obstacle of economic constraint upon the goal of ecological integrity, is that the state will limit its responses to environmental issues 'at the dictation of perceived strategic and economic necessity'. In terms of enhanced democracy, Paehlke concedes that future environmental protection in such a state may nevertheless 'require economic constraints that are greater than, or different than, a democratic majority might be willing to tolerate' (Paehlke 1988:305). Equally problematic may be the contradiction Weale foresees of a democratic polity such as Eckersley's that has imposed *a priori* ecocentric constraints upon the outcome of discussion and debate (Weale 1993:342; discussed in *2.2.4, fn 17*). Indeed, with capitalism reliant upon relentless economic growth, as Bell argues, and likely to prove incompatible with 'long term ecologically viability', then a viable ecological society, it follows, must necessarily be non-capitalist (Bell 1992:211).

In terms of overcoming economic constraint as an obstacle to ecological integrity, Eckersley's framework of decentralised economic and political power is promising at least for acknowledging Lauber's argument that growth to the detriment of the environment is pursued not by the populace but by political and economic elites. According to this view, the obstacle of economic constraint should be addressed not by centralising state power and issuing deterministic 'natural' laws, but by checking elite power, thereby checking growth. The democratised state would then restrain, limit and break down the concentration of elite power - a purpose for which Lauber argues, 'liberal democracy is rather well fitted', and suggested as possible within Eckersley's ecocentric polity (Lauber 1978:200; Walker 1989:36-37; Eckersley 1992:184; Paehlke 1988:305). Against such faith in democratisation and the capacity of an enhanced democracy to realise ecocentric goals, Dryzek explores the non-capitalist alternative, invoking Hardin's ecologically tragic 'unreliability of the individual'. Dryzek holds that 'ecological rationality' should take priority over competing forms of reason in collective choices with an impact upon ecological integrity. An open, emancipated society is thus seen as potentially lacking pragmatism, co-ordination and the ability to solve ecological concerns, particularly where democratic market systems are retained and continue to respond more readily to corporate rather than ecocentric imperatives[65] (Dryzek 1987:58-59). Despite its anthropocentric limitations, discussed in *2.3.4*, Dryzek's approach is a worthy attempt to rescue ecology from the constraints of state, capital and market, and to offer it refuge in an 'autonomous public sphere' with immunity from the state. Dryzek concedes, however, that the prospects of achieving such autonomy are 'dim', given the 'obduracy of the

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65 Dryzek (1987) reviews nine potential societal systems, before advocating open and discursive 'communicatively rationalised' social choice. Market rule is rejected by Dryzek as self interested. Highly structured, centralised organisation is rejected for lack of flexibility, as are both the formal rule of laws and the promulgation of desirable values.

market, capitalism and the administrative state'. Yet he claims that his proposal for freeing ecological discourse is useful for calling attention to the constraining pressures of market and capital upon state action, and the need to counterbalance these with equal pressure from an autonomous public sphere concerned to promote ecological values (Dryzek 1990:104-108).

Blake follows both Dryzek, in depicting ideological contradiction in terms of opposing values and rationality, and Neo-Marxism, in describing any tendency towards the legitimisation of ecological imperatives as an undermining of democratic capitalism. The basis of the state's response to ecological concerns, Blake observes, is that it is deep rooted and constrained within the structural contradiction between 'private capital' and 'democratic social' interests raised in *2.4.1.* The further ideological contradiction between the opposing ecological world view and 'institutionally dominant' industrial perspective equally inspires policy practices that mitigate and displace rather than resolve environmental concerns. Having failed to be resolved, Blake argues, these concerns will simply multiply and, in the long term, threaten the legitimation of democratic-capitalist social structures. The deepening legitimation deficit resulting from unmet ecological demands, however, will 'open new potential for structural change' by the system either adapting or being forced to adapt to accommodate demands rather than suffering its own demise (Blake 1986:3;21). State intervention to mitigate the ecological effects of economic activities is, then, dictated by the extent to which it is perceived to be *system supporting,* i.e. where regulation is to avert an eventual threat to capital accumulation, or *system threatening,* i.e. where intervention seeks to 'thematise the ecological world view' (Blake 1986:9). The extent of the state's incorporation of ecological demands will be the extent to which they contradict economic rationales, undermine

capital accumulation and threaten either the viability of the growth economy, or the state's own popular legitimacy (Blake 1989:6).

2.4.6 The Ecologically Sustainable State?

To question whether the state in capitalist society can adopt the logic of ecological integrity is, as we have seen, to question the extent to which the logic of capital accumulation can be adapted to accommodate ecological demands. The easiest 'wins' for environmentalists, as we saw in *2.3.6*, tend to be those in the hierarchy of ecological issues which most conform (rather than contend) with dominant values, and therefore least threaten capital interests. Profoundly ecocentric demands, such as those inspired by the principles of ecocentric rather than anthropocentric egalitarianism, for example, and those most challenging the central values and ideology of industrial society, are the least likely to succeed. There is no certainty, therefore, that the state in capitalist society will act to ensure that capital accumulation functions, not only efficiently in economic terms, but equitably in social and ecological terms. However whilst state support for capital accumulation constrains the realisation of ecological demands, unmet demands may be equally threatening to state legitimacy. Lauber's, Walker's, Eckersley's and Paehlke's arguments discussed above for the enhanced democratisation of the state, seek to break the *state-capital* nexus by enhancing the reliance of the state upon popular support, thereby enhancing its willingness to contradict capital objectives in order to protect its own legitimacy. In the meantime, given its tendency to identify the public interest with that of capital (Head 1984:41-44), the state continues to rely upon mitigating and displacing as well as accommodating ecological demands.

Despite the diversity of demands from the environmental movement over the last twenty years, the difficulty that states continue to face in

dealing with these is, as Dobson (1990:73) suggests, that 'the foundation stone of Green politics' remains the contentious belief that 'our finite Earth places limits on industrial growth'. These limits have again been making headline news, O'Riordan (1989:77) observes, as the market oriented politics of the 1980s have taken their social and ecological tolls. Short term economic gains are being won at the expense of huge, social and environmental costs, as relentless growth brings poverty, hardship and extensive damage to life sustaining ecosystems, especially in third world countries, with:

> loss of tropical forest cover, widespread drying of the savannah margins, regional pollution of inland seas and oceans, atmospheric contamination on a vast scale in the form of increased acidity and greenhouse warming, and growing alarm over the distribution of toxic chemicals in consumer goods and waste discharges (O'Riordan 1989:77).

In 1987, societal sustainability, long advocated by environmentalists for its recognition of the 'limits to growth', was acknowledged by the UN General Assembly following the tabling of the Bruntland Report entitled *Our Common Future*.[66] The goal of *sustainable development* was, Beder observes, 'largely accepted' by the governments of one hundred nations, and defined as 'development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs' (Beder 1993:3). For the first time, there was an additional awareness of the link between poverty and environmental degradation, and the need, not only to put industrialised nations on sustainable development paths, but to change development policies harming people and environments in the less developed nations of the south (Conroy & Litvinoff 1988:xiii). However, the contradictions and limitations of sustainable development, and its preoccupation with human rather than ecological survival, were soon to become apparent.

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66 This report by the then Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Bruntland was later to be released by the United Nations (World Commission on Environment and Development 1990).

For sustainability to satisfy ecocentric criteria, it would need to *observe* the global concerns identified by the original *Limits to Growth* research (i.e. accelerating industrialisation, rapid population growth, widespread malnutrition, depletion of non-renewable resources, and a deteriorating environment); *adopt* solutions to these concerns, based upon ecological notions of interdependence, alternative technology, deindustrialisation and community empowerment, (Dobson 1990:73-4), to limit economic growth and industrial development whilst redistributing income to the extent required to ensure environmental preservation; and *conform* to the physical, biological and moral *first principles* of steady state economics, including the logic of ecological integrity as articulated, for example, by Aldo Leopold's land ethic:[67]

> Examine each question in terms of what is ethically and aesthetically right as well as economically expedient. A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise (Leopold 1949:223).

Instead, sustainable development has accommodated ecological demands in Sandbach's terms, (noted in *2.2.5)*, of averting a threat to the interests of capital by rhetorically purporting to strike common ground between developers and environmentalists, whilst implicitly failing to adapt ecocentric criteria to the conditions of resource use. Whilst 'sustainable' from an ecocentric viewpoint suggests the maintenance of ecological integrity, Beder (1993:18) observes that from the point of view of 'non-ecological elites' it means simply sustaining a supply of raw materials when the existing supply runs out. The threat to capital interests of 'global communalism', argued by O'Riordan to lie at the heart of the sustainability debate, is averted by adopting this latter definition without

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[67] Specifically, world environmental groups have defined sustainability to include: respect and care for the community of life; improvement in the quality of human life; conservation of the Earth's vitality and diversity; minimisation of the depletion of non-renewable resources; observation of the limits of the Earth's 'carrying capacity'; a change in personal attitudes and practices; care by communities for their own environment; national frameworks for integrating development and conservation; and the creation of a global alliance (IUCN, UNEP, & WWF, 1991:9-12).

then resorting to the massive redistribution to wealth and power that an ecological basis to state economies would require (O'Riordan 1989:93). Sustainable development has been embraced, O'Riordan suggests, by the 'environmentally perplexed', conservative environmentalists, who are nevertheless prepared to forsake earlier demands for a steady state in the interests of mediation, cooperation and an end to the contentious conflict that has characterised decades of environmental politics (Beder 1993:18).

The satisfaction of ecological demands remains, as Walker (1989:38) argues, a major adaptive challenge for the modern state. However, to accept a version of sustainability that denies ecocentric criteria is clearly unsatisfactory. This solution merely reflects the state's interest in averting a legitimation crisis, or loss of public support, by appearing to distance itself from the interests of capital, whilst, to employ Lindblom's (1982:325) terminology, imprisoning environmental interests within the logic and limitations of the market system. Ecological concern is not served by such co-option, nor by the bureaucratisation associated with sustainable development processes that, as we saw in *2.3.3* & *2.3.5*, equally threatens to suppress and diffuse rather than resolve environmental demands.[68] Whilst the environmental movement is sufficiently diverse to enable its members to attempt ideological and institutional change by working at a variety of levels, in theory at least environmentalists can rely upon the state to respond to its concerns where these threaten the legitimacy of democratically elected governments, bearing in mind, however, the powerful obstacle of growth based economics in market

[68] Diesendorf (1993) discusses the shortcomings of the Australian ecologically sustainable development process, including: the hasty, superficial division of working groups into industry sectors; the few women and aboriginals participating in the process; the belated, inadequate community consultations; the dominance of vested interests; the bureaucratic support for industry sponsors of government agencies; the limited resources of environmental as opposed to industrial interests; and the bureaucratic undermining of the process in the documentation of its reports that were so vague and meaningless as to precipitate the collapse of the ESD forum completely after protest from all but the government representatives (see also McEachern 1993; & Papadakis 1993:128-134 for further discussion).

societies to social and ecological change. The enhanced democratisation of the state discussed above may assist, as Lauber argues, in checking the pursuit of growth by political elites, however given its benefit to *all* political elites (no matter what their ideological orientation), it may be as Lindblom suggests (noted in 2.3.2) that 'no market society can achieve a fully developed democracy because the market imprisons the policy making process' (Lauber 1978:216; Lindblom 1982:332). The difficulties of influencing policy formation when additionally faced with the challenge of weakening the growth based paradigm, its political structures and its ideologically sustained legitimacy remain despite enhanced democracy.

2.5 Conclusion - The Quest for Ecological Justice

In 2.2, we saw that despite the plethora of views characterising the environmental movement, ecological values are essentially defined by the four 'pillars' of ecology, social responsibility, grass roots democracy and non-violence, and that, in opposing industrialism and unbridled growth, the ecological paradigm offers a powerful critique of the *status quo*, as Eckersley explains, whilst offering differing political prescriptions for attempting the transition to an ecologically sound future. Section 2.3 considered the hegemony of dominant ideology, its legitimation of 'the institutions and politics of industrial capitalism', and, in Cotgrove's terms, its systematic repression of the articulation of alternate viewpoints. The ideological constraint of ecological demands follows, as 2.3 concludes, the identification of ecocentrism as a contending, rather than conforming, set of values within the dominant industrial paradigm. Ideological bias toward orthodoxy, whilst frustrating the *legitimation* and *generalisation* of ecological integrity as a policy concern within orthodox politics, does not necessarily, it is argued, negate the potential to achieve a broad range of other ecological goals. A review in 2.4 of the capacity of the state to respond to ecological demands found, indeed, that the extent

of the state's response to, or incorporation of, ecological demands will be the extent to which they contradict economic rationales, undermine capital accumulation and threaten either the viability of the growth economy, or the state's own popular legitimacy.

The quest for ecological justice, or the realisation of ecological demands is confined, however, within an ideologically and structurally constrained policy environment, so that the more direct the ecocentric challenge to dominant values, institutions and the industrial imperative, the more constrained is the achievement of ecological ends. The less demands are met, the more environmentalists, having turned initially to pluralistic political pressuring to achieve their ends, will seek to influence mainstream political processes and parties. The threat to the legitimacy of democratically elected governments from the political campaign efforts of environmental activists has indeed achieved results, as is instanced by the political record of the last twenty years in Tasmania for example. However the problem remains, as Porritt (1984:x) observes, that ecological opposition to the dominant world order 'cannot possibly be articulated through any of the major parties, for they and their ideologies are part of the problem'. Indeed there is more in common between left-right political parties and orthodox politics, such as the commitment to economic growth and industrialism that is ecologically harmful, than there is between these and the advocates of an alternate ecological politics that would call a halt to the politics of natural resource depletion. As environmentalists experience a 'filtering' by mainstream politics and processes of those of their demands considered threatening to the status quo, they will continue to seek legitimacy by forming their own political groupings and pressuring for ideological and structural reorientation beyond ecological expediency and toward long term ecological and social justice, and indeed toward planetary survival.

CHAPTER THREE:

THE PROBLEM OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ANALYSIS

3.1 Chapter Outline

Chapter Three comprises three main sections: (3.2) *Environmental Policy Analysis;* (3.3) *Explaining Policy Constraint;* and (3.4) *Frameworks of Analysis.* Having considered the nature of environmental values in Chapter Two, Chapter Three determines a framework of analysis capable of explaining the ideological and structural constraints found to have an influence upon environmental policy and the realisation of ecological demands that contend, rather than conform with dominant social values and goals. A number of case studies are examined where environmental policy is found to be constrained by capital interests and industrial imperatives. The Chapter also reviews theoretical explanations of causality in policy making, and considers analytic frameworks capable of explaining broad influences upon specific policy processes. It argues that because of the ideologically contentious nature of environmental demands, analysis must consider the potential for the mobilisation of bias toward orthodoxy to frustrate the generalisation of ecological integrity as a policy concern, and the policy actions of the state must be seen as potentially constrained by the priority it accords industrial interests within capitalist societies. The framework of analysis used in reviewing Tasmanian environmental policy is one that sees policy as the translation of dominant values into the capacity of institutions and policy processes to constrain value contenders - prescribing 'policy boundaries' capable of accommodating or routinely excluding environmental interests.

Chapter Three begins by discussing how the findings of the preceding Chapter help define the nature of the environmental policy problem and therefore the requirements for a framework of analysis. The case studies

examined (in *3.2.3; 3.2.4; 3.2.5* & *3.2.6*) confirm a mobilisation of bias away from the realisation of ecological demands where these threaten material interests, revealing the shortcomings in the pluralistic notion of 'equality of influence' in interest group politics and the formation of policy. The Chapter examines the utility of power theory in environmental policy analysis for the various levels of explanation it offers from the likelihood of environmentalists achieving their goals in interest group bargaining, to the nature of the ideologically and structurally sustained hegemony of dominant growth based values, and the constraints therefore upon the legitimation of ecological integrity as a policy concern within a restricted policy environment. After reviewing a number of policy approaches, the Chapter concludes that Downey's (1987) adaptation of Simeon's (1976) 'policy funnel' best explains the influence of prevailing values, power and the role of the state, found in Chapter Two to define policy responses to the demands of environmentalists. This framework is adopted for consideration of the Tasmanian studies in following chapters.

3.2 Environmental Policy Analysis

3.2.1 The Nature of the Environmental Problem

In his overview of ten recent Australian case studies in environmental policy, Walker laments the lack of 'universal agreement on the nature of environmental problems' and on the methods or techniques to be used in their study. Having suggested that the political economy perspective may be the most powerful for being the most illustrative approach, Walker qualifies this by adding that whilst this perspective may explain the neglect of environmental considerations, it does not suggest how these may be incorporated either into analysis or 'into political decision making'. On the other hand, Dryzek's notion of ecological rationality, and Goodin's application of 'ethical principles to environmental

problems', each appeal to Walker for demonstrating that consistency at least is possible in approaching problem analysis, whilst confirming that 'to encompass the vast range of environmental problems, any grand theory would, at the very least, have to be extremely complex' (Walker 1992:251-2).

One of the first hurdles for environmental policy analysis is a recognition of the ideological, and therefore of the practical, complexity of ecological demands. As an emerging alternate paradigm, or view of the world, environmentalism brings with it, as we saw in Chapter Two, not only attitudes, goals and policy demands, but a challenge to the mental framework of a world defined by capital accumulation, and responsible therefore for ecological degradation and potential ecological catastrophe (Berman 1984:49). As a world view, environmentalism encompasses not only alternate core values, but notions of *economy, polity, society, nature* and *knowledge* directly opposed to those inspired by growth-based values (Cotgrove 1982:27). Despite 'pernicious and persistent' convention, it is wrong, Hay argues, to describe 'environment' as 'mere issue', or indeed as 'a single issue' that will fit within a broader issue-context:

> It is rather a comprehensive system of interlocking and mutually reinforcing values, a fully-fledged tool (that is) for interpreting social existence - a competitor not with other *issues*, but with the other great ideological systems; socialism, liberalism, conservatism (Hay 1993:8; see also 2.2.4 for a review of the limitations of issue analysis).

Walker (1992:3, 14) explains that the essence of environmental issues, the nature of ecology and the consequences of 'human disruption of otherwise self-regulating and resilient natural ecosystems',[1] requires the student of environmental policy to view problems in their broader

[1] Walker (1992:6) adds that the 'solving' of ecological problems may then involve 'a genuine attempt at amelioration by investigating the disruption to the ecosystem, and the establishment of a new ecological equilibrium'. Otherwise, it may simply be displaced (a typical response as we saw in 2.4) as an externality in the process of production.

context, for practical rather than metaphysical reasons. In terms of more traditional policy concerns, ecology is disadvantaged both by a general ignorance of its relationship to other concerns, and the difficulty politicians find fitting it within the routine conceptual framework of 'widely accepted theories and world views'.[2] Political perception is then a key determinant, Walker suggests, to the resolution of environmental problems, and indeed to the success of the environmental movement. If political gain is measured in the traditional terms of 'compromise and horse trading',[3] Walker continues, then the environmental movement could be said to have enjoyed considerable success. However, when gain is measured in more complex ecological terms, (for example, in the halting or reversing of ecological degradation to the level required for the preservation of biodiversity and the prevention of *eco*-catastrophe), then, Walker concludes, 'the picture is far less satisfactory' (Walker 1992:4).

Given the practical need that Walker identifies for seeing environmental problems 'as wholes and in their broader context', it may then appear, he notes, that the case study approach to environmental policy analysis is inadvisable for its lack of 'wholism' (Walker 1992:14). However, in his study of corporate power and environmental policy, Blowers (1984:9) also reviews the relevance of case study analysis of complex ecological problems and argues that the illustration of generalisations, and indeed the undertaking of comparative theoretical inquiry, is necessarily reliant upon the detailed probing that case study analysis undertakes.[4] Indeed,

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[2] Paehlke (1989:210) notes that environmentalism seems foreign to the political decision making process, which, according to Lowi's 'interest group liberalism', responds to the most organised groups, whose members tend to be wealthy and tend to seek concrete, economically self-interested, and immediate gains.

[3] Walker (1992:13) notes that in any case, '[e]nvironmental policy issues are frequently unfit for compromise, not least because ecological systems do not understand political constraints'.

[4] Blowers (1984:9-10) cites Dunleavy (1981:182) as arguing that the case study approach 'can usefully serve as the basis for the comparative assessment of theoretical approaches, the exposition of gaps in the analyses, the testing of hypothetical relations in an empirical context, and the assessment of the different approaches'.

Blowers's own findings are that '[t]he study of an environmental issue in a specific local context has suggested that certain theoretical assumptions derived from other issues on a national basis may be challenged' (Blowers 1984:254). Equally there is value, Simeon (1976:551) observes, in undertaking 'coordinated case studies' that apply 'similar questions, frameworks and methods to carefully selected issues of different sorts' to yield cumulative results. Whilst Walker acknowledges that his insistence upon the policy approach of pragmatic wholism 'can impose unmanageable burdens on the analyst' (Walker 1992:14) - [a difficulty acknowledged by Barrett and Hill (1984:238), who stress that empirical studies must raise questions about *policy context* despite the risk this poses of 'taking projects beyond the point of manageability'] - Simeon (1976:551) warns against studies becoming so easily submerged in the *minutiae of detail,* that broader factors influencing policy outcomes are completely missed.[5]

3.2.2 The Problem of Environmental Policy Analysis

Walker's lament for normative analysis has resonated throughout policy literature since its emergence twenty years ago as 'a significant subfield within the discipline of political science' (Sabatier 1991:144), often concluding, as Walker does, that no one theory is altogether adequate in explaining the problem at hand (Walker 1992:249), and more generally that 'the appropriate mode of analysis will vary according to the issue and its context' (Hogwood & Gunn 1984:5). Theorists commonly advocate such techniques as policy analysis undertaken at various levels with particular attention paid to the interaction between levels; a synthesis or bridging of theoretical approaches or indeed simply recognition that a

[5] Simeon (1976:551) is critical of the case study approach - where mandatory theoretical chapters at the beginning of the work bear little relationship to the case study detail; where studies fail to develop new hypotheses or generalisations for later application and testing; and where studies are isolated, unique and often exotic, offering insights that may actually be misleading.

theorist's particular policy focus may well be a narrow area of interest but from within a broad field of influence. 'Micro', 'middle' and 'macro' levels of policy analysis would then respectively address decision making, policy formation and political systems, assessing policy making and policy effectiveness within a broader analysis of the distribution of economic and political power within political systems (Ham & Hill 1984:17-18). In addition to recognising the ideological complexity of environmentalism as a policy concern, studies of environmental policy must then consider the influence of the industrial paradigm, acting, in Hall's terms, as a *policy paradigm* - that is constraining action, choice, processes and the ability of environmentalists to achieve their demands where decision makers are guided:

> by an overarching set of ideas that specify how the problems facing them are perceived, which goals might be attained through policy and what sort of techniques can be used to reach these goals. Ideas about each of these matters interlock to form a relatively coherent whole that might be described as a policy paradigm (Hall 1992:91).

Rodman (1980:64-65) argues that the study of environmental policy and politics has itself been constrained by the preoccupation of modern political science with modelling itself upon the 'linear, one dimensional, cause and effect' analysis of modern natural science that so contradicts ecological notions. Instead of finding political society interpreted in the classical sense as if it were an organism, Rodman (1980:66) continues, we find it interpreted by one dimensional modern analysis as if it were a mechanism. In analysis, we then encounter 'variations of the Darwinian view of nature that legitimate either capitalist competition, socialist-anarchist mutual aid, or perpetual "development"', and, furthermore, a 'pretension to a nonteleological, autonomous status [that] has amounted in practice to an unquestioning acceptance of the basic presuppositions of the modern paradigm, so that being "value-free" has typically meant that one's "values" are not conspicuous because they are so widely shared'

(Rodman 1980:65). Rodman suggests that this 'domestication' of analysis has served the present day 'politics of wealth' by failing to critique the modern paradigm, whilst reducing the study of environmentalism to within the framework of 'the policy process' and the *politics of getting* (who gets what, when, and how). In noting the short sightedness of such analysis, Rodman concludes that, rather than perceiving environmental issues as unrelated concerns (which the 'regulations, incentives, and technical innovations' of the market economy could combine to keep at tolerable levels), the *interdependency* of issues must be emphasised, as must their place within a modern industrial paradigm committed to industrialisation and the technological domination of nature (Rodman 1980:50-51).

Walker's (1992:233-254) review of approaches suitable for environmental policy analysis is as frustrating to the reader as no doubt it is to the author himself.[6] In part this is because Walker sets himself several concurrent tasks - in discussing the fate of pressing environmental problems given the priorities of modern political culture; in considering the politics of environmental policy described by his case studies; in searching for appropriate policy explanation which, he concedes, in each case is likely to vary; and in exploring the policy models that he reviews, not only for their explanatory ability, but also their utility in prescribing ecologically sound future choices. For the purposes of this discussion, Walker is concerned by 'displacement', or symbolic politics, that is designed to reassure public unease about environmental issues without substantially resolving the causes of their unease. He is concerned with his finding of environmental decisions based upon radically incomplete information

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[6] Walker notes the *political economy* perspective; *corporatism, brokerage* and *symbolic* politics; *'middle-level' process* theories (rational-comprehensive, disjointed incremental and 'mixed scanning' decision making models); and the *issue-attention cycle* (Walker 1992:236-251).

that is exclusively controlled and subject to professional biases. He warns of entrenched business interests that hegemonically dominate politics, perpetuating development myths whilst blocking consideration of viable alternatives, sustaining their own power by the exploitation 'both of natural resources and human beings' (Walker 1992:233-236). Walker argues that a policy explanation of these circumstances must concede that context does in fact limit decision options, as the following case studies demonstrate, and that the explanatory value of decision strategies in these circumstances ranges from 'minimal' to 'quite irrelevant'.

3.2.3 Crenson & the Un-Politics of Air Pollution

Crenson explores constrained environmental decision making in his oft quoted study of the 'un-politics' of air pollution, employing *non-decision making* analysis to review the relative impacts of industrial influence and power reputations upon pollution control in two adjacent steel towns, Gary and East Chicago, in Indiana. Crenson's study is concerned with explaining why East Chicago addressed its air pollution problem in 1949, whilst Gary, although similarly populated and polluted, took no action before 1962. He explicitly attempts, as Lukes (1977:42) observes, to find a way to explain 'things that do not happen' on the assumption that 'the proper object of investigation is not political activity but political inactivity', hence his interest in non-decision making. This practice is described by Bachrach and Baratz (1962:948) as *A's* ability to create or enforce social values, political values, and institutional practices 'that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues that are comparatively innocuous' to *A's* interests. It is an approach Blowers (1984:229) sees as *neo-elitist* for combining traditional elitist focus upon disproportionate power with an interest in key issues that challenge the ability of this power to dominate the policy process. In terms of power theory, (discussed in 3.3.3) non-decision making borders a

two-dimensional behavioural view of power (exhibited only in decisions and non-decisions) and a three-dimensional situational view of power (power that is non-individualistic), in addition to considering how power may be exercised to prevent issues being raised (Lukes 1977:44-45).

Crenson relies upon the *mobilisation of bias* insights of Schattschneider, and of Bachrach and Baratz[7] to find that democratic pluralist politics, for all its 'apparent penetrability and heterogeneity', may in reality restrict the scope of the political process to a limited range of acceptable issues and demands, with much of the restricted influence exerted indirectly (Crenson 1971:23). He finds, in terms of his empirical studies, that 'the perceived influence of political and economic elites can have an important effect upon the level of political activity in the field of air pollution' (Crenson 1971:182). In the 'one company' town of Gary, for example, strong party political culture and organisation combined with the power reputation of US Steel as indirect influence to prevent the air pollution issue surfacing on the city's political agenda, thereby delaying legislation until 1962. Conversely in East Chicago, where both political power and industrial influence is more dispersed (that is, with no strong party organisation, and a number of steel works, rather than one large company) indirect influence did not impede the early adoption in 1949 of pollution controls (Lukes 1977:42). Observable action in these studies is therefore an incomplete guide to environmental policy making, just as Ham and Hill (1984:66) explain that it is to the distribution of political power, in spite of pluralist notions about the penetrability of the political process. Emphasis upon observable politics, political actors and their actions may then lead investigators to overlook the power of obstruction identified in Gary, that enforces inaction on environmental policy whilst

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[7] Discussed in 2.3.4 in terms of the constraint of 'orthodoxy' upon ecological discourse and the realisation of ecological values, interests and demands.

maintaining the impenetrability of the political process (Crenson 1971:21; see *3.3.2* for a detailed discussion of the explanatory limits of pluralism).

Whilst Crenson's study is a pioneering demonstration both of decision making as an activity that may be channelled and directed by the process of non-decision making, and of the undue influence of industry in a 'one company' town in establishing the boundaries to environmental policy (Crenson 1971:178), it is of limited utility as a broader framework of analysis for offering an explanation of constraints upon environmental policy making only at the *behavioural* and *situational*, rather *structural* or *ideological* levels. Where Crenson talks of structural or ideological factors, he does so in terms of the local community, organisation, and political culture of Gary or East Chicago. He explains, in the case of these two towns, that the limits to policy making are specific to place, so that, whilst air pollution legislation is obstructed by corporate power in Gary, it may not necessarily be obstructed in similar steel towns elsewhere. The 'inarticulate ideology' that Crenson identifies promoting the 'selection perception and articulation of social problems and conflicts' is described as specific to the political institutions of Gary, responsible for that town developing its own unique political climate, rather than described in the broader sense of dominant industrial ideology mobilising bias in general against the realisation of environmental values and demands (Crenson 1971:23).

The value of Crenson's study for this discussion remains its 'unmasking' of the operation of constraining influences upon environmental decision making. Whilst political power may appear fragmented, and penetrable, and whilst policy making may appear to be open, although lacking coordination, such 'disjointedness', Crenson finds, may well disguise the 'causal mechanism' of a restricted decision making environment which

exploits certain kinds of conflicts whilst suppressing others (Crenson 1971:178-80; Clegg 1992:82). As well, Crenson shows that corporate suppression and control of environmental concern may be achieved through power reputation alone without any recourse to action or participation by corporate actors in the political or policy arena. Decisive corporate control over the environmental agenda identified by Crenson in Gary may well have parallels elsewhere, with its symptoms characteristically recognisable as corporate evasiveness, silence and inaction in public debate on issues of concern, together with a local political inclination to support, and seek support in return, from major industrial concerns. Contrary to the tenets of the issue attention cycle, Crenson (1971:25) claims that political issues tend to be interconnected, with the promotion of one civic issue tending to drive other issues away. An apparent preoccupation with 'business and industrial development' will then tend, for example, to preclude discussion of their social and environmental costs, particularly where anticipated reactions, such as the loss of employment or the 'flight' of industry to a more sympathetic locality, could be the consequence of addressing public concerns.[8]

Crenson's comparative studies rest, as Lukes (1977:46) notes, *firstly*, upon his judgement that the citizens of Gary would prefer not to be poisoned by air pollution; *secondly*, upon his hypothesis that, given full information and a choice, the citizens of Gary would actively choose not to be poisoned; and, *finally*, on the basis of comparative data, that in East Chicago, where non-decisional power was not exerted or was exerted to a

[8] This tactic is known as 'job blackmail' and is shown by Schrecker's research (1985:14; 1990:168-170) to be quite candidly used by members of the business community in dealing with governments. Blowers (1983:412) finds (i) that when jobs and profits are on the line, the business case meets with more sympathy from governments, and (ii) that when business is at its weakest in economic terms, it can best defend itself against environmental pressures. Polsby (1980:216-217) suggests that the people of Gary do make a choice in these circumstances and would rather have pollution and jobs, than no pollution and no jobs. However, Morriss (1987:148) remains unconvinced, arguing that 'posing the choice in this way precisely highlights the lack of power of those who live in Gary'.

lesser degree, citizens had in fact made and enforced such a choice. Whilst the difficulty of constructing similar case studies is well noted (Clegg 1992:118), the case for the enhanced democratisation of the policy process as a means of both fragmenting corporate power and achieving environmental ends is well proven by Crenson's analysis, albeit on wholly anthropocentric, rather than Eckersley's ecocentric, grounds.

3.2.4 Sandbach, Environment, Ideology & Policy

Sandbach (1980:106) argues the case for Marxist analysis of environmental policy, and the capacity of environmentalists to realise their interests, on the grounds that '[t]he study of pressure groups and power makes little sense except in relation to the structures of constraint'. His theoretical project, like Crenson's, is to move beyond the assumption that power and the ability to influence policy and political processes is, as the pluralists maintain, equally enjoyed by environmentalists and their opponents. Whilst pluralist and elitist focus is upon 'who decides', and 'who has power over whom' in decision making, Marxist analysis is concerned with 'constraint' and 'how choice is shaped and limited'. However, despite his (1980:90) rejection of behaviouralism for obscuring objective conditions with its focus on factors in isolation, Sandbach is prepared to concede that environmentalists' behaviour is capable of drawing a positive policy response (Sandbach 1980:18).

In seeking an explanation for the gains of the environmental movement since its rise in the late 1960s, Sandbach then follows Miliband's (1977) instrumentalist Marxist approach, acknowledging the concept of *relative autonomy* of the state from capital, and of environmentalists in circumstances of constraint.[9] This explains pluralist achievements in

[9] Poulantzas criticised Miliband for introducing the notion of elites, subjective choice and free will into Marxism. Indeed, by rejecting the Marxist tenet that thought and action

capitalist societies as - 'the granting of concessions to the subordinate classes or political forms which allow a real degree of choice, in order to maintain an overall world view which preserves capitalism by distorting beliefs, values, common sense assumptions and popular culture' (Cox *et al* 1985:66).

Sandbach (1980) applies Marxist analysis to a range of environmental concerns, including the role that technology has played in economic development to the detriment of the environment. His project is to unmask power in environmental politics, and to explain the economic, political and ideological constraints upon the pursuit of ecologically sound alternatives. In terms of powerful capital interests behind the promotion of ecologically unsound technology, Sandbach discusses two approaches for addressing the hegemonic corporate control of the nuclear power industry and the future of the energy industry generally. The first approach, advocated by Lovins (1977), is restricted, Sandbach (1980:59) argues, for confining its concern to a rational discussion of the case for and against nuclear power,[10] whilst ignoring nuclear power politics. The flaw in Lovin's 'soft' energy path, he claims, is that it fails to appreciate that 'soft' technology is as vulnerable to corporate capture as 'hard' technology, so that the problem for the future is not 'what' energy is produced, but 'who' controls it, and 'how' this control is legitimated.[11] Sandbach prefers Martin's (1978) analysis for seeing nuclear power as 'favoured by advanced industrial capitalism because it further centralises

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is determined and shaped by the logic and requirements of capitalism, Poulantzas argued that Miliband was no longer a Marxist (Cox *et al* 1985:68-69).

10 Lovins (1977:37) advocates 'soft' energy alternatives, i.e. conservation, renewable energy and social changes in lifestyle, to the 'hard' energy path, for example offered by the nuclear power industry, where supply is centralised and controlled by a bureaucratic elite. Sandbach (1980:160) is unconvinced by the mutual exclusivity of this 'soft'/'hard' distinction, seeing an ecologically sound future as conceivably employing a mix of both.

11 Beder (1993:240) lists impediments to the pursuit of alternative 'green' technology in industry as including: the initial cost of introducing these measures; industry ignorance of the long term cost savings against the initial investment; the lack of competitive pressure and performance standards, and so on; in addition to vested interests and political power.

control over investment and production, keeps decisions in the hands of employers and their hired experts, and maintains passive consumerism' (Sandbach 1980:163).

Similarly, Sandbach explains corporate influence as responsible for the failure in Britain by local authorities to charge industrial polluters under the Public Health Act, and the failure, initially in Britain, as well as other countries, to set adequate levels of charges to deter pollution. Following its enactment in the early 1970s, parts of water pollution legislation in Britain remained virtually unimplemented, causing a deterioration of water quality toward the late 1970s discussed in *3.2.6* (Sandbach 1980:18). However, the local British authorities were keener to attract industry at a time of high unemployment than they were to tax polluters.[12] Industry also favours the imposition of pollution standards rather than taxation on the level of pollution, because it can delay, avoid or litigate to postpone having to meet standards with greater ease than it can taxes, and, ironically, has resisted paying taxes, by invoking the ideological rhetoric that these are a 'licence to pollute' (Sandbach 1980:55). Corporate interests have been well positioned, Sandbach observes, from the early development of pollution control policy in Britain in particular, to exert control over the process in partnership with governments and close alliances with pollution control inspectorates.[13]

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[12] In terms of air pollution, however, Sandbach (1980:208) notes that the Clean Air Act 1956 has steadily reduced smoke and sulphur dioxide emissions into the air over Britain, resulting in the 1970s in a 50% increase in sunshine hours per day.

[13] Sandbach also describes the twenty year battle, including legislative provisions, to successfully implement pollution control standards in America, which has suffered setbacks from industrial collusion and the relaxation and deferment of industry standards (Sandbach 1980:56-7). Gunningham (1974:50) observes that the US automobile industry has also totally resisted government attempts to legislate against noxious exhaust fumes on the grounds of cost and lack of available technology, despite pollution threats serious enough to potentially result in the banning of cars from American cities.

Whilst Sandbach sees capitalism as encouraging the centralisation of power and decision making so as to increase corporate influence upon policy outcomes, it is not inevitable that environmentalists will fail to gain concessions. He acknowledges that where environmental groups are organised, their demands for increased participation in policy making and politics create a lever for the implementation of environmental policy despite objective circumstances of constraint. The power of capital is not invincible then, but like a Chinese 'paper tiger', can be defeated in the face of collective resistance (Sandbach 1980:128). His critique vacillates between determinist and instrumentalist Marxism, apparently according to the issue and evidence at hand, so that whilst tending generally toward the former approach, Sandbach draws on the latter as the contradiction of democratic achievement arises despite structural constraint. Whilst not always convincing given his ideological generalisations and eclectic use of theory, Sandbach nevertheless provides insightful description of the difficulties confronting environmentalists, (despite his flirtation with pluralist notions of equality of opportunity to influence policy), when the realisation of their demands would seriously undermine capital interests:

> Marxist accounts can be seen as useful in terms of their scope and breadth of analysis. They also possess a predictive utility and within their own terms are internally logical and coherent. Whether or not they are descriptively sound and empirically consistent, depends upon whether one accepts the initial premises or not. That they raise interesting concepts and insights for the further analysis of power - the importance of latent interests, the role of social conditioning and ideological hegemony in shaping attitudes and preferences, and the need to study the constraints which economic power places on the use of political power - is not, however, in doubt (Cox *et al* 1985:223).

Where power is appreciated in the Marxist sense as the capacity to realise interest, environmentalists certainly appear disadvantaged compared to their corporate opponents in achieving policy outcomes.

3.2.5 Blowers & Power in the London Brick Dispute

Blowers (1984) is also concerned, in his study of the London Brick dispute, to explain the disproportionate corporate power over environmental policy making enjoyed by the London Brick company of Bedfordshire. He employs competing theories of power, pluralism, neo-elitism and Marxist structuralism to build a picture and an explanation of the London Brick works dispute which from any single perspective, he concludes, is partial and therefore flawed.[14] Briefly, the conflict was over London Brick's eventually successful plans for the complete redevelopment of its brick making activities in Bedfordshire despite environmentalists' concern over site rehabilitation and air pollution (Blowers 1984:205). Blowers finds that over a long period of time, the company was able to exercise power to achieve its ends both by inaction, and by taking direct steps to thwart its opponents as required.

When the company found itself in open confrontation with environmental interests, it sought to negotiate, and when that failed, it retaliated. Blowers observes that it is possible to perceive an oscillation in the balance of power, over the period of the dispute, between the opposing interests, for example, as the successes of environmental groups are met by a resurgence of business power (Blowers 1983:412). Furthermore, Blowers finds, as does Crenson, that corporate advantage varies with place, with some counties or regions providing more propitious business environments than others, so that the 'mediating

[14] His original analysis of the dispute was more simply a consideration of the opposing 'pluralist' and 'political economy' perspectives of corporate power. Blowers concludes that both contribute to an understanding of corporate influence in the dispute despite their respective limitations. The former view regards the London Brick company as an interest group with roughly equal chances of success in a battle with other interest groups, whilst the latter contends that business possesses such reserves of power that the eventual outcome of any dispute is never in doubt (Blowers 1983:413). It is apparent from his later study that Blowers felt this explanation to be frustrating and incomplete, encouraging his adoption of an eclectic descriptive approach based upon Lukes' three-dimensional explanation of power.

concepts' of temporal and spatial difference must be accounted for in describing corporate power over policy making.

Blowers finds the pluralist idea of a multiplicity of interests, enjoying different resources but equality of opportunity to influence policy, only superficially borne out in the London Brick dispute. Whilst ostensibly all interests were able to participate in the decision process regarding the future of the works, the company enjoyed privileged access in the early stages before consultation on its proposals formally commenced. An acceptance of the company's expansion plans by the decision makers was very likely achieved by this informal 'socialisation' process. Concerning suppression of the problem of pollution by the works, Blowers finds the company active in this regard, controlling information, defusing opposition, deflecting disclosure by settling compensation claims out of court, and in every way preventing the issue emerging publicly.

In the end, however, Blowers finds that structuralism rather than pluralism or elitism best establishes the reasons underlying the dispute by identifying the contest as one between the material interests of production and profit on one hand, and of land and amenity on the other. Despite failing to account, as pluralism would, for the role of local actors in the dispute, the intensity of local conflict and the significance of participation by various groups, Blowers finds that the structuralist account exposes the real interests at stake, the dependence of workers on London Brick, and the ability of the company to achieve its goals despite an apparently powerful and implacable opposition. Over and above the conflict were structuralist forces at work which rendered the ambitions of the environmentalists futile, and London Brick's own win seemingly inevitable (Blowers 1984: 3, 6, 222, 227, 235, 241 & 291).

Despite the descriptive utility of his theoretical synthesis of power approaches, Blowers acknowledges great difficulties in constructing what he calls a 'precise relationship' between power theory and evidence in the London Brick case. This is not merely because he is applying conflicting theories, but also because the approach he adopts, in his view, outruns empirical application. Blowers claims that his Brick Works study belongs to the 'new, innovative and somewhat innocent' area of urban studies, which, given its unorthodox, multi-disciplinary approach, is bound to experience methodological problems of falsifiability and conceptual precision.[15] However, he finds that without the use of the mediating concepts, which he employs to link the various interpretations of power, then the evidence is strained, as he observes, 'to support hypotheses which bear little relationship to the complex and confusing pictures presented by experience'. Blowers cites authors of other contemporary urban studies as equally interested in theoretical synthesis - Saunders, for example, who remarks that one sided theoreticism is likely to prove as sterile as one sided empiricism; and Dunleavy, who suggests that it does not seem utopian to detect signs of empirically supported common ground underlying contending theories (Blowers 1984:250-260).

Blowers compares the findings of his London Brick Works study with American research such as Crenson's, and draws broad parallels between them about the relative power of corporate and environmental interests.

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[15] Blowers's approach to overcoming methodological problems is two-fold. Firstly he does not put forward each theory of power as a clearly defined set of hypotheses capable of being supported or falsified by the evidence, but rather uses each perspective as a means of interpreting the evidence of the case.

Furthermore, he collects the evidence provided by the various power theories, each of which clearly identifies certain aspects of the case whilst ignoring others, and then links this by his 'temporal and spatial' mediating concepts, to which he adds local and national considerations, as well as the political processes respectively exploited by environmental and economic interests (Blowers 1984:260-291).

This attempt bears scrutiny - both for its comprehensive analysis of the Brick works dispute, and for indicating the difficulties to be confronted in synthesising conflicting accounts of power (see also discussion of Blowers and corporate power in 3.3.4).

Industry, he finds, has generally suffered from the shift in values to an increase in concern both for the environment, and for the public health risks of industrial pollution. However, it has reacted by averting what it regards as unacceptable costs - exploiting political circumstances in order to secure its political objectives - and by offering technical solutions to problems which beg broader questions of overall costs and benefits. In the first instance, Blowers finds, industry will always attempt to ensure that issues inimical to its own interests are not agitated to ensure that certain concerns never reach the overt decision making arena (Blowers 1984:312-322). Blowers further reviews the Reserve Mining controversy, the British Clean Air Act and pollution control in the USA for signs that pollution controls may be forcing major changes in corporate strategies. Finding little evidence of this, he concludes that corporate interests possess greater effective power in contests with environmentalists, particularly where they exploit not only covert corporatist, but also overt pluralist, political arenas (Blowers 1984:323).

3.2.6 Hill et al & Policy Inaction on Pollution Control

Hill *et al* employ Blowers's multi-levelled analytic approach to examine the British government's inaction over the control of nitrate pollution in the problem areas of Severn-Trent, Anglia and Thames - as well as other intensively cultivated regions in the country where ground rather than surface water is the predominant public water supply, and therefore most likely highly contaminated by nitrates[16] (Hill *et al* 1989:228). The authors also discuss policy inaction on nitrate pollution as a general problem in Britain, one which has taken nearly two decades (and external pressure particularly from the EEC) to achieve prominence on the British political

[16] Intense cultivation combined with heavy nitrate fertiliser usage inducing nitrate leaching through disturbed soils, 'is concentrated in those parts of the country where the rocks are permeable and aquifers are essential water sources'. Whilst there are concerns with nitrate concentrations in surface waters, these concentrations are more easily dispersed, except where groundwater is an important source of supply (Hill *et al* 1989:228).

stage, despite alarming medical and scientific evidence on the dangers of contamination first surfacing in the early 1970s (Hill *et al* 1989:227-232). Hill *et al* find, in the case of nitrate water pollution in Britain, temporal factors complement policy explanations provided by pluralist, elitist and structuralist accounts. Pluralism explains how ignorance and apathy sustain the status quo against pollution control, elitism and structuralism address the underlying circumstances, whilst temporal analysis identifies a gradual weakening, over the period studied, of state support for the agricultural industry creating an environmental policy opportunity and demonstrating the potential for state autonomy (Hill *et al* 1989:239).

The legitimacy of medical, scientific and, ultimately, public concern over British drinking water supplies being subject to nitrate contamination, was established in the early 1970s on the grounds of links between nitrate pollution levels and both infantile methaemoglobinaemia, and cancer, particularly cancer of the stomach.[17] At this time, surface water nitrate concentration levels were also recorded for the first time as exceeding 45mg/l, close to the World Health Organisation and EEC recommended maximum safe levels of 50mg/l. Other events to draw the problem into the public arena included the unprecedented closure of some bore hole water supplies by water authorities; research interest in the amount of nitrate entering groundwater and its passage through water bearing strata; the formation of a Department of Environment Nitrate Sub-Committee; and a Royal Commission review of agriculture and pollution that failed to recommend a curbing of the agricultural fertiliser use, despite nitrate problem areas being known to be intensively cultivated. The authors note that this finding set the tone of government policy as sceptical about

[17] The authors report that medical evidence of methaemoglobinaemia is alarming, and that it has in each case been linked to drinking water contaminated to a nitrate level of around 50mg/l, the WHO recommended level, as well as the maximum concentration limit set by the EEC Drinking Water Directive (Hill *et al* 1989:227, 232).

the need to achieve the EEC Drinking Water Directive recommended safe nitrate concentration levels (Hill *et al* 1989:232).

Whilst the nitrate debate gradually builds over two decades into an argument for increased pollution control and revised agricultural practices, Hill *et al* (1989:227) argue that no clear policy resolution has been achieved, leaving it unclear just *what* will be done to control the nitrate problem and importantly *who* will bear the cost. At the same time, the combined interests of the agriculture and fertiliser industries remain active in contriving to keep any change to acceptable nitrate pollution levels to a minimum, and to localise any policy interventions, rather than see a general revision of agricultural practices (Hill *et al* 1989:239). Conflicting scientific and administrative signals about the dangers of nitrate and its links to agricultural practices appear to have resulted in ambiguous, flawed policy responses, prompting several equally conflicting views identified by Hill *et al* (1989:230) as representing alternative scenarios in the nitrate debate. The fact that debate emerged at all is due to a number of factors external to community (including the medical and scientific community) dissatisfaction with levels of nitrate pollution, and despite the best efforts of government and industry to contain ongoing community demands for action.[18]

The nitrate debate comprised the views: that the problem is exaggerated (promoted by major fertiliser manufacturers and bolstered by government ambivalence on action); that where nitrate concentration is a problem, it can be tackled by localised control measures (basically an

[18] Besides the significant pressure from the EEC (that lent enormous credibility to local efforts) for member states to meet its water pollution control requirements by mid 1985 and to curb agricultural production, the authors ironically also credit both water privatisation attempts by the national government, as well as complaints from environmentalists to the EEC about the legality of its derogation of nitrate concentration levels, with ensuring that the nitrate issue emerged onto the public agenda (Hill *et al* 1989:233-234).

administrative stance that has to date proven ineffective); and, that nitrate use in Britain should be generally restricted, rather than arbitrarily penalising farmers in certain specific geological zones. The latter radical action would not only address the problem of nitrate pollution, the authors note, but also the general damage done by 'intensive, chemically supported, arable farming', whilst furthermore offering a mechanism, in line with the current EEC commitment, for curbing agricultural production (Hill *et al* 1989:231).

The authors are faced with explaining a long period of policy inaction over nitrate levels despite concern dating back to the early 1970s, as well as a 'flurry of policy activity' in the late 1980s apparently aimed at no longer evading the EEC Directive and searching for new ways to limit pollution, yet ultimately failing to deliver a pollution control outcome. A simple *pluralist* explanation for inaction is that nitrate in water cannot be detected by taste, so that without scientific warnings of its dangers, the public are unlikely to be concerned. However, once the public had been made aware, and had become concerned, attitude polling indicates that the majority nevertheless upheld 'the traditional view that the care of the rural environment should be left to agriculture' (Hill *et al* 1989:237). Whilst pluralism explains the significant weight that the EEC Directive lent to the campaigning efforts of the British Friends of the Earth, Hill *et al* turn to *elitism* to explain the ways in which the political agenda is controlled by small yet powerful groups such as the agricultural lobby.

Against the powerful agricultural *status quo,* the authors see the scientific elite, for example, as constrained by their role as public employees despite their important research linking nitrate pollution to agricultural practice. It took until the late 1980s, when the tide of events generally appeared to turn against the agriculture industry, for the scientific community to shed

its 'common acceptance of shared caution' and to divide into industry supporters and those conscious of the problems faced by water authorities to which the cost of pollution control had been delegated. The authors find that only *structuralism* explains the manner in which economic considerations dominated state pollution policy, however incomplete its explanation of the weakening of state support for agriculture in the late 1980s, and the manner in which this is exploited by those concerned to achieve improved environmental policy (Hill *et al* 1989:238-239).

Each of these four studies above show a range of power analyses that will be considered in the determination of a framework of environmental policy analysis for use in Chapters Five and Six. None of the studies above, with the exception of Sandbach's Marxist approach, emphasises the ideological basis of environmental policy demands. Nevertheless, the studies show the consequences of ideological contention by detailing the mobilisation of bias against ecopolitical concerns. It will be argued later in this chapter that the focus of power analysis may in fact range from the most overt to the least overt of political arenas, and from the most overt to the least overt of influences, therefore, upon a policy outcome. The utility of power analysis as a 'multi-layered policy tool' is then apparent when we consider that ecopolitical concerns themselves are inspired by many differing shades of light to dark green, requiring differing policy explanations, as we shall see in *3.4*. However, first we turn, in *3.3*, to a critique of the studies above in terms of their utility in explaining environmental policy constraint.

3.3 Explaining Policy Constraint

3.3.1 The Role of Power & Causality

A review of the ideological nature of ecopolitical demands in Chapter Two, and the potential obstacle of dominant materialist ideology to their legitimisation as policy concerns, suggests that environmental policy analysis must account for capacity and constraint in the policy process. The case studies reviewed above found the realisation of environmental demands similarly constrained although in differing circumstances: by industrial influence and the corporate reputation for power of US Steel that ensured local policy inaction on air pollution in Gary, Indiana; by powerful capital interests promoting ecologically unsound energy technology and found by Sandbach to be thwarting the pursuit of 'soft' energy paths; by the disproportionate corporate power of London Brick over environmental policy processes affecting the fate of the disputed Bedfordshire brick works; and by collusion between the British government and the agricultural and fertiliser industries that has prevented policy action upon harmful levels of nitrate concentration in drinking water supplies despite years of lobbying by environmentalists.

These cases suggest that the capacity of environmentalists to achieve their ends is deterministically limited by objective circumstances of constraint - despite Crenson's finding of enhanced democratisation as an appropriate means of fragmenting corporate power - that may otherwise so bind the state to the support of capital as to succeed in thwarting any genuine environmental policy response.[19]

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[19] In East Chicago, enhanced democratisation of local politics and policy making enabled pollution control to be achieved years before Gary, where power was centralised, policy tightly controlled, and corporate collusion routine to the process of governance (see 3.2.3).

It is apparent, certainly where ecological demands directly challenge capital interests, that environmental policy analysis must consider the influence of broad determining factors upon the specifics of the decision making process in order to adequately explain policy decisions and the outcome of conflict between opposing interests. Environmental policy analysis must then, in Simeon's (1976:550) terms, avoid a 'too narrow' focus on decision-making that will be at the cost of failing to comprehend the influences which shape such factors as the range of alternative decisions considered, the assumptions and values behind policy choices, the kinds of action that decision makers may have taken and the forces behind certain policy outcomes.

Simeon's approach is intended to 'link up the study of policy with the more traditional concerns of political science and in particular with the three most vital elements: 'power, conflict and ideology'. A review of *socio-economic* context, the system of *power* and *influence,* dominant *values* and *ideas,* formal *structures* and *institutions,* and the *policy process* will help to isolate and comprehend the multitude of factors which define the parameters within which policy makers operate. This perspective Simeon calls the 'funnel of causality', the purpose of which is to relate policy to the study of politics generally, and to define the opportunities and constraints influencing the policy process (Simeon 1976:550, 556, 566).

The 'causality' approach is useful both in considering the capacity of environmentalists as ideological contenders to realise their demands, and in reviewing the studies of corporate power and non-decision making discussed above. Three principles 'flow' from the causality perspective that are both particularly significant to a consideration of environmental policy, and confirm the importance of a broad analytic perspective. The

first, that policy emerges from the play of economic, social and political forces, is an entirely apt description of environmental policy formation given its contentious origins. The second, that as choice in which resources are limited and goals and objectives differ, policy making is a matter of conflict, again echoes the circumstances of environmental decision making and the many bitter disputes that policy decisions have sought to resolve. The final principle, that policy analysis from the causality perspective is comparative across both space and time, has already proven valuable in general discussion of the policy gains of environmentalists over the past two decades, and has added depth to both Blowers's analysis of the brick works dispute, and the study by Hill *et al* of many years of policy inaction over nitrate polluted water in Britain.

Whilst Simeon's approach acknowledges the causal quality or agency of influences such as dominant values and structures of power upon policy outcomes, it also does not deterministically deny that the policy process itself may have some effect independent of constraint (Simeon 1976:556). This policy perspective rather resembles Barrett and Hill's approach that describes 'the importance of the complex "shell" in which any specifically identifiable policy "core" may be imbedded', and the inter-relationship, therefore, of structural and substantive policy issues.[20] This 'shell-core' perspective addresses the way in which policy issues are viewed, placing policy concerns, as Simeon does, in the context of values, interests and power (Barrett & Hill 1984:238).

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20 Knoepfel and Weidner (1982:91-92) developed the 'shell-core' approach as a method of analysis attempting to precisely depict actor agency against a background of structurally fixed power relationships in the implementation of air pollution control policy. The 'analytic grid' must be fine enough, the authors argue, to cover the variety of interests within each of the greater *socio-cultural, economic* and *politico-administrative* systems.

Adapting the 'shell-core approach', Whitmore's (1984:242) argument for a 'policy paradigm' to be seen around the core to explain ideologically charged policy choices returns us to the problem for environmental policy analysis of material constraints upon ecological demands, and Hall's suggestion, noted in *3.2.2*, that an overarching set of ideas interlocks relatively coherently to define the limits or boundaries of policy outcomes (Hall 1992:91). It leads us furthermore to a review of the ability of various theories of power to address constraint in environmental policy making, at levels of analysis that may be seen to constitute layers of analysis around Barrett and Hill's policy core. We begin with a critique of the pluralist view of liberal democracy in which any interest group 'can ensure that its political preferences and wishes are adopted if it is sufficiently determined' (Ham & Hill 1984:27).

3.3.2 The Explanatory Limits of Pluralism

It is apparent in the work of Crenson, Sandbach, Blowers and Hill *et al*, that environmentalists do not enjoy equality of access and influence in the policy making process, but that power as the capacity to achieve policy outcomes, contrary to pluralist tenets, is disproportionately held by their corporate opponents. The pluralist analytic perspective is not, however, dismissed entirely by these authors. Whilst pluralism may not be able to explain the outcomes of their case studies, both Blowers and Hill *et al* nevertheless argue for its integration with 'elitism' and 'structuralism' into a descriptive analysis of environmental policy that would otherwise be partial and therefore flawed. As mentioned earlier, Crenson concedes the value of enhanced democratic practices, and Sandbach the campaigning efforts by environmental activists, in achieving the fragmentation of corporate power and the realisation of ecological demands - conceding thereby that public or community power may be separate, as pluralism maintains, from economic power. There is evident

value, on the basis of these findings, in incorporating pluralist analysis as a layer of explanation within environmental policy analysis. At the same time, the explanatory limitations of pluralist analysis must be clearly understood. Pluralists are criticised for their focus on key decisions and actual behaviour, and their failure to consider the pressure of capital to confine decision making to relatively safe issues (Ham & Hill 1984:63; Sandbach 1980:36).

Clegg (1989:9) notes that, for many pluralist writers, power is something that 'a concrete individual had to be seen to be exercising', and something that is exercised in order to have those subject to it fall in with the individual preferences of the powerful:

> Characteristically pluralists regard power as most likely to be dispersed among many rather than fewer people; to be visible in instances of concrete decision making rather than through reputation; to be competitively bargained for rather than structurally pervasive; to be best viewed through relatively formal instances of voting and to be more widely dispersed than narrowly concentrated in communities (Clegg 1989:9).

Crenson shows, however, that pluralism fails to account for neglect of environmental issues and behaviour that restricts rather than addresses the range of community, environmental and political concerns which he is able to identify - indeed that relegates some issues such as air pollution control in Gary to political oblivion. The proper object of investigation required to explore 'non-decision making' is therefore not political activity, as pluralism holds, but political inactivity, or politically enforced neglect (Crenson 1971:25-6). Crenson (1971:177-184) dedicates an entire chapter to detailing the failings of pluralist analysis on the basis of his case study, including its failure to recognise issue obstruction, to acknowledge covert power, to see the victims of power as ignorant and invisible, and to appreciate its own tenuous link to democracy.

However, pluralist methodology, pioneered by Dahl's (1961) study of power in the town of New Haven, selected key political issues to examine on the basis that they were issues in open conflict between two or more actors (Ham & Hill 1984:27). Not only were issues not in open conflict excluded from consideration, but, as Clegg (1989:64) observes, nearly 50 percent of New Haven's inhabitants were also excluded, on the basis of their non participation in elections. In making such exclusions and confining itself largely to the study of observable phenomena, Cox *et al* (1985:121) note the main weakness of pluralism may be, (as Cox *et al* say pluralist theorists at least implicitly recognise), that 'it is a description rather than an analysis of power relationships'. Indeed, even before his critics had done so, Dahl acknowledged obstacles to participation in political life that Lukes (1974:14) describes as unable to be accounted for by pluralism.[21]

Crenson (1971:25) finds that 'the pluralism of observable political activity may actually be a rather stunted kind of diversity, hedged about by concentrations of political influence which prevent the further growth of local political heterogeneity'. Indeed, Hill *et al* (1989:236-237) are unable, in pluralist terms, to explain the contradiction of public discontent over agricultural practices and 'a strong public bias towards non-interference'. Equally problematic for pluralist analysis as instances of non-decision making, Sandbach (1980:114) explains, are the instances of environmental policy where government has heeded public concern, and responded by making decision making processes as open and apparently representative as possible, however leaving covert influences over policy outcomes virtually unchanged.

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21 Given this admission, the question then to be addressed, Clegg (1989:64) argues, is 'what is the status of the formal model of power premised on an agency perspective'?

As we saw in 2.3.5, such government action may well function as mere 'placebo' policy response, achieving illusory participation that Amy (1990) found symbolic and placatory, and in which environmentalists often ended up trading their core demands. In the early phase of the London Brick works dispute, pluralist emphasis upon observable conflict would equally see local quiescence on the subject of pollution and industrial dereliction as evidence of consensus that these were non issues (Blowers 1983:410). In fact Blowers found the company's long established, low profile strategy, its pacification of local farmers, the liberal planning conditions applying to its works and site, and its close relationship with the Alkali pollution inspectorate, an adequate defence against early challenge by environmentalists.

Whilst the overt political arena of concern to pluralists is fraught with dangers for environmentalists as ideological contenders and political outsiders (not the least of which are those experiences discussed in 2.3 of communicative distortion, co-option, suppression and misrepresentation of environmental concerns by dominant political processes), there is equally no doubt that it is also an arena well exploited both in terms of short term ecopolitical gains, and attempts in the longer term to transform materialist society. Pluralism as a description, a methodology or an evaluation, however, will only ever provide an account of visible decision making - a valuable initial account of what appears to have happened, or what is 'apparent' in an environmental dispute. This first layer of explanation must be transcended if issues such as the role of ideology, the influence of corporate power, and the mobilisation of bias against ideological opponents are to be addressed in analysis. Although pluralist analysis is blind to the way in which the political agenda is controlled, and the manner in which pluralist researchers may assume the bias of the political system under observation, it is well placed to

document policy change, the extent to which environmentalists impact upon policy processes, and indeed the success of their efforts in revising power relations between themselves and their avowed political opponents.

However, notwithstanding this descriptive utility, it remains difficult to reconcile the pluralist sense of politics as an equitable bargaining process with either the structural power imbalance found in *2.3.6* to potentially constrain ecological demands, or Cotgrove's view of environmentalists as relative political outsiders, ideologically opposed to basic societal values, and systematically repressed by dominant interests[22] (Cotgrove 1982:88). In all, Cox *et al* argue that the drawbacks to pluralism are substantial for ignoring concepts like the mobilisation of bias, non-decision making, agenda setting, the role of ideology and suppression of preferences through the unconscious operation of social and political values and institutions, and therefore on balance it suffers from a limited explanatory utility (Cox, Furlong & Page 1985:219-220).

3.3.3 Power in Three Dimensions

Lukes places pluralism as the first of his three dimensions of power. He sees pluralism as a *one-dimensional* view of power; the *two-dimensional* view belongs to its critics; whilst his own *three-dimensional* view moves beyond simple pluralist analysis, to provide a 'deeper', 'more satisfactory' view of power relations and latent conflict.[23] Lukes observes that

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[22] Gunningham draws on Gouldner's concept of 'normalised repression' to explain power as the ability to define what is moral, and the success of governments in portraying environmentalists as anti-social and hysterical (Gunningham 1974:86-7).

[23] Lukes defines power in the *first dimension* as the ability of A to prevail over B in formal political decision making (normally in government) on one or more key issues, when there is a direct and observable conflict between A and B over outcomes.

The *second dimension* is defined as the ability of A to prevail over B in determining the outcomes of observable conflicts of interest in formal decision making and also in determining what is to count as a formal issue, where there is a conflict of interest over policy preferences and observable grievances over these preferences outside the political system.

pluralism offers a clean-cut paradigm for the behavioural study of decision making by political actors, but assumes the bias of the political system under observation and is blind to the ways in which its political agenda is controlled (Lukes 1974:57). Lukes' two-dimensional typology follows Bachrach and Baratz's (1962) account of power's 'second face', by which these authors consider not only the classic political question of 'who gets what, when and how', but 'who gets left out and how'. This two-dimensional typology 'embraces coercion, influence, authority, force and manipulation', notes the 'confining of the scope of decision making to relatively safe issues', and examines both decisions and non-decision making (Lukes 1974:17-20). In a sense, Lukes argues, the second face of power argument extends the pluralist boundaries of the political system to include, not just key issues, but 'potential issues which non-decision making prevents [such as Crenson and Hill *et al* each reveal in their studies] from being actual' (Lukes 1974:19). The second face of power is not confined to formal decision making within the political system, but may operate in other ways, i.e. - it is 'manifest not just through *overt* acts of conflict but can be exercised by *covert* means through denial and closure of access to the political system' (Cox *et al* :1985:34).

A limitation of the second face of power is recognised by its proponents, Lukes claims, as the difficulty of empirical verification. If the intention of the second-dimension is to move beyond merely an extended case of behaviourism, then, Lukes (1974:18) argues, it is jeopardised by Bachrach and Baratz's empirical insistence 'that their so-called non-decisions which confine the scope of decision making are themselves (observable) decisions', and similarly that if 'there is no conflict, overt or covert, the presumption must be that there is consensus on the prevailing allocation

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The *third dimension* is defined as the ability of A to prevent B from realising his/her "real" interests or from articulating them effectively due to the mobilisation of bias resulting from the institutional structure of society (Cox *et al* 1985:32).

of values, in which case non-decision making is impossible'[24] (Lukes 1974:19). This account is of limited utility in pursuing potential links between non-decision making, and the impact of industrial influence or dominant materialist ideology upon environmental policy formation. Furthermore, Crenson shows that lack of conflict over environmental issues does not necessarily indicate universal public acquiescence that no issue exists, or, if an issue does exist, that its policy resolution is entirely satisfactory. Lukes moves, with his own conception of power, away from behaviouralism and toward Marxian recognition of latent conflict,[25] and of subjective and real interests that need not be expressed as policy preferences or grievances to exist (Cox *et al* 1985:35). Having ventured into Marxist territory, in which Lukes sees his radical view of bias mobilisation as Gramscian licence to examine social forces, historical patterns and the concept of hegemony, he then fails to resolve, in his own words, where to draw the line 'between structural determination, on the one hand, and an exercise of power, on the other' (Lukes 1974:25, 57).[26]

Both the two and three-dimensional views of power offer greater scope than pluralism in explaining the role of bias mobilisation in the constraint, suppression and narrow definition of environmental concern. However these views have their own difficulties of definition. Lukes uses the individualistic 'second face' of power to launch his own three

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[24] Empirical verification forced a modification of this nondecisional thesis, (later seen by the authors as an unwise retreat), away from a trenchant critique of pluralism, to a position 'closer to that of modified behaviourism' Clegg (1989:79). Critics had argued 'that grievances and issues that not exist could not be researched' (Ham & Hill 1984:68).

[25] Latent conflict relies on the contentious notion of false consciousness, and the unarticulated 'real' interests of those excluded from decision making (Lukes 1977:24-5).

[26] Lukes vacillates, Clegg explains, between *conventionalism* and *realism* condemning Dahl's positivism, yet remaining epistemologically imprecise (Clegg 1989:86). He retreats to the very (albeit modified) methodological individualism that he initially sought to demolish (Debnam 1984:17), leaning toward the power conception of his predecessors, yet, like them, failing to follow structural dimensions 'to which they rightly point' (Isaac 1987:15).

dimensional view. Yet Schattschneider's mobilisation of bias theory brought by Bachrach and Baratz to their 'two-dimensional' view may be argued to adequately suggest Lukes' own three-dimensional view. To this could be added Lukes' failure to reconcile elite power theory with his 'radical' view, perhaps in an attempt to contain the potential for elitism to blur the distinctions between the dimensions he describes. He acknowledges, for example, that the theoretical framework of Crenson's concept of non-decision making borders the two and three-dimensional views, and he additionally carries mobilisation of bias from Bachrach and Baratz's view of power through to his own (Lukes 1977:17;43). Elite consideration of behaviour and control, both of which are of interest in exploring corporate influence on environmental policy making, could be argued to operate in any, or simultaneously in each, of Lukes' three dimensions of power. Blowers' recourse to 'neo-elitism' - a combining of power in the second and third dimension - resists these difficulties of definition by gathering together the theoretical middle ground between pluralism and structuralism to descriptively review issue suppression, corporate power and environmental policy making in the London Brick dispute (Blowers 1984:253-258).

3.3.4 The Value of Corporatism

Whilst the power debate, particularly power in Lukes' three dimensions, remains problematic and unresolved, theorists nevertheless agree, as Simeon observes, that power is central to an understanding of policy:

> [T]he means by which policy is carried out is related to the level of conflict and to the distribution of power: the more widely influence is distributed, as in the pluralist model, the more voluntaristic the means; the more intense the conflict, the less the likelihood of compromise, and the more the chance of coercion (Simeon 1976:570).

Simeon is concerned, however, that there be no automatic assumption of the self interestedness of elites, but that a 'third model of power' be

employed (beyond pluralism and elitism) to work back in detail through the political process, and establish the actions, attitudes and/or alliances that may have influenced a policy outcome. Blowers (1983:413), then, on the basis of a painstakingly detailed study, asks whether London Brick was a master of its own fate, or a naive, innocent victim of circumstance; whether it enjoyed disproportionate political power, that is, or whether it was simply an interest group 'with roughly equal chances of success' as any other interest group. He employs a 'dual state' concept[27] to explain how the company exploited its national government support to overwhelm local government opposition, forging corporatist links with officials in an exclusive, collaborative bargaining arena excluding their environmental opponents. By managing to confine environmentalists to the overt pluralist political arena, where the public sympathy tended toward jobs over 'intangible' clean air and environmental amenity, and confident of the national government's willingness to intercede should the local outcome fail to favour the brick works, the company ensured that environmental demands neither prevailed over corporate goals and tactics at the local level, nor in any way impinged upon national policy making (Blowers 1984:289).

Blowers (1984:228-230) employs neo-elitism, as mentioned above, to reveal corporate influence. He acknowledges that the disproportionate power of certain elite groups derives from their superior resources, and he recognises both non-decision making and bias mobilisation as means of suppressing concern for the environment. However, it remains for

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[27] As 3.2.5 mentions (see fn. 15), Blowers' use of temporal and spatial mediating concepts, as well as 'local-national' considerations, and a review of covert and overt political arenas represents his attempt to link analysis from the conflicting pluralist, elitist and structuralists accounts of power.

The 'dual state' thesis, first proposed by Saunders (1981), explains the central state's primary function as 'social investment in support of capital accumulation', whereas the primary role of local government is social consumption with interests more likely to be mediated through competitive politics (Blowers 1984:277).

Blowers to explain not only how but why industry is able to command unstinting loyalty from the state, as London Brick did of the national government in the brick work dispute, as US Steel did of the local government in Gary, as the agriculture industry did of the British government on the setting of nitrate levels, and indeed as industry has traditionally done of the Tasmanian State Government as Chapter Four will argue. For such explanation, Blowers (1984:277) uses corporatist analysis - which he says is 'variously used to refer to an ideology, a process, or a strategy', and 'appeals to elites with its idea of exclusive participation and to Marxists with its suggestions of collusion between state and capital'. Corporatism simply expresses:

> the will of both government officials and interest representatives in all fields to avoid conflict in the development and implementation of policy, and to do so by creating monopolistic representative groups working through formal structures for collaboration (Pross 1986:215).

The political implications of corporatism for policy making have been, Self (1985:125) argues, loss of flexibility and openness in favour of more routinized, established and closed bilateral monopoly relations between government departments and interest groups. By definition corporatism locks unions, employers and governments into arrangements that may well exclude and constrain environmental interests. As Self (1985:108) explains, corporatist values, in principle, oppose those of liberalism and democratic pluralism, by striving for systematic order and harmony at the expense of individual freedom, with the result 'a lessening of electoral accountability of the decisions reached as a result of negotiations between members of the higher echelons' (Simmie 1981:105). This lessening of accountability reflects the 'imprisoning' of institutions and policy making in market oriented societies that Lindblom (1982:330) argues is brushed aside ordinarily as an embarrassing feature of ostensible democracies.

Corporatist analysis indeed offers valuable insight into not only *how* industry may collude with government to resist environmental demands, but also *why*. In *2.4.1*, we saw that the ability of the state to adopt the logic of ecological integrity is constrained by the imperative of capital accumulation and the priority, therefore, that the state accords both material interests and economic growth. In practical, if not ideological, terms, corporatism explains this priority, and the limitation of 'perceived strategic and economic necessity' upon environmental policy responses that Walker describes (Walker 1989:38 in *2.4.5*). Corporatism has further utility in identifying arrangements at a variety of levels, as McEachern (1993b:174) explains, from the level of central government, through 'meso' or 'sectoral' levels between organisations and public officials, and generally at the more dispersed level of policy communities in which 'corporatised interests' again may become the privileged 'insiders'.

3.3.5 Reviewing Ideological Constraint

It remains to consider, in reviewing power theory and policy constraint, what Lukes' third dimension of power, and explanations of ideological hegemony beyond the third dimension add to environmental policy analysis. Whilst Lukes has flirted, as we have seen, with the concept of ideological hegemony as a constraint upon the realisation of interests in his third, 'radical' dimension of power, he has difficulty, Ham and Hill maintain, in explaining how it is that 'real interests', i.e. those exercised relatively free of constraint, can be identified (Ham & Hill 1984:71). This presents Lukes with methodological difficulties that, in Clegg's view, have deflected the entire debate over power theory away from Lukes' three dimensional typology, (for its 'ambiguous' coupling of notions of 'non-decision making' and 'non issues', with the core concept of 'hegemony'), and towards 'less analytically pre-emptive' explanations

(Clegg 1989:2).[28] In moving beyond these difficulties, Clegg (1989:103) observes that Lukes' critics have a number of choices including retreating away from the concept of hegemony into the 'narrow', 'restricted' world of empiricism that 'limits our ability to say almost anything of consequence on the topic of power'. Alternately theorists may undertake detailed exploratory analysis, for example of the explanatory potential of each of the different conceptions of power, as Blowers (1984), Hill *et al* (1989) and Gaventa (1980) have done, systematically comparing various conceptions of the same phenomena.

Gaventa (1980:15) believes that Lukes' third dimension of power provides scope that, to date, is the least developed, least understood of the three views. Beyond attempts to identify mechanisms of power in latent conflict, a study of power in the third dimension may involve 'the study of social myths, languages and symbols', 'the study of communication', 'a focus upon the means by which social legitimations are developed' and the location of 'the power processes behind the social construction of meaning and patterns'. In Gaventa's case study of an Appalachian coal mining community, Clegg concedes that a causal link between hegemony and relative powerlessness is persuasively argued from its basis in 'a case constructed primarily through the fine detail of historical analysis', and for improving on Lukes' model 'by not making the focus of interests a constitutive feature' (Clegg 1989:14). Gaventa gives 'the actual processes of myth, persuasion, legitimation, ideologization and so on' a reality that Lukes was clearly unable to convey in his own condensed study (Clegg 1989:109; Gaventa 1980:13). In general, however, Clegg sees the power debate as having moved beyond the third dimension to deal with two

[28] Clegg's (1989:xv) own project beyond these difficulties is essentially to temporally trace power debate, from its origins in Hobbes and Machiavelli's opposing notions of *agency* and *strategic* power, to their modernist applications, in arriving at his own 'circuits of power' that he suggests orders the debate into 'three family groupings clustered around loci of dispositional, agency and facilitative concepts of power'.

distinct contemporary concerns in power theory, firstly critiquing the dominant ideology thesis, and secondly exploring post-structuralist analysis which proposes that:

> [R]ather than thinking of either ideology or hegemony as a state of mind, one would better regard it as a set of practices, primarily of a *discursive provenance* which seeks to foreclose the indefinite possibilities of signifying elements and their relations, in determinate ways (Clegg 1989:16; italics added).

There are other means of evading Lukes' methodological 'dead ends', as Ham and Hill suggest (1984:71), besides resorting to an exploration of post-structuralist discursive practices. However, these 'other means' do not necessarily contradict the usefulness of post-structuralist inquiry. Post-structuralism does help to identify opposing discourse in ecopolitical conflict, however it less helpful in identifying the dominant material and industrial sources of ideological constraint. Lindblom, on the other hand, utilises the insights of elitism and marxist structuralism to adopt a mixed *critical pluralist/corporatist* approach. This enables his recognition of *selective social mechanisms* that mobilise bias and exercise agenda control in the promotion of corporate interests, without leading him into the 'abyss' of structural determinism, whereby 'agents' are no more than the 'bearers of objective forces which they are unable to effect' (Lindblom 1982:329; Ham & Hill 1984:35). Lindblom's mechanism is the *market punishment* that social or environmental reform automatically triggers:

> The efficacy of the recoil mechanism is evidenced by the continuing historical failure of egalitarian aspirations to achieve a significant change in the distribution of wealth and income among social strata, and by the continuing autonomy of corporate management in a world in which increasing numbers of thoughtful people are arguing, on environmental and other grounds, that no group of leaders can be allowed to exercise so autonomous a control over our lives (Lindblom 1982:330).

Crenson's study of non-decision making adds, to Lindblom's observation, that even the *power reputation* of the market for automatic punishment of 'non-market' reforms could preclude the initiation of environmental

policy measures. Crenson and Gaventa are both able to evade Lukes' methodological obstacle of 'real interests', with Crenson simply assuming that the citizens of Gary have an interest in not being poisoned that is 'scarcely disputable'. Crenson as the 'observor' then makes a judgement based upon 'the value of human life' that may certainly apply to other environmental policy issues. The inarticulate ideology that he finds in Gary's political institutions suppresses the air pollution issue, promoting 'the selective perception and articulation of social problems and conflicts' (Lukes 1974:45, 46; *3.2.3* for discussion). Gaventa, on the other hand, finds the legitimation of 'dominant ways and values' in the Appalachian Valley achieved in the third dimension by further *indirect mechanisms of constraint*, i.e. the promotion of a community *ideology of loyalty* against the interests of the rank and file; a *shaping of conception* through media information flow; a *denial of participation* cultivating a *routine of non-challenge;* and a manipulation of the 'power field' through the *invocation of myth, rumours or symbols* where routines of non-challenge are broken (Gaventa 1980:255-256).

3.3.6 Syntheses of Power Approaches?

It is apparent that power analysis in each of Lukes' three dimensions, as well as the dimensions beyond, contributes to a broad yet detailed picture of capacity and constraint in the realisation of environmental demands. Several considerations stand out in reflection, such as the descriptive ability of pluralism, the explanatory value of corporatism, the utility of non-decision making and bias mobilisation in the second and third dimensions, and the structuralist explanation of institutional constraint. Each dimension has its limitations, however. Pluralism offers a valuable account of the overt political arena, to which, Blowers argues, corporate interests prefer to keep environmentalists confined. However, pluralism assumes that there is an equality of opportunity to influence policy

outcomes. For the purposes of this discussion, pluralism fails to appreciate the environmental challenge as ideologically distinctive, and potentially constrained within the dominant industrial paradigm. Non-decision making and bias mobilisation analysis complement pluralism for explaining the obstacle of material interests and dominant values to the legitimisation of environmental policy concerns discussed in *2.2.5.* Together, the second and third dimensional perspectives explain the manner in which dominant interests and ideas, as Sandbach argues, marginalise environmental concerns whilst appearing to resolve them (Sandbach 1980:36-38 in *2.2.5*).

Corporatism complements the second and third dimensions of power by reviewing state-capital arrangements that may exclude environmental interests and direct concerns.[29] It identifies the mechanisms that the state may employ to facilitate, support or direct corporate activity, and clearly contrary to pluralism, it suggests that power has increasingly centralised as governments, in Self's (1985:115) terms, have acted 'to give different support to some interests while trying to neutralise the demands of others'. Whilst the second and third dimensional accounts demonstrate how contending values and demands may be prevented from entry to the overt decision making arena, corporatism, as we have seen, explains how and why this may occur. Corporatist insight has been incorporated into pluralism by Lindblom to show the privileged position of business, and by Marxists, such as Sandbach, into their discussions of power in capitalist societies, to show the manner in which economic relations shape human action and constrain environmental policy formation (Cox *et al* 1985:230). The structuralist account of objective policy determination complements

[29] There is furthermore scope within corporatist analysis for recognising the relative autonomy of the state, following Lindblom's explanation of 'government as operating under a realistic mixture of political pressures and economic constraints', rather than seeking an explanation from 'any visible structural imperative' (Self 1985:118).

Lukes' three dimensions of power by defining the scope and capacity of policy response, and can usefully be included in a 'multi-layered' explanation of environmental policy constraint.

It is relatively common for theorists applying conflicting views of power to conclude that each view has both theoretical and empirical explanatory utility. It is equally common for theorists to suggest, as Gaventa does, that 'only through the interrelationship of the dimensions and the re-enforcing effect of each dimension on the other' will the total impact of power be understood (Gaventa 1980:256). However, theoretical syntheses of power are not easily achieved. They face the obstacle of reconciling very different theoretical approaches, each drawing upon very different disciplinary traditions, each derived from different, largely incongruous images of the totality of the polities, or the states, which are the objects of their analyses, and each claiming to be the proper and correct method of analysing power in capitalist societies (Etzioni-Halevy 1989:18). Cox *et al* conclude that it is impossible to arrive at a 'correct method of power analysis', since no universally accepted 'meta' theory of power can ever be agreed upon.

They welcome the convergence of interest in issues of power and constraint by scholars of different theoretical persuasion, and suggest that, of itself, this will undoubtably lead, by cross fertilisation, to a greater understanding of the mechanisms of change and continuity in capitalist society (Cox *et al* 1985:231). In the meantime, they advocate the adoption of an eclectic, detached perspective, which, in the absence of an overarching general theory of power, would involve keeping an open mind to the insights which competing theories offer, recognising that some concepts of power will inevitably remain essentially contested (Cox *et al* 1985 vii-viii, 39). If syntheses such as this are shunned, Ham and

Hill (1984:61) warn, then there is a real danger that methodological and definitional debates will end up overwhelming 'the substantive questions [about power] that originally interested researchers in this field'.

Case study analyses such as those by Blower (1984), and Hill *et al* (1989), strive descriptively, if not methodologically, for a synthesis of explanations with mixed results. Blowers finds great difficulties in constructing a 'precise relationship' between power theory and the empirical evidence in the brick works dispute. This is not merely because he is applying conflicting theories, but also because the eclectic approach he adopts, in his view, outruns empirical application. Blowers sees his study as part of the 'new, innovative and somewhat innocent' area of urban studies, which, given its unorthodox, multi-disciplinary approach, is bound to experience a range of methodological problems. He finds that without the use of the mediating concepts mentioned above, which he employs to link the various interpretations of power, the evidence is strained 'to support hypotheses which bear little relationship to the complex and confusing pictures presented by experience'. Other urban studies authors are equally interested in synthesis, Blowers observes, - Saunders, for example, who remarks that one sided theoreticism is likely to prove as sterile as one sided empiricism, and Dunleavy, to whom it does not seem utopian to detect signs of empirically supported common ground underlying the contending theories of power (Blowers 1984:250-260).

Simeon acknowledges the importance of power theory in explaining policy by including power as a key approach in his 'causality funnel' from which, as discussed above, policy is seen to emerge from multiple causes. In terms of the conceptual and methodological debate, not only about theories of power, but also between each of the other approaches which

comprise the policy funnel, Simeon himself also notes that competing power theories are more usefully seen as complementary on the basis that each theory makes some contribution, but that none alone provides a full understanding of policy outcomes. He adds that although the most useful policy models appear to be the *power-resources* (spanning Lukes' first and second dimensions) and *cultural-ideological* (spanning Lukes' second and third dimensions) ones, the utility of each approach varies (as we have seen) depending on the aspect of policy one wants to explain (Simeon 1976:566-570).

Different approaches to power have validity at different levels of analysis, as Brugger and Jaensch (1985:80-81) observe, and the model of power one uses will depend upon the questions one wants to ask. By distinguishing power from other key approaches (that is socio-economic context, ideas, institutions and policy processes) Simeon nevertheless overlooks the potential for each of the theories of power to address and, as we have seen, to add depth to each of these levels. Overlap between power theory and policy approaches will need to be reviewed before adopting Simeon's framework of analysis for explaining environmental policy outcomes, and it is to this task which we now turn.

3.4 Frameworks of Analysis

3.4.1 Power and Policy Analysis

Power theory, as reviewed in *3.3.6*, provides a 'multi-layered' explanation when considering the key concern of this thesis, namely the capacity of environmentalists to realise their policy demands, and, as we shall see, plays a key role in the framework of analysis applied to environmental policy making in Tasmania. However the place of power analysis within the broad policy approach discussed so far needs clarification before the framework adopted for Tasmanian analysis is detailed at the conclusion of this Chapter.

The basic elements of the framework for Tasmanian analysis reflect Downey's (1987) application of Simeon's (1976) causality funnel, however with a deeper appreciation of the value and levels of power analysis. The aspects of analysis that must be considered prior to introducing this framework are then: the overlap between power and policy analysis, the suitability and manageability of analysis at multiple levels, the details of Downey's model, the problem of linear focus that the causality approach may generate, and an acceptable resolution of these issues that facilitates an approach to environmental policy analysis and an explanation of the actions of the state in Tasmania.

The focus of power analysis may range, as we have seen, from the most overt to the least overt of political arenas, and from the most overt to the least overt of influences, therefore, upon a policy outcome. If we return to a consideration of the character of environmentalism and the nature of environmental issues, discussed particularly in *2.2.1* to *2.2.3*, the utility of power analysis as a multi-layered policy tool soon becomes apparent. In Chapter Two, environmentalism is introduced as paradigmatically

opposing dominant industrialism; environmental values as subversively challenging prevailing values and policy boundaries; and the satisfaction of ecopolitical demands requiring the radical distancing of the state from the interests of capital. However, it is noted that whilst conceptually convenient, the transformation of values into structured paradigms is fraught with problems and contradictions, and that in reality there are almost as many 'shades of green' as there are environmental issues. Indeed, this diversity is seen as both one of the Green movements greatest strengths, in ensuring the 'unfolding' [in Fox's (1990) terms] of its many ecological, social, and ethical concerns, and it greatest weakness, in denying the movement a single, defining political voice.

In policy terms, it would be a mistake to assume that environmentalism is easily defined, for example as single issue politics. If environmentalists are located within mainstream policy processes, it would furthermore be a mistake to assume that they represent the totality of environmental belief on a particular issue, and that the issue is therefore 'resolved' and off the agenda for having an institutionalised resolution process. Indeed, if we consider environmentalism in the shades of 'light' to 'dark' green discussed in *2.3.1*, we find that the 'deepest' shade of green offers the greatest policy challenge to dominant values, and is most resistant to mainstream policy processes. This 'deepest' shade of green is inspired by 'the key value of ecocentrism', and, as we have seen, defines what is novel and distinctive about Green politics, around which the values of the ecological paradigm cluster (Eckersley 1992b:160; Hay 1988:27; in *2.2.4*). This ecocentric shade of green furthermore inspires environmental demands that most challenge the values of the dominant paradigm, and are therefore the least easy to satisfy in policy terms. In *2.3.6*, following a review of the boundaries of ideological constraint upon the realisation of environmental demands, we found a 'hierarchy of environmental

issues' paralleling the shades of 'light' to 'dark' green environmentalism, with the easiest achievements for environmentalists involving the least threat to dominant industrial interests and most readily acceptable to the state (Dempsey & Power 1973:616; in *2.3.6*).

A multi-layered approach to power analysis offers an explanation for the capacity of environmentalists to achieve a policy response or experience constraint at a variety of levels. The hierarchy of environmental issues is captured by a hierarchy of power analysis - beginning with the first dimensional pluralist account of visible action, moving on to the second dimensional account of covert influence and bias mobilisation toward certain policy outcomes, and concluding with the structuralist account of objective circumstances of constraint and ideological accounts of the policy privilege of dominant discourse.

Whilst the struggle to legitimise and realise any environmental demand is usually initiated in the overt pluralist political arena, to confine power analysis to a pluralist account as we have seen is, in Eckersley's terms, to 'miss or underplay' in this case the significance of the environmental challenge to capital interests and the mobilisation of bias to contain any such threat to the capital accumulation process. As we saw in *2.4.1*, the satisfaction of ecological (i.e 'deep green') demands requires such a radical distancing of the state from capital interests that Bell (1992:210), for example, argues that only limited (i.e. 'light green') reforms may ever be achieved.

Both Simeon (1976:568) and Downey (1987:31) recognise the role of power, specifically the *distribution* of power, in the determination and analysis of public policy. Downey, as we shall see in *3.4.3*, adapts Simeon's policy approach to an analysis of environmental policy in the interests of best

describing and appreciating 'the various influences and assumptions which define the context within which public policies are made'. Simeon observes that power offers at once the 'most plausible and most complex' of perspectives:

> We would expect policy outcomes, especially the distributional dimensions, to be a function of the number of interests involved, the degree of disagreement or conflict among them, and the relative means of influence which each is able to bring to bear in the policy process. But grave problems arise in the conceptualisation and measurement of power itself, and in describing the structure of power in society (Simeon 1976:568).

Whilst the debate between power theorists 'shows no signs of abating', Simeon is concerned that the difficulties inherent in what he calls the 'influence focus' should not lead to its abandoning altogether, but rather that conflicting theories should each be able to make their contribution to an explanation of public policy (Simeon 1976:569). The limitation of the role of power in Simeon's framework of analysis is its restricted focus upon the distribution of power, i.e. of interests in society and of the resources available to satisfy these interests,[30] when power could be argued to manifest as a policy determinant of various dimensions within each of Simeon's 'socio-economic', 'power and influence', 'dominant values and ideas', 'formal structures and institutions' and 'policy process' levels of policy analysis (noted in *3.3.1*). An explanation of environmental public policy at any of these levels, if it were to properly account for power as the capacity to achieve the policy demands of environmentalists, could then be extended to review power in the first, second, and third dimensions, and beyond these to review structuralist power and ideological constraint.

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[30] Although Simeon does concede that the 'distributional' power approach to policy within the context of his 'causality' framework of analysis would take a variety of forms.

3.4.2 Macro, Middle & Micro Levels of Analysis

It is worth considering the growing role that eclecticism is playing, not only in power theory, as we have seen in *3.3.6*, but in policy analysis, as theorists attempt to link specific policy processes and outcomes with a broad range of influences. Ham and Hill advocate a framework[31] that mirrors both Simeon's and Downey's emphasis upon the context within which public policies are made, and indeed that is adopted by Hill *et al* (1989; in *3.2.6*) in their study of non-decision making on nitrate pollution in Great Britain. Blowers and Hill *et al* use contrasting paradigms to establish influences upon environmental policy, as we have seen, and in doing so expose the limitations of the theories of pluralism, neo-elitism and structuralism to the extent that no theory appears valid without the explanatory contribution of the other. Even where corporate power and structuralist influences appear the best explanations, as they do in both studies, this conclusion rests upon information gleaned from other accounts, and, in Blowers' case, upon mediating spatial, temporal and political concepts that link the otherwise disparate levels of analysis. The broader analysis of the structuralist account is then tempered both by the minutiae of detail afforded by observation, and by the state-capital nexus that is found by Blowers to mobilise bias toward a given policy outcome.

Whilst the first, second and third dimensions of power identify overt, covert and latent influences upon public policy outcomes and policy formation, the pluralist, neo-elitist and structuralists accounts, as Blowers and Hill *et al* employ them, describe both influences and arenas of state action in their case studies. Neither author attempts the task of relating

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[31] In order to account for social, political and economic influences upon public policy formation, they consider: 'the micro level of decision-making within organisations; the middle range analysis of policy formulation; and macro analysis of political systems, including examination of the role of the state' (Ham & Hill 1984:17). Ham and Hill note that the interaction between levels is significant and problematic, as does Simeon, who observes that these interrelationships provide independent contributions to analysis of the central dimensions of policy (Simeon 1976:556).

power theory to state theory, although both employ power terminology, in particular non-decision making, in each of their analyses. Indeed Hill *et al* explicitly explore the pluralist, neo-elitist and structuralist arenas in an attempt to explain non-decision making on ground water pollution controls, whilst Blowers explores each of the arenas in describing the brick works dispute as well as explaining the role of corporate power in determining its outcome. Crenson, on the other hand, focuses solely upon non-decision making as an empirical exercise in discrediting pluralism, whilst Sandbach tempers his Marxist approach by recognising the role of agency in achieving a policy outcome. Before turning in *3.4.3* to Downey's recommendation of Simeon's framework as an approach for environmental policy analysis, it is worth considering how the pluralism, neo-elitism and structuralism relate to Simeon's categories, and whether there is any obvious obstacle to reviewing power in each of his categories, or levels of analysis, as suggested above in *3.4.1*.

The broadest level of analysis advocated by Simeon (1976:567) is 'socio-economic environment'. This covers the general characteristics defining the policy context or setting, such as geography, demography, technology, and limiting the resources available for achieving a policy resolution. Whilst these features may determine the scope of policy, and provide an invaluable starting point for comparative analysis, Simeon claims that they are unable to explain the detail of policy responses and processes. In terms of structuralist analysis of environmental policy, this level may be seen more specifically as the political economy of the policy setting found wanting by Walker in *3.2.1*, (in spite of its 'illustrative' utility), for its lack of specific attention to process. Simeon's broadest level of analysis does not parallel, preclude nor contradict the structuralist account so much as precede it by placing structuralist considerations in a broader, potentially limiting descriptive context. The 'middle level' of Simeon's typology

considers the 'fundamental political variables' of power, culture, ideology and institutions. Here the correlation between these factors and the middle level of elitist and neo-elitist explanations employed by both Blowers and Hill *et al* is on shaky ground, although not altogether irrelevant, since elitism belongs to 'power' analysis but is less a part of cultural, ideological and institutional approaches. Simeon's final level of 'policy process' correlates relatively easily with pluralism and Lindblom's critical pluralism, by focusing upon day-to-day influences leading up to a policy outcome.

Davis *et al* note that policy analysis 'must look to insights from a range of approaches and avoid being confined to the narrow concerns (or jargon) of any one approach'. Their application of Simeon's causality funnel, has analytic focus moving 'from the broadest possible scope to detailed concern' on the basis that:

> A funnel technique assumes that different explanations are required at different levels as the analyst's perspective moves closer and closer to the specific (Davis *et al* 1988:9).

In their causality model, Davis *et al* examine Australian public policy after Simeon, at the 'macro level' of the role of the state, at the 'middle level' role of bureaucrats, parties and interest groups, and at the level of outcome where they examine key policy fields and specific policy choices. This approach accommodates the authors' need to 'describe the local policy arena and processes, to explore the interplay between people and institutions, and to emphasise the continuing role of the political'. They find that structural and electoral constraints limit policy making rather than a failure by decision makers to comprehend better policy options, and that only the political process, operating within such constraints, rather than 'rational' choice or policy planning techniques determines 'who wins' in the shaping of Australian public policy (Davis *et al* 1988:9).

3.4.3 Downey's Categories of Analysis

By moving on to consider Downey's adoption of Simeon's causality approach, we return to our concern with environmental policy analysis. Having established that such analysis must acknowledge the complexity of environmentalism, the hierarchy of environmental issues from most to least threatening to dominant interests, and the overt, covert and latent constraints upon environmental policy formation, Downey's adoption of Simeon's framework to a consideration of environmental policy appears a useful approach. We shall return to the question of the manageability of this approach for Tasmanian analysis in the conclusion of this chapter after reviewing the utility of Downey's and other policy frameworks. Briefly, Downey believes that policy analysis must reflect the complexities of environmental decision making. He finds Simeon's approach reasonably thorough for its explanation of 'the selection, scope, means, and, ultimately, the distributive dimensions of government policy', but also useful to his own project of identifying the range of factors restricting environmental choice and innovation, thereby creating problems in the promotion of 'desired changes' in policy (Downey 1987:30). Downey argues that the demonstration of 'complexity' in the formation of policy, challenges the 'narrow, idea-less pragmatism school of public policy analysis', but he warns that conclusions based upon a broader approach must be drawn from detailed study rather than mere hypotheses about the role of causal forces (Downey 1987:34).

Downey's basic explanatory concerns parallel the concerns of this thesis that environmental policy analysis *not* rely upon a simplistic 'issue based' focus, but that it proceed from a recognition of the fundamental nature and complexity of environmentalism and of the range of environmental issues, and that it identify constraints upon the realisation of policy goals. Downey seeks to explain apparent ad hoc,

'erratic fluctuations in the level of government commitment and methods of intervention' that have resulted in significant environmental policy variations. Explanations by analysts of policy variation as the result of governments pragmatically, reactively 'muddling through' fail to convince Downey. He argues that to employ pragmatism as a policy explanation is inadequate. It ignores ideological, economic and social influences upon the policy process, and in short, 'is nothing more than a handy excuse for avoiding more difficult questions and for failing to attempt more incisive explanations':

> Government responses over time to environmental concerns can be described as a most blatant form of ad hockery, and on occasion have been characterised by the policy makers themselves as simply doing what was 'best' in the circumstances. However, it must be emphasised that these responses have not been formulated in a vacuum (Downey 1987:31).

If 'method' is to be gleaned from the apparent policy madness of ad hoc decision making, Downey argues that it will only be by 'appreciating the various influences and assumptions which define the context within which public policies are made' (Downey 1987:32). The broader context of the policy environment, is, Downey suggests, the obvious starting point for analysis, before moving through Simeon's other categories of power, ideas, institutions and the policy process. The broad context may include state allegiances and dependencies, as well as its political economy, and its physical and industrial characteristics. In terms of power as a policy tool, Downey (1987:31) adopts neither a pluralist nor neo-Marxist position, but notes that the influence and access of various interests to decision makers must be reviewed before determining 'not only who is in a position to influence policy and to whom benefits accrue, but also whether or not benefits received are necessarily a consequence of influence'.

Whilst he only briefly deals with the broader socio-economic context of policy analysis, and the distribution of power, the role of institutions and the policy process, Downey (1987:31-32) is more forthcoming about the utility of ideology as a tool for environmental policy analysis, arguing that policy 'should be examined with reference to ideas'. Ideologies, dominant ideas, and policy paradigms, he argues, each account for policy orientation and assumptions behind environmental decision making, for example a 'common belief' in:

> the appropriate role of the state in society, the legitimate participants in the policy process, preference for, or an aversion to, the market system, emphasis on economic growth over a concern for the distributive dimension of policy and the like (Downey 1987:31).

Environmentalists campaigning against pollution in the early 1970s, for example, were seen as attacking 'individualism and materialism' and 'the free enterprise consumer economy', and therefore won few victories and discovered that 'the inertia to change was greater than expected and bold words did not always lead to bold actions in the political arena'. The primacy of the business ethic is 'above challenge', Downey argues, and dominates environmental concerns 'particularly in difficult economic times' (Downey 1987:32). As Doern and Phidd (1983:53) note:

> Ideologies remain an important element of political life not because ideologies 'cause' or automatically lead to policy preferences and action by governments in power, but because ideologies can help foreclose certain policy options or reduce levels of commitment to particular courses of action and to particular ideas.

Whilst related to ideology, Downey sees dominant ideas like 'efficiency', 'individual liberty', 'equality' and so forth as each having their own influence upon policy, and constituting 'another level of normative content'. Policy paradigms, on the other hand, usually apply to a specific field of policy, and prescribe '[p]rinciples concerning the manner in which issues should be construed and handled', with an obvious example being Keynesian economics (Downey 1987:32). A dominant policy paradigm

may be tempered or challenged by a contending one, for example as environmentalism is argued in Chapter Two to challenge industrialism.

3.4.4 The Policy Flow Approach

Despite the importance of the levels of analysis proposed by Simeon in his broad framework, the causality funnel analogy itself presents major difficulties. The cause and effect linearity that 'funnel analysis' implies could undermine the utility of Simeon's inquiry if it were taken literally. It is useful to review Sabatier's (1991b:149) criticism of Hofferberts' (1974) earlier model upon which Simeon's appears very much based, that is, the 'open systems (funnel of causality) approach'. Hofferbert positioned his funnel sideways, and indicated that the broad analytic focus at its mouth then narrowed through levels of analysis in a causal fashion to influence policy output at its opposite, narrowest width. His conceptual framework then explains policy outcome as the 'direct and indirect function' of:

> ... historical-geographic conditions, socio-economic decisions, mass political behaviour, government institutions, and - most directly - elite behaviour (Sabatier 1991b:149-50).

The causality funnel's 'development sequence' is criticised by Sabatier (1991b:150) for its 'black-box' approach to policy explanation, and indeed for lending causal weight to socio-economic characteristics.[32] However, rather than analytically ranging through general to specific influences in arriving at a policy output, as Downey suggests, Simeon proposes the opposite direction of analysis, defying his own description of a *funnel of influence* and its inference of broad factors weighing down on specific outcomes. Simeon notes that whilst his categories of analysis 'group and make sense out of a wide variety of determinants of policy', the starting point for analysis, he argues, should be the policy outcome, from which

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[32] Sabatier's (1991b:153) own model focuses upon 'the interaction of competing advocacy coalitions in a policy subsystem/community' however acknowledging both the constraints of basic social structures and constitutional rules, and changes in the broad socio-economic conditions external to the policy subsystem.

the analyst must work backwards as far as required into the political process to achieve an explanation (Simeon 1976:555-6). Such analysis may, in a particular case, establish causal influence after Hofferbert, however Simeon investigates before making assumptions and advocates not a linear analytic path, but rather the pursuit of a range of complementary policy approaches.

An approach that avoids the difficulties of causality and linearity, and yet accounts for the considerations of power and values that are of concern to this discussion is the 'policy flow' model and its application to analysis of the most internationally analysed Tasmanian environmental dispute - the Franklin-Lower Gordon Dam controversy (Simmons *et al* 1974; Davis 1984). The focus of the policy flow model is upon 'executive, legislative and judicial participants in the policy process, with a view to explicating the relationship of values to public policy' (Simmons *et al* 1974:457). It suggests that public policy choices emerge from 'interactive processes' into which 'actors, groups and agencies' are drawn on particular policy issues. Policy making in general is explained as the network of these interactive processes within 'a total system', with the various participants in policy making seen as belonging to 'sub systems' that are 'constrained by formal and informal arrangements derived from the total system'. The concern of the policy flow model is, as is Simeon's and Downey's concern, to 'identify aspects of policy making normally obscured', and so to capture the complexity of the policy making process beyond individual decisions (Simmons *et al* 1974:458-460).

For the purposes of this discussion, 'policy flow' overcomes the problem of causality discussed above, being designed to contrast traditional linear focus in policy analysis with focus upon interaction and policy evolution in the identification of 'the total milieu of policy formation'. The 'black

box' funnel analogy is overcome by a 'policy interaction milieu' that is graphically depicted as a spherical policy environment, into which flow interests, values and power arrangements, and out of which spin public policies. Whilst this milieu is seen as dynamic, the authors nevertheless acknowledge the potential for tendencies toward both *entropy*, where lack of 'resources and energy' see policy fail to emerge, and *hypertrophy*, where policy is so 'dominated by a particular characteristic' that its evolution is inhibited or paralysed and 'the social need that spawned the process in the beginning is [in fact] no longer served'. The authors illustrate domination with the example of hydro-industrialisation in Tasmania, and its constraining impact upon the state's ability to respond 'to interests demanding environmental protection of valued natural resources' (Simmons *et al* 1974:460-461). (This constraint is, in fact, the focus of Chapter Four's review of the capacity of environmentalists to achieve their policy demands in Tasmania).

Values and power are interpreted more restrictively in the policy flow model than in Simeon's analysis, focusing respectively upon the values of the policy participants and the power arrangements brought by them to a specific policy arena. There is, however, nothing to suggest that these concepts cannot be interpreted more broadly, for example by placing the milieu of policy interaction (or policy community in more contemporary terms) within its greater socio-economic environment. Davis's (1984:6) elaboration of the policy flow model in his review of the Franklin-Lower Gordon Dams controversy reveals that, 'utilising variables common to a number of other policy models', he is able to enhance the explanatory utility of 'interactive milieu' analysis.[33] In introducing the characteristics of the policy issue, Davis captures the key technocentric-ecocentric value

[33] Davis's (1984:6-7) approach is to explain the controversy with reference to: the policy issue; the time horizon; the principal protagonists; tangible and intangible input variables; policy process; policy style; policy outcome and impacts; and policy feedback.

clash introduced in *2.2.1* in terms of opposing dominant material and alternate ecological paradigms. Davis (1984:12-13) subsequently notes that policy 'actions and decisions [throughout the Dams controversy] were based more upon beliefs and political leverage than any detailed evaluation of factual evidence'; that the government exploited the value clash by promoting anti-conservationist sentiment in an attempt to achieve its own policy goals; and that the issue was 'ill-handled' by 'incompetent politicians' who thwarted democratic decision making in the interests of retaining 'insensitive bureaucratic power' over the policy process.

3.4.5 An Environmental Policy Approach

The framework of analysis adopted here to review environmental decision making in Tasmania is concerned to establish the ability of environmentalists to achieve their demands in circumstances of policy constraint. As noted in Chapter One, and confirmed by Davis (1984:2), Tasmania sought early this century to overcome its isolation and vulnerability as a peripheral island economy by adopting the policy of hydro-industrialisation. In Downey's terms, hydro-industrialisation functioned as a policy paradigm that defined the context within which all other development decisions were to be made (Downey 1987:32). The policy primacy of hydro-industrialisation went unchallenged until the rise of environmentalism in the late 1960s. An ideological challenge was first posed to development policy by environmentalists in the dispute over the flooding of Lake Pedder, and deepened with the subsequent Franklin-Lower Gordon, Electrona silicon smelter and Wesley Vale pulp mill disputes.

The boundaries of constraint upon the realisation of environmental goals, and the political boundaries of state action and response to

environmental demands were overtly prescribed by hydro-industrial imperatives. A study of the policy outcomes of these disputes must therefore, in Simeon's terms, review the political, economic and social framework within which policy is made, in order to explain both the forces that limit and the forces that extend the range of policy alternatives. The intent of the case study reviews in Chapter Four and the analysis in Chapter Five is to establish whether, as Chapter Two suggests, dominant values inform policy boundaries capable of accommodating or routinely excluding environmental demands.

The framework of analysis chosen for reviewing the Pedder, Franklin, Electrona and Wesley Vale case studies follows Simeon's concern to identify broad influences upon specific policy outcomes. However, some important modifications are undertaken to Simeon's approach. Firstly, Downey's emphasis upon the influence of ideology, dominant ideas, and policy paradigms is drawn upon to introduce the case studies as studies in paradigmatic conflict. As Hay and Haward note, 'Tasmania is a crucible of environmentalist conflict'. In conflicts between the 'greenies' and the 'proponents of large scale development' in Tasmania, the authors argue that the issues and values at stake are more focused and distilled than anywhere else in the world (Hay & Haward 1988:435).

Each of the Pedder, Franklin, Electrona and Wesley Vale disputes saw the dominant development paradigm challenged by ecocentric demands that classically opposed prevailing values and policy boundaries. In terms of the shades of 'light' to 'dark' green discussed in *2.3.1* and *3.4.1*, these ecocentric demands represent the most intractable, deepest shade of green. This deep ecocentric green challenge is motivated, Hay and Haward (1988:442) argue, by the threat of the wholesale destruction of

Tasmania's remnant wilderness areas, and has lent powerful momentum to the structuring of the state's green political movement.

Having introduced each conflict in terms of the dominant economic and alternate ecological values at stake, Chapter Four is preoccupied with the documentation of the empirical detail of the disputes. As we have seen, ecocentrism inspires demands that are least easy to satisfy in policy terms, so that whilst Chapter Four essentially documents the nature of each of the conflicts and the mechanisms introduced to resolve them, it is also concerned to identify the relative opportunities of the opposing interests to influence the policy outcome. The empirical documentation then also considers the overt, covert or latent opportunities available to the value contenders in the pursuit of their opposing economic and ecological goals. In summary, the approach to the Tasmanian studies is essentially in two parts. Chapter Four documents the four key disputes, presenting in each case the broad policy environment before describing the issues at stake, the details of the conflicts, and the specific events and policy processes involved in the resolution of an outcome. Discussion moves initially as Downey suggests from broad influences to specific details and outcomes, however returns at the conclusion of Chapter Four to reflect upon the opportunities and constraints experienced by opposing value contenders, and upon the capacity of environmentalists therefore to achieve their policy demands in Tasmania. This review of power as the capacity in various dimensions to achieve a policy outcome further modifies Simeon's approach, and serves to introduce broader analysis in Chapter Five of the efficacy of the environmental challenge over two decades in Tasmania.

The adoption of this broad policy approach follows Ham and Hill's (1984:17) recognition of the need in policy analysis to stand back from the

world of everyday politics in order to ask what they call 'some of the bigger questions' about the role of the state in contemporary society and the distribution of power between groups. The bigger questions in terms of Tasmanian environmental policy analysis, include the following concerns - What is the nature of conflict in each dispute? How are conflicting concerns accommodated or constrained? Is there equality of opportunity to influence the policy process and to resolve the dispute outcome? Have two decades of bitter conflict led to policy learning or improved decision making practices? Any analysis that failed to appreciate environmental disputation in Tasmania as ideologically charged would, in Eckersley's terms, miss or underplay what is novel and distinctive about the nature of the environmental challenge to hydro-industrial state development practices. However, the approach adopted here of reviewing ecopolitical conflict and policy influences at a variety of levels is an attempt to ensure that the hierarchy of environmental issues can be matched to a hierarchy of ecopolitical influence from the most to the least overt of political arenas, and an attempt to explain not only constraint by Tasmanian state governments of the goals of environmentalists in each of the Pedder, Franklin, Electrona and Wesley Vale disputes, but also to explain the external influences that were successfully brought to bear upon the state to thwart the proposed Franklin Dam and the Wesley Vale pulp mill.

3.4.6 Environmental Policy Analysis

The policy approach adopted here may be one that addresses, at least in regards to several Tasmanian case studies, Walker's lament for the lack of agreement both on the nature of environmental problems, and the techniques to be employed in their study, as noted in *3.2.1.* Discussion in Chapter Three has drawn upon ecopolitical theory in Chapter Two to find that environmentalism is ideologically contentious, and beyond the

explanatory reach, therefore, of simplistic issue attention analysis. As Chapter Two explains, economic growth and material values serve as the ideological reference points for the dominant paradigm or world view, whilst ecocentrism and non-material values serve as the ideological reference points for the alternate environmental paradigm.

Conflict between the opposing paradigms is then a contest of meaning between dominant and contending values as environmental values struggle for legitimacy in a material world, rather than jostle in a pluralistic way for attention in an impartial polity or policy process. Yet, despite its utility in revealing the fundamental values at stake in the struggle to realise environmental interests, goals and demands, Chapter Two finds paradigmatic analysis overly simplistic. Indeed, the chapter identifies and discusses the many difficult 'shades of green' that comprise contemporary environmentalism, and finds that there is a hierarchy of environmental issues ranging again from 'light' to 'dark' green - with 'deep green' issues most inspired by ecocentrism and posing the greatest threat to dominant material interests.

Chapter Two concludes with a consideration of the extent to which the state is able to distance itself from traditional growth imperatives in order to respond to environmental policy demands. The chapter finds that the state is not an impartial mediator of environmental conflict, but that its response to demands is constrained by the priority it accords material interests and the growth imperative within capitalist societies. As noted in *2.4.6*, the easiest 'wins' for environmentalists in policy terms tend to be those 'light green' demands in the hierarchy of ecological issues which most conform with dominant material values, and therefore least threaten capital interests.

The hierarchy of 'light' to 'dark' green environmental issues, it is argued in Chapter Two, ranges from least to most inspired by ecocentrism, from least to most threatening to dominant values and material interests, and from least to most difficult for the state to satisfy in policy terms. In Chapter Three, it is argued that only analysis undertaken at various levels can capture the complexity of environmentalism as a policy problem, and indeed satisfy calls such as Walker's noted in *3.2.2* for pragmatic wholism in environmental policy analysis. The case studies of power analysis and environmental policy making reviewed in Chapter Three demonstrate mechanisms of constraint upon the realisation of environmental demands that may be exercised, in Lukes' terms, as overt, covert or latent influence. In 'power' terms, the intensification of constraint upon the realisation of demands can therefore be understood as the mobilisation of bias against a value contender that intensifies as does the shade of light to dark green.

Hence the legitimation of deep green demands as mainstream policy concerns is most frustrated by the mobilisation of bias toward dominant orthodox values. Chapter Two suggests that whilst economic determinism is regarded as conventionally wise and responsible, ecological determinism is rejected as contrary to the principles of liberal democracy and natural freedom. In the case studies reviewed in Chapter Three, the mobilisation of bias against ecological imperatives is seen to be achieved by a combination of political power and corporate influence that overtly and covertly enforces policy inaction on environmental issues and concerns. It remains then to explain the role of power analysis in the achievement of this policy constraint.

The case study review in Chapter Three of power as the ability to prevent decisions from being taken leads, in *3.3.1*, to a consideration of the role of

causality in policy formation. However, rather than consider causality in its narrowest sense as an exercise intended to cause or prevent an event or action, causality is considered in Simeon's terms as a societal influence. Whilst acknowledging the causal quality or agency of dominant values and structures of power upon environmental policy formation, Simeon does not, however, deterministically deny, as *3.3.1* notes, that the policy process may have some effect independent of constraint. The framework of analysis that Simeon adopts evades the methodological difficulties, discussed particularly in *3.3.2*, of empiricism facing pluralist analysis, and of determinism facing structuralist analysis, by settling, in Hall's (1992:91) and Downey's (1987:32) terms, for a 'policy paradigm', that is essentially a 'multi-layered' descriptive approach. Nevertheless, Chapter Three finds that the range of contending power theories addresses constraint in environmental policy making at levels of analysis that reveal layers of influence lacking in Simeon's approach.

Simeon's broad causal approach is then well complemented by the descriptive insight gleaned, as we have seen, from employing the full range of contending theories of power. As discussed in *3.3.6*, this includes Lukes' three dimensions of power, as well as the competing, yet descriptively complementary, structuralist and ideological accounts. Furthermore, there has been increasing recognition, also reviewed in *3.3.6*, of the need for descriptive syntheses of power in policy analysis given the unlikelihood of a universally accepted 'meta' theory ever arriving at one 'correct' method of power analysis. It is concluded in *3.4.1* that a multi-layered approach to power has great utility in explaining the capacity of environmentalists to achieve a policy response or experience constraint at a variety of levels, and to address the intensification of constraint against the realisation of environmental demands that fundamentally threaten capital interests.

3.5 Conclusion - The Role of Values, Power & the State.

In conclusion then, in Chapter Two, a range of ideological and structural constraints were found to influence environmental policy formation by mobilising bias against the realisation of environmental demands. It was suggested, after Vickers (1972:29), that environmental policy is not the product of an ideologically benign process, but of a web of circumstances that favours dominant industrial over contending ecological values. Bias toward dominant values, as we have seen in *2.3.6*, may frustrate the legitimation of environmental concerns where political discourse and policy processes define legitimacy in orthodox terms. A structural power imbalance may then constrain the realisation of ecological demands, as their proponents are drawn into debate, the terms of reference of which have been set by their ideological opponents.

Environmental policy analysis must acknowledge the ideological contention between dominant and ecological values, and the potential for the mobilisation of bias toward orthodoxy to frustrate environmental demands. However, since this contention has not deterministically limited the achievement of a broad range of environmental policy goals, analysis should also recognise both the range of ecopolitical demands spanning the opposing dominant and ecological paradigms, and the realisation of environmental goals in circumstances of ideological constraint. Simeon's causality approach provides a valuable account of the broad range of influences upon policy formation, albeit modified (in *3.4.5*) for environmental policy analysis.

Whilst the strength of Simeon's approach is its wide ranging focus upon the many influential factors shaping and constraining policy formation, the limitations of his approach for our purposes include its superficial view of ideological contention, policy influence and political power, as

well as its suggestion of linearity in policy analysis conveyed by the 'funnel of causality' notion. For the purposes of environmental policy analysis in general, and for the review of Tasmanian studies in particular, the role of ideology in the policy process is a crucial consideration, as is the role of dominant societal influences in suppressing the legitimation of ecological values. In Chapter Four, each of the case studies is firstly introduced in its broad policy context. As we saw above, the Tasmanian environmental policy context has historically been defined by hydro-industrialisation and its constraining impact upon the state's ability to respond to ecopolitical demands.

More recently, as Hay and Haward (1988:435) argue, conflict between state development imperatives and ecological demands has seen the issues and values at stake more distilled and focused than anywhere else in the world. In modifying Simeon's policy approach, and ensuring its manageability for Tasmanian case study analysis, Chapter Four reviews the ecopolitical challenge to the paradigm of state development, before detailing the decision making process, the actions of the state in resolving conflict, and the multi-layers of influence in the policy process. Chapter Five moves from the specific case studies to general conclusions about the role of values, power and the state in the realisation of ecopolitical demands in Tasmania, and discusses the utility and insights of Simeon's modified framework of analysis.

CHAPTER FOUR:
ECOPOLITICAL DISPUTES FROM PEDDER TO WESLEY VALE

4.1 Chapter Outline

Chapter Four comprises four main sections reviewing case studies that span twenty years of ecopolitical conflict in Tasmania: (4.2) the Lake Pedder dispute; (4.3) the Franklin River dispute; (4.4) the Electrona silicon smelter dispute; and (4.5) the Wesley Vale pulp mill dispute. As noted in *3.4.5* and *3.4.6*, the chapter details the disputes, which are then analysed more broadly in Chapter Five. After Simeon (1976:551; see *3.2.1*), this evidence is reviewed by applying 'similar questions, frameworks and methods' to each study with the aim of gaining cumulative results for analysis. With the exception of the Electrona dispute, these conflicts are well documented individually by Australian authors such as Southwell, Davis, Bates, Hay, Chapman and Economou, as we shall see. The choice of these cases is not so much for their notoriety, however, as for revealing the paradigmatic nature of conflict, and the efforts of conservationists, environmentalists and development opponents to achieve their goals in constrained policy circumstances.

Each study begins with a review of the *policy context* of the dispute, and considers the issues at stake, before turning to the *dispute* detail and the *role of the state* in achieving a resolution. The *aftermath* of each dispute is considered to set the tone both for the subsequent study and the chapter conclusion. The discussion finds, in each of the Lake Pedder, Franklin River, Electrona smelter and Wesley Vale pulp mill disputes, there was a profound ecocentric challenge to the dominant development imperative in Tasmania. As the following review shows, the disputes fall into two 'development policy' periods, *pre* and *post* the 1983 thwarting of the Franklin River dam. *Pre*-1983, hydro-industrial policy was hegemonic,

leaving conservationists excluded from the policy processes, and encouraging the emergence of Tasmanian environmentalism in protest. The Pedder and Franklin River disputes, (of the early 1970s and early 1980s respectively), were characterised by political and bureaucratic secrecy, exclusion tactics, expedient decision making, failure to properly define the impact of the proposal or consider alternatives, and ad hoc, reactive management of the state's natural resources. *Post*-1983, emphasis shifted to the industrial side of the hydro-industrial equation, with hydro-industrialisation's demise as a development panacea, and the stripping of the powers of the Hydro Electric Commission.[1] However, importantly in this latter period, the legacies of the policy expediencies of the hydro-industrial era were only too evident in the Electrona and Wesley Vale disputes, (of the mid to late 1980s respectively), with the Liberal State Government dismissing its opponents as anti-Tasmanian, and riding rough shod over a range of environmental and community concerns. In the *pre*-1983 period, the loss of Pedder to 'hydro-inundation' served as a forerunner dispute to success against a similar fate. Similarly, in the *post*-1983 period, the failure of opponents to halt the Electrona smelter, served as a forerunner loss to successful efforts to halt the Wesley Vale pulp mill, a proposed development thirty times larger than Electrona.

The following review finds that in the cases studied, ecopolitical conflict prompted by a clash between ecological and development imperatives, has intensified where ad hoc policy making and exclusion tactics were employed to constrain opponents, so that, paradoxically, conservative opposition has proved a fillip to the state's environment movement. The disputes reveal a failure by state governments to improve policy

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[1] Davis (1993:121) notes that by the mid 1980s, 'reform of the Hydro-Electric Commission was in progress', and 'energy sources other than hydro-electric were under investigation'.

processes to incorporate an appreciation of ecological values. They reveal instead bureaucratic and political attempts to match the sophisticated campaigning of environmentalists with exclusion tactics of their own to constrain them. Chapter Five moves beyond these details to examine the ideological, political and institutional background to these disputes to make sense of the routine assertion of dominant industrial values in Tasmania. Both Chapters conclude that from the rise of hydro-industrialisation, Tasmanian governments have failed to acknowledge the intrinsic value of the state's unique natural areas. In Fox's terms, their approach to land management has not only been *anthropocentric* (human-centred), but on the scale of human-centredness, has been the most exploitative. Exploitative anthropocentrism is the antithesis of an *ecocentric,* or ecology centred approach. It views natural areas for their *use value* rather than for their *intrinsic ecological value,* and is characteristically concerned with the *physical transformation value* of the non-human world, for example by damming, clearing or scenery mining, rather than its preservation (Fox 1992:3).

4.2 The Pedder Dispute - 'a jewel impounded'

4.2.1 The Policy Context - the hydro-industrial imperative

Having traditionally adopted an exploitative approach, particularly towards the state's South West wilderness, Tasmanian governments have valued the development of these areas for their instrumental economic worth, over their preservation as intrinsically, ecologically or spiritually valuable. So despite its national park status, the state's hydro-industrial imperative threatened, and subsequently achieved, the flooding of Lake Pedder - a ten square mile, whisky-coloured lake bounded by mountains, button grass, pink quartzite beaches and glacial dunes high up in the South West wilderness (see locality map 4.1).

Before inundation in 1972, Pedder had been an ecologically unique and aesthetically exquisite jewel in the crown of Tasmania's wild, untouched and uninhabited natural areas (Kiernan 1990:20).



Locality Map 4.1 - Lake Pedder

(Scale 1:250,000. Source : Base Map Dept. of Environment & Land Management)

The neglect of the intrinsic value of natural areas has been compounded in Tasmania by a sorry record of ad-hoc, expedient management policy, that as Davis (1984:12) suggests, saw 'error compound upon error' in both the Pedder and Franklin conflicts. The routine of ad hoc, expedient policy response to conflicting land use imperatives was established in the late 1960s and early 1970s with events leading to Pedder's inundation. The campaign to save Pedder constituted the first overt challenge to hydro-industrial policy from conservationists who were rebuked by Labor Premier Eric Reece for 'meddling in public affairs' (Burton 1990:82). The campaign provoked hostility from the Hydro-Electric Commission (HEC) as well as its bi-partisan political supporters. Hydro-policy proponents shrouded Pedder's inundation plans in secrecy, keeping conservationists

in the dark for nearly two decades. Despite the 1955 declaration by the State Government of Pedder as National Park, HEC Commissioner Allan Knight[2] had indicated in 1954 'that a dam might be built' at junction of the Gordon-Serpentine rivers (Lowe 1984:25).

Later it was discovered that the HEC had indeed placed flow recorders on these rivers as early as 1953 (Kiernan 1990:20; Southwell 1983:19). Whilst community suspicion over Pedder's fate was met with outright political and bureaucratic denial, successive events confirmed the HEC's inundation plans. In 1963, federal funding of $5 million saw the construction of the Gordon Road covering 90 km from Maydena to Middle Gordon into the heart of the South West wilderness (Bates 1983:1). This was followed two years later by Premier Reece's chance remark that Pedder may in fact be 'somewhat modified'. By 25 May 1967, when the HEC finally tabled its inundation plans in State Parliament, amid a blaze of its own publicity intended to quell opposition, public concern had heightened to public outrage.[3]

Given the lack of access to information confirming the HEC's inundation plans, the campaign to save Pedder was waged in difficult circumstances. In 1962, nearly ten years after the flow indicators were thought to have been placed on the Gordon-Serpentine rivers, a conservationist watchdog body, the South West Committee, was formed (Gee & Fenton 1978:276). In terms of its ability to impact upon the policy process by which Pedder's

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[2] The declaration was made on the advice of the Tasmanian Scenery Preservation Board following lobbying predominantly by members of the Hobart Walking Club. It was a submission to the TSPB from HWC members, who had flown and walked to the area since 1946, that had achieved the 23,800 ha park status (Gee & Fenton 1978:251).

Ironically, Knight chaired the same Board that had recommended the Lake Pedder National Park. Dr Geoff Mosley (1981:42), former Australian Conservation Foundation Director, describes Knight's role on the Board as a 'spook', there to protect HEC interests.

[3] 1967 Gordon River Power Development Stage 1 Act sealed Pedder's fate, with inundation complete in 1974, and power generation commencing in 1978.

fate would be sealed, the Committee[4] later experienced great constraint, as we will see, that prompted the formation of more radical conservation bodies and ultimately the world's first green party, the United Tasmanian Group.[5] Not least of the obstacles to the realisation of conservationist objectives included the impossibility of asserting scenery preservation and recreation arguments for keeping Pedder in its natural state, against the hydro-industrial 'logic' for inundation.

The Pedder region had long been visited by Hobart and Launceston Walking Club members, either by making the three day walk in, or, since the mid-1940s, by making light plane landings on Pedder's distinctively 'firm, pink quartzite sands' (Kiernan 1990:20). In the minds of the artists, walkers and campaigners who had witnessed Pedder, an aesthetic appreciation of its beauty was justification enough for its preservation. 'Aesthetics preceded science' for these devotees, who used their artistic impressions to bring Pedder's splendour to Tasmanians, most of whom had little idea of what the lake looked like (Bonyhady 1993:29), and only raised science as a last resort. In the tradition of Tasmanian development, proponents of inundation failed to be moved by ecocentric concepts of aesthetic value. Indeed, the HEC mocked the loss of Pedder by calling its drowning an 'enlarging', and asserting its engineering and construction work worthy of the Lake Pedder reputation by retaining the Pedder name to describe the impoundment (Davis 1980:165).

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[4] The South West Committee was formed when members of the Canine Defence League 'became disturbed over irresponsible shooters abandoning dogs in the South West', as well as the loss of Tasmanian Tiger habitat 'from carelessly lit fire' (Southwell 1983:9).

[5] In the early stages of the dispute, the South West Committee had actively sought discussions and negotiation with government. Only when it was 'ignored and derided did more militant and mobilised conservation groups emerge' (Davis 1980:165).

Groups to form included the South West Committee (1962), Save Lake Pedder National Park Committee (1967), the Tasmanian Conservation Trust (1968), Lake Pedder Action Committee (1971), the United Tasmanian Group (1972), and the Tasmanian Wilderness Society (1976).

4.2.2 The Pedder Dispute - from conservation to green politics

It is difficult to establish precisely when the battle for Pedder began. The decade between Knight's 1954 indication, and Reece's 1965 confirmation, that Pedder would be modified, was as a decade of community *suspicion* and official *denial*. Despite the rumoured 'modification' plans for Pedder, in the late 1950s, the 'common view' was that National Park status, and the region's own remoteness, would protect it. Exploration activities had already covertly commenced, however, with HEC 'helicopter sorties and vehicle tracks' into the Strathgordon and Serpentine, proving that, by 1961, 'a good deal of money' had been spent on investigation in the area (Southwell 1983:20). Conservationists' unease grew over the Gordon Road. It was clear by 1964 that this road was not destined for tourism use, but was 'a heavy duty construction whose massive earthworks showed up clearly as crude scars even on satellite photographs from outer space' (Southwell 1983:20). However, the essentially conservative South West Committee was persuaded by Commissioner Knight's announcement that power development in the South West was nothing other than a remote possibility. The Committee was confident that its own plans for a South West National Park were based upon common sense that would be appreciated and endorsed by the State Government. '[I]t came as a rude shock' a Committee member later reported, 'to discover the generally low calibre of these incompetent, expedient politicians who seemed to have no conception of planning for the future' (Southwell 1983:20).

Serious campaigning by conservationists started in March 1967 with the formation of the Save Lake Pedder National Park Committee (SLPNPC) just months before the 'Gordon River Power Development Project Stage One' report was tabled by the HEC in Parliament recommending Pedder's flooding as the first stage of the Middle Gordon Power Development

(Bates 1983:1; *4.2.1 fn.* 3). Political activism was not, however, unilaterally embraced by the conservationist community, even though most were aware by that stage of the impending report that would betray official promises that Pedder was under no threat. Mosley argues that conservationists were of two breeds, split 'between their feelings as citizens and their feelings as bushwalkers'. Pedder supporters were drawn from bushwalkers who regarded the South West wilderness as 'their terrain', but were divided over whether to oppose development within it. Equally, they comprised progressives prepared to challenge parliamentary and bureaucratic powers, and conservatives prepared only to appeal for rationality in the policy process. As Mosley explains, this division 'came into the open' in 1967 (Mosley 1981:44). The brewing activism in the months preceding the tabling of the HEC's plans, and the impending revelation that their years of suspicion had been justified, exploded afterwards into on a frenzied campaign by the SLPNPC to thwart Pedder's inundation. It had taken a decade for conservationists to appreciate how little they had impacted on land management policy, and indeed how little national park status meant to development proponents, yet the SLPNPC's activism was still considered intemperate by some conservationists.

The Save Lake Pedder National Park Committee organised a petition of 8,500 signatures opposing Pedder's inundation - claimed by Mosley to be the largest petition ever in Tasmanian history - within weeks of the parliamentary tabling of the HEC's plans (Mosley 1981:45). Coupled with public concern over decision making practices, and pressure from conservationists, this prompted the Legislative Council to establish a Select Committee Inquiry into 'the Establishment of the Proposed Gordon River Power Development and its effect on Lake Pedder and Lake Pedder National Park' (Bates 1983:1). In 1964, just prior to his indication

of Pedder's likely 'modification', Reece established an Inter-Departmental South West Committee comprising the HEC, Forestry Commission and Department of Mines. In effect, this Committee usurped the activities of the Tasmanian Scenery Preservation Board, and may have been intended to counter the South West Committee's conservationist influence. Conservationists were refused representation on the Inter-Departmental Committee - which further explicitly rejected the promotion of conservation values in the South West (Lowe 1984:25; Gee & Fenton 1978:239-241). The Inter-Departmental Committee's recommendation for an enlarged South West National Park was eventually released by Premier Reece as a means of countering public concern over the HEC's designs on Lake Pedder (Southwell 1983:21).

The Legislative Council Select Committee of Inquiry into the Pedder issue eventually supported inundation, but backed the enlarged South West National Park recommendation. Without waiting for its findings, Premier Reece introduced legislation enabling Pedder's inundation, and approving $95 million for the impoundment, accompanied by legislation vesting 1.6 million acres of South West wilderness with the HEC. Both Bills passed into law on 24 August 1967 after the Select Committee's findings were finally handed down, with Reece immediately halving the recommended 363,000 ha South West National Park (Johnson 1972:56;58; Kiernan 1990:20-21).[6] Reece's pre-emptive actions showed that he never doubted approval would be gained for the HEC's plans, and that, by vesting control of large tracts of the South West with the HEC, he had equally anticipated further battles looming over hydro-industrialisation.

[6] Conservationists claimed that the Select Committee wanted to save Pedder, but not on the cost options put to it by the HEC. Its 'price' for agreeing to Pedder's loss was gazettal of a 363,000 ha South West National Park that was later halved by Reece.

Enabling legislation settled the policy outcome for Pedder, but the dispute was far from over. The radical conservationist cause was still to breathe life into Tasmania's moribund politics, by intensifying its campaigning, and evolving into a fully fledged green political party despite failing, even in a bid for federal intervention described in *4.2.3*,[7] to save Lake Pedder. Although the Save Lake Pedder National Park Committee had spent its efforts and disbanded after Reece had achieved legislation for inundation, a few individuals refused to concede Pedder's loss (Southwell 1983:23). They may well have gained heart from the Reece Government's ousting in the 1969 State election, as Tasmania's first ecopolitical casualty,[8] with Labor losing office for the first time since the Depression (Gee & Fenton 1978:241). Meanwhile, the Liberal Opposition had paradoxically campaigned on a policy of 'no delays' to HEC projects, as well as a plan to replace ad hoc policy with a National Parks and Wildlife Service, and a Community Conservation Advisory Board. Incoming Premier Bethune nevertheless retained Reece's hydro-industrial vision including Lake Pedder's flooding (Lowe 1984:30).

Conservationists meanwhile had ironically gained unprecedented access to Pedder with the completion of the Gordon Road. In Easter 1971, at the annual 'get-together' of Tasmania's walking clubs, over one thousand people trekked or flew in to bid Pedder farewell (Bonyhady 1993:30). With inundation less than one year away, the South West Committee, the Walking Clubs and the Australian Conservation Foundation had each given up the fight. However, this pilgrimage touched

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[7] Kiernan (1990:31-33) describes the failure of the Federal Labor Government under Prime Minister Whitlam to save Pedder despite a Federal Labor Party Caucus resolution to do so.

[8] Reece had engendered the concern of both his hydro-industrial support base over delays to Pedder's inundation, and his detractors firstly for resisting any influence of 'the rising younger section of the Party', and secondly for excluding conservationists from policy processes that lacked any coherence on conservation issues. It was broad public discontent over the Pedder issue that saw him become an ecopolitical casualty (see Lowe 1984:29).

conservationists with a sense of impending loss, sparking at least some back into action. Inspired by the 'get-together', activist Brenda Hean and others convened a public meeting at the Hobart Town Hall at which the call was made for a state referendum. Legislative Councillor Shoobridge, the sole politician to have visited the lake, moved a referendum motion in State Parliament that was quashed on the basis of the HEC's own cost estimates of saving Pedder (Lowe 1981:168; Southwell 1983:23).

Conservationists brought together by the public meeting established the Lake Pedder Action Committee (LPAC), and launched a campaign effort that soon turned national, prompting the Liberal Prime Minister to offer federal funding for an optional power scheme that Bethune vehemently rejected. The LPAC then moved into state parliamentary campaigning, establishing the world's first green party, the United Tasmanian Group (UTG). Following the collapse of Bethune's coalition government, the UTG contested the 1972 state election, in which they continued to fight inundation. The Liberal and Labor parties declared Pedder a 'non-issue', leaving it to the HEC to counter the UTG - despite the breadth of alternate social, economic and community issues in the UTG's policy platform (see *5.2.2, fn 4*). The HEC ran an extraordinary campaign, using public funds, basically claiming that a vote for the UTG was a vote for increased power prices.[9] However, the UTG only narrowly failed to gain one seat, and influenced the outcome of another under Tasmania's unique system of

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[9] Southwell (1983:27) claims Pedder campaigners had experienced such difficulties gaining balanced media coverage in Tasmania, that the Victorian LPAC took out a national advertisement countering some of the HEC's more contentious assertions. The HEC responded with an 'astonishing' series of national advertisements, followed by election eve scare mongering ads in all Tasmanian papers misrepresenting the LPAC.

The HEC threatened increased power tariffs if the Pedder scheme was stymied. It subsequently campaigned vigorously, for the damming of the Franklin, only abandoning plans to repeat its 'unthinkable' electoral advertising efforts in 1982 after intense public pressure (Bates 1983:15). The use of these tactics well into the 1980s are all the more extraordinary for the fact that by the late 1960s, according to Davis, the 'myth of hydro-industrialisation was wearing thin' (Davis 1993:120).

proportional representation.[10] In a swing back to Labor, Reece was returned to power, and expeditiously resolved Pedder's inundation using tactics, including his self appointment as Attorney General,[11] the passing of 'doubts removal' legislation sanctioning an otherwise illegal inundation of part of the enlarged South West National Park, and the rejection of an inundation moratorium recommended by a Federal Committee of Inquiry (Bates 1983:7; Gee & Fenton 1978:241; Lowe 1984:41).

4.2.3 The Role of the State - failed federal support

Two levels of the Tasmanian state played a part in the Pedder dispute - the State Government, formed by the political party commanding the majority in the House of Assembly, and the Legislative Council, comprised of so-called independent Legislative Councillors sitting in the Upper House. Although the inundation of Pedder was a vision of Labor Premier Reece's realised by the HEC, it was a bi-partisan vision overtly shared by his Liberal political opponents and members of the Legislative Council, and upheld uncritically by the Tasmanian media. The hydro-industrial vision was further a pragmatic arrangement, between business, bureaucracy, and trade unions, responsible for Labor's long hold on state political power (Lowe 1981:178).

By sharing this vision, the Liberals shared a development ethos beyond political ideology, that left them curiously supportive of both the Labor Government and its union constituency. The emergence of environmental politics revealed the extent of bi-partisan support for

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[10] Although Reece and the ALP were returned with a clear majority, the UTG polled well with 7% of the total vote, and the near election of one UTG candidate 'standing primarily on a conservation platform, with limited funds, no press support, and only three weeks campaigning' (Johnson 1972:60; Gee & Fenton 1978:241).

[11] After Mervyn Everett QC resigned that is, convinced that conservationists had the standing to proceed with a realtor action to legally challenge Pedder's flooding. Reece had rejected this advice, prompting Everett's resignation, and settled the matter with the HEC (Doubts Removal) Act sanctioning the otherwise illegal flooding (Bates 1983:7).

hydro-industrialisation, prompting the UTG in their 1972 election campaign, to dub the Labor and Liberal parties the 'Laborials' (Bell & Sanders 1980:70-80). Development proponents treated the campaign to save Pedder as subversive for flouting hydro-industrial policy, so that whilst seeking to influence the decision making over Pedder's future, conservationists were subsequently kept in the dark, ignored, discredited, misrepresented and obstructed by politicians, bureaucrats and the media.

The bi-partisan political support Pedder's inundation enjoyed at the state level, was not shared by the Federal Government, whose intervention to halt the scheme was nevertheless a slim hope by conservationists, given the lack of federal grounds for the evaluation of state projects.[12] In addition to funding the Gordon Road, the Federal Liberal Government had in 1966 financially supported inundation with $55 million of 'special' funding for the Pedder project (Southwell 1983:20). Although the State Government was refusing to receive petitions opposing inundation for their 'conflict with Government policy', the quarter million signatures were taken seriously by Liberal Prime Minister McMahon. However his approach to Liberal Premier Bethune on seeking inundation options was rebuffed as interventionist by the State Premier (Southwell 1983:25). Neither McMahon nor his successor, Labor Prime Minister Whitlam, were more than half hearted in their intervention attempts, although Whitlam was persuaded by his Minister for Environment, Dr Moss Cass, to fulfil his election promise of a Committee of Inquiry into Pedder's future. The Committee endorsed the LPAC moratorium option, whereby the feasibility of saving Pedder, including rehabilitation costs of $8

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12 The legislative backing with the potential to justify intervention was gained after, and as a direct consequence of, the Pedder dispute, with the establishment of the Australian Heritage Commission, the Register of the National Estate, and the Commonwealth's Environmental (Impact of Proposal) Act 1975 (Burton 1990:87).

From 13 February 1973, it became policy for all development proposals in which the Commonwealth of Australia is involved to require an environment impact statement (Bell & Sanders 1980:70).

million, would be funded by the Commonwealth. Cabinet rejected this, but in a victory for Dr Cass, was overruled by Caucus, after a moving slide show by photographer Olegas Truhanas (Gee & Fenton 1978:242).

It was only at this late stage, as the waters were rising on Pedder, that key scientific information, and evidence refuting the HEC's dubious claims, as well as its failure to pursue cost options that could have saved Pedder, was coming to light[13] (Kiernan 1990:21; Lowe 1984:25-27; Johnson 1972:9; McHenry 1972). As close as Lake Pedder was at this stage to being saved, several key political forces thwarted Caucus's resolution. At the federal level, Whitlam delayed communicating Caucus's compensation offer to Reece, and finally sent word on a party basis. Reece, who had refused to co-operate with the federal inquiry, ignored Whitlam's communication of Caucus's offer and pressed ahead with inundation. LPAC's final appeal to the Australian Council of Trade Unions, backfired when President Hawke 'torpedoed the proposal', by referring it back to the pro-dams Tasmanian Trades and Labour Council which rejected the moratorium offer (Kiernan 1990:31-3).

4.2.4 The Aftermath of Dispute

The failed federal support of the Whitlam Government, in retrospect betrayed only a symbolic will to save Lake Pedder. However, Whitlam's Committee of Inquiry gave Pedder campaigners credibility, by declaring the lake as too important to destroy, and for condemning, as Bates notes, 'the decision making process which had led to this ill conceived power development' (Bates 1983:2). The loss of Pedder was inconsolably tragic; however the campaigning efforts of conservationists achieved important secondary gains crucial to winning the looming Franklin River dispute.

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[13] In 1972, independent research, confirmed Pedder's habitat, which had barely been studied before inundation, as biologically distinct and supporting at least 17 endemic species, prompting 184 scientists to sign a petition opposing inundation (Johnson 1972:9).

These included the launching of environmentalism and the world's first green party in Tasmania, the sophisticated campaigning skills learnt in state and federal political arenas, and the wide public attention, beyond Tasmania's parochial shores, drawn to the intrinsic value of the South West wilderness. Broad recognition of this value, combined with the loss of Pedder, inspired a determination in conservationists to save the rest of the South West from 'the rapacious grasp' of the HEC (Bates 1983).

As mentioned in *4.1*, the policy lessons learnt by the proponents of the exploitation and physical transformation of the South West involved *not* incorporating ecological values into development policy processes, but learning how to better constrain their environmental opponents. The 1968 South West National Park declaration, had subsumed the 1955 Lake Pedder National Park and subsequent Pedder impoundment within its boundaries (Gee & Fenton 1978:251). However, just as Park status had not protected Pedder from inundation, offering only symbolic security to intrinsic ecological values, neither was it to protect the South West from the designs of the HEC. Indeed, in the wake of Pedder, with the energy and vigilance of conservationists at a low ebb, the HEC turned swiftly from its victory to 'business as usual', ensuring that legislative approval for the Pieman scheme to flood the Pieman, Mackintosh and Murchison Rivers 'passed quickly through both Houses of Parliament without, once again, the benefit of any Parliamentary or public inquiry. After which, the HEC's attention turned to the Lower Gordon and Franklin Rivers' (Bates 1983:2).

4.3 The Franklin Dispute - 'last wild river'

4.3.1 The Policy Context - countering hydro-industrialisation

If the State Government had learnt to exercise policy exclusion tactics and legislative veto to achieve its hydro-industrial goals given the emerging threat of ecological values, conservationists had equally learnt from the Pedder dispute to exploit democratic processes in the politicisation of their demands for wilderness preservation. For their campaigning tactics in the Franklin dispute, they were denounced by their critics as 'greenie anarchists challenging parliamentary democracy itself' (Bates 1983:12). After Pedder they were fiercely determined not to be steamrolled into compromise or defeat in the looming dispute over the damming of the Franklin River (see locality map 4.2). The 1970s had been dismal years for conservation in Tasmania - the early years marred by the drowning of renowned wilderness photographer Olegas Truhanas, and loss of the incomparable Lake Pedder; whilst later years saw the flooding without scrutiny of the Pieman River, (one of the state's finest remaining wild rivers west of Cradle Mountain), and the revocation for forestry of almost a third of the Hartz Mountain National Park (Bates 1983:2; Southwell 1983:42). These events, combined with the imminent 'hydro-threat' to the South West's Franklin River, inspired the 1976 formation of the Tasmanian Wilderness Society in a bid to turn the tide to conservation.[14]

Despite hydro-electric encroachment, Tasmania's South West remained, in the late 1970s, one of the last great temperate wilderness areas in the world.[15] The Lake Pedder Action Committee had discovered, during the

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[14] The Society's predecessor was the South West Tasmania Action Committee, set up in 1974 to achieve the protection by the Federal Government of South West Tasmania as a national park for all Australians, safe from development pressures (Southwell 1983:45).

[15] The State Government's South West Advisory Committee recognised the South West's World Heritage significance in an interim report May 1976. It was subsequently also found by UNESCO in February 1978 to be worthy of World Heritage status (Gee & Fenton 1978).

Pedder dispute, that, in a list of the world's most valuable natural lakes and waterways, UNESCO had described Pedder as 'a unique wilderness of incomparable significance and value', the destruction of which 'must be regarded as the greatest ecological tragedy since the European settlement of Tasmania' (Southwell 1983:26; Kiernan 1990:26). Whilst the Pedder impoundment had eventually ensured this tragedy and halved the South West region, the HEC's Franklin dam proposal would have bisected the remaining wilderness with flooded rivers and dams that would have reduced its natural values to utter insignificance (Thompson 1981:70).



Locality Map 4.2 - Franklin River

(Scale 1:500,000. Source : Base Map Dept. of Environment & Land Management)

The flooding of the Franklin-Lower Gordon was considered a foregone conclusion by hydro-industrial proponents, despite the area's world heritage conservation status determined by UNESCO in 1982, and parallel bureaucratic efforts by the National Parks Service to establish a Wild Rivers National Park to protect the region (discussed in 4.3.3). However,

sophisticated campaigning by conservationists achieved Prime Minister Hawke's decisive intervention, with his passing of the Commonwealth's World Heritage and Properties Conservation Act (1983) that subsequently enabled the High Court to confirm the legality of the federal bid to save the river (Bates 1983).

Franklin campaigners had learnt from the Pedder dispute to argue for the preservation of intrinsically valuable natural areas as much on economic as aesthetic grounds. They embarked on an aggressive media campaign and systematic lobbying in the parliamentary arena, that targeted and destroyed the HEC's own project cost estimates, state power projections, and therefore its economic credibility. However, at the same time, the campaigners built a parallel aesthetic dialogue that visually marketed the beauty of the South West and readily conveyed the spoiling of the Franklin River by road construction, an oil spill, a chain saw, or an HEC bulldozer (Sanders 1981:158). The visual marketing of the Franklin was critical to the success of the campaign. It began in State Parliament with the 1977 launching of the Tasmanian Wilderness Society (TWS) film, 'Last Wild River'.[16] Stickers, posters and pictorials were later joined by the yellow 'No Dams' triangle, that has since become an international emblem for wild areas preservation. From its inception, TWS resumed the UTG's industrial arguments that 'historically the extensive development of low cost power has not assisted the state's development relative to the mainland', and that contrary to traditional development mythology, the establishment of a hydrocracy had not protected the state from more general problems of commercial and industrial development. In the Franklin dispute, TWS's conservationist arguments against hydro-

[16] A reluctant Dr Bob Brown joined a novice film-maker Paul Smith on a pioneering rubber rafting trip down the Franklin in the summer of 1976, during which the 16mm film was made. Bob Brown was moved to passionate campaigning and a life time's dedication to conservation after this experience (Southwell 1983:47).

policy were buoyed with critical mainstream economic findings such as Tasmania's poor growth rate, its virtually stagnant population, and its employment being little affected by the establishment of major power consuming projects relative to smaller industries (Johnson 1972:93).[17]

In their campaigning, conservationists were constrained by the routine HEC tactics of the withholding of information on development options and economic costs; the delaying of the public release of information until it was ready to present to Parliament; and the suppression of, or the failure to, document, social and environmental impacts (Lowe 1984:25; Johnson 1972:61). Eleven years before its plans for the Franklin were tabled in Parliament, the HEC had built a road into an 'investigation site' below Mt McCall. In the late 1970s, it denied resuming activity in the region despite sightings by rafters and conservationists. However in its 1979 parliamentary report of the Stage Two Gordon River Power Development, (to harness the Lower Gordon, King and Franklin Rivers and flood the Franklin at an estimated $1.3 billion), the HEC documented $6.5 million worth of expenditure that had already been spent without parliamentary approval on the suspected 'investigations' (Bates 1983:2).[18]

However pre-emptive actions by the HEC designed to facilitate its plans for the Franklin were this time matched by the pre-emptive actions of its opponents. Conservationists had already announced the HEC's own plans some months before their 1979 tabling in Parliament, and had already achieved public opposition, polled at 2:1 against the scheme by this time (Gee & Fenton 1978:268; Green 1981). Neither was the HEC able

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[17] Hay (1987:6) notes that employment in Tasmania's major energy-consuming industries peaked in the early 1960s and has been declining ever since.

[18] Parliamentary agreement to HEC proposals had long been considered a mere formality. With a blank cheque for expenditure always at hand, the HEC possessed powers unequalled by any public authority in Australia (Thompson 1981:25; Herr & Davis 1982).

to rely upon the exclusion of conservationists from the policy process that would decide the fate of the Franklin River, nor upon the bi-partisan political support that it had always enjoyed previously for hydro-industrial projects. On the contrary, a change in political leadership from Labor Premier Reece, upon his retirement in 1975, to his successors Neilsen and subsequently Lowe, saw a remarkable if brief transformation as we shall see from autocratic to consensual policy making, and from the HEC's operational autonomy, to its unprecedented scrutiny by the short lived reformist Lowe administration.

4.3.2 The Franklin Dispute - from reformism to 'business-as-usual'

It had taken two decades from the first public mention of Pedder's likely 'modification', to its inundation by the HEC. As we saw in *4.2.4*, the HEC was keen after the Pedder dispute to return to the 'business-as-usual' of hydro-industrial inundation. During 1971, against the backdrop of the Pedder dispute, and confident of its outcome, HEC Commissioner Knight briefed State Parliament, not only on the proposed Pieman River Power Development, but also, in notional terms, of the integrated power scheme to follow. This referred to Stage Two of the Gordon River Power Development, and was later realised by Premier Lowe to have first flagged the Franklin dam proposal (Lowe 1981:168). Conservationists had been aware of the HEC's ambitions for the Lower Gordon and Franklin since at least the early 1960s, with leaked documents indicating that 'the HEC's grand design would leave few river valleys of the South West unflooded' (Southwell 1983:48). In spite of the dispirited disbanding of the LPAC after Pedder's inundation, its most influential, experienced members kept their conservationist aspirations to secure the South West against hydro-industrialisation alive by working within the UTG before forming the South West Tasmania Action Committee, the predecessor of the Tasmanian Wilderness Society (Southwell 1983:45; see *4.3.1, fn 14*).

These efforts paid dividends after the UTG's campaigning in the 1974 federal half-senate election, and 1975 federal by-election in the Bass electorate. Liberal Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser undertook, on assuming office in November 1975, 'to fund a major wilderness park in the South West' and 'a joint Federal State Resources study of the area' (Southwell 1983:47-48; Lowe 1984:63).

The State Government's own policy apparatus set up under Premier Reece to manage the South West, had been, Davis (1980:163) explains, driven by the 'territorial imperatives' of the public development agencies. As mentioned in *4.2.2*, the assessment and protection of the South West's resources by the Tasmanian Scenery Preservation Board was usurped by the Inter-Departmental South West Committee established in 1964 by Premier Reece (see also *4.2.1, fn 2*). Whilst the Board was replaced by Premier Bethune's establishment of the National Parks and Wildlife Service in 1970, the real administrative control over the resources of the South West remained with the Inter-Departmental Committee. This was dominated by the HEC, and actually ensured the 'attrition and frittering away of the public domain by wasteful exploitation and ad hoc decision making' as the resource based state departments encroached upon and exploited the South West wilderness (Davis 1980:165; see also *4.2.2*). After Pedder's flooding and Premier Reece's retirement, the Labor Government set up its own South West resources inquiry. The South West Advisory Committee was established on 17 November 1975, chaired by Sir George Cartland, 'to inquire into and report on land use planning of the south west wilderness area' and 'produce an accurate definition of the resources and competing values of the area' (Lowe 1984:64). Its May 1976 interim report was criticised for making no significant park recommendations, for failing to set any curbs upon development, and suggesting only the South West's 'conservation

area' gazettal, together with park status for a few localities with some safeguards on their development, but with no interim protection (Davis 1980:164). The August 1978 final report found that it would be 'impractical and unwise to constitute the whole of South West Tasmania as National Park' (Gee & Fenton 1978:255-256). However, it did set the scene for the preservation of both the Franklin and South West by recommending that the State seek annual funding for South West Tasmania from the Commonwealth 'on the basis that the area is of world heritage status and a unique national asset' (Southwell 1983:49).

The Franklin dispute arose against this background of campaigning by conservationists for the general protection of the South West, as well as apparent bureaucratic efforts to find a policy solution to the conflicting imperatives of conservation and exploitation. Although conservationists boycotted the Cartland Inquiry on the grounds of the 'biased' composition of its Committee, this Inquiry at least adopted participatory procedures and received public submissions for the first time in the history of South West management (Southwell 1983:48; Davis 1980:163). It was soon clear, however, that the HEC demanded 'unstinting loyalty from its political masters', and would brook no opposition to its hydro-vision for the South West (Bates 1983:16). In early 1977, before the finalisation of the Cartland report, the HEC had Premier Neilsen release a statement of its plans to dam the Franklin in two stages, flooding first the Gordon and Denison splits, and then the Franklin River gorges (Southwell 1983:48).

However, to his own political cost, Neilsen's successor, reformist Premier Lowe, broke the tradition of automatic parliamentary acceptance of the HEC's plans. He attempted the first ever assertion of Ministerial control over the HEC by establishing an independent Energy Directorate within the Premier's Department, and calling for the HEC to present options to

Parliament with the tabling of its Franklin proposal in 1979. He then created history by releasing the proposal and its options for public comment before passing any deciding legislation.[19] Lowe's call for a full and open debate to precede any final decision, and the eventual passing of the Gordon-above-Olga legislation that would avoid flooding the lower reaches of the Franklin River incurred the wrath of retired Premier Reece. As a member of the newly formed Association of Consumers of Electricity, Reece lobbied the Parliamentary Labor Party to heed the HEC Commissioner's warning that 'any scheme that didn't flood the Franklin would have to be seen as irresponsible' (Lowe 1981:169-79; Tighe 1992:125).

The next eighteen months saw a remarkably effective backlash against Premier Lowe by hydro-industrial proponents for his attempts to reform the hegemonic powers of the HEC. It began with the Legislative Council's 13 to 4 rejection of Lowe's alternative Olga scheme and threat of blocking supply over the issue, and spread to within the ranks of the Labor party, with Harry Holgate twice challenging and finally deposing Lowe 12 to 9 as party leader (Lowe 1981:178). Lowe resigned from Labor's State Branch, and joined Democrat Norm Sanders on the cross benches, to be followed by Labor colleague Mary Willey. All three independents supported the Liberals' no confidence motion in Labor's 'handling of the power scheme' and brought the Government down. The 1982 state election resurrected hydro-industrial 'business-as-usual', with the HEC's

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[19] Lowe broke the unwritten law of Tasmanian politics by requesting optional schemes from the HEC, in 1971 for its Pedder plans whilst he was a member of the Opposition, and in 1979 for its Franklin plans when he was Labor Premier. From the HEC's reply to the first request, Lowe states that 'it was obvious no interference would be tolerated in the scheduled development program'. The second request cost his premiership (Lowe 1984).

Of his attempt to independently assess the HEC's plans for the Franklin before being deposed, Lowe later explained that '[t]here was sufficient bias and distortion in information provided by the HEC that I realised I did need a separate, objective and competent group to advise me on the complexity of energy policy matters, not only power development but conservation strategies and all other related matters' (Lowe 1981:167).

original bill for the Gordon-below-Franklin dam reintroduced into the House of Assembly by the Gray Liberal Government.[20] By this time, the systematic campaigning efforts of conservationists had reached the parliamentary arena, and were matched by their increasingly effective media tactics outside it. But these efforts came to nought when the Lower House passed the Legislative Council's proposed Gordon-below-Franklin legislation 29 to 2, opposed only by Lowe and Sanders, the independents returned by the June election (Bates 1983:4). Despite intensifying public pressure to save the Franklin, Labor 'went to water' and executed a back flip away from an 'historic first' achievement of the Lowe Government.[21] Although the alternative Olga scheme was rejected by conservationists for flooding the upper reaches of the Franklin and wreaking havoc in the South West, it had not been the preferred option of the HEC either. However, for the first time ever, it had been an option determined independently by State Parliament in the interests of natural area conservation (Lowe 1981:178).

4.3.3 The Role of the State - decisive federal intervention

The Pedder dispute had seen conservationists as the lone critics of hydro-industrialisation, battling the entrenched political supporters of the HEC. However, in the Franklin dispute, the Lowe Government had attempted the role of impartial mediator, seeking consensus between the opposing forces for the conservation, and the exploitation, of the South West. This provoked the HEC, initially into producing the sort of material by which it had swamped the 1967 Legislative Council Inquiry into Lake Pedder's

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[20] The legislation passed to flood the Franklin was the 1982 Gordon River Hydro-Electric Power Development Stage II Act.

[21] The reasons for the backflip included the perception of Lowe's consensual political style as weak and inappropriately leading the party away from its pragmatist roots. Fronting for the HEC, the Hydro Employees Action Team, symbolised Labor's spurned constituency, attracting a network encompassing unions powerful enough to threaten the pre-selection of PLP members, causing their defection throughout 1981 away from the alternative Olga scheme to support for flooding the Franklin (Lowe 1981:177).

inundation. The HEC's report accompanying its recommended Gordon-below-Franklin legislation was described by conservationists as 'a multi-volume glossy publication several feet thick', capable of 'bamboozling' any politician, overestimating future power needs, and skating over the options to the Franklin dam (Southwell 1983:49).[22] When it became clear to the HEC that Lowe's Energy Directorate was intent on public comment, and a review of optional schemes, HEC Commissioner Ashton was provoked to declare that '[i]f the Parliament tries to work through popular decisions, we're doomed in this state and doomed everywhere' (Bates 1983:16). In introducing his alternative legislation several months later, Lowe replied that '[t]he HEC is an engineering organization', 'not a socio-economic planning body. Previous governments may have been satisfied with a cursory perusal of its recommendations, followed by an automatic stamp of approval. This is not my style' (Southwell 1983:51).

The Franklin dispute revealed the HEC as the 'state within the state' in Tasmania, its powers unequalled by any public authority in Australia. As early as the 1950s, Premier Bethune had recognised that Parliament had abrogated its proper power to the HEC (Thompson 1981:18-25). In May 1981, just months before being deposed by his own party, Lowe convinced his Cabinet to proclaim the Wild Rivers National Park and forward its nomination for World Heritage listing to the Federal Liberal Government. From that moment on, Lowe's every effort at state level to resolve the issue was thwarted, including his attempt to hold a state referendum that allowed a 'no dams' option.[23] The Federal Liberal Government played a critical role in saving the Franklin by sending

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[22] Lowe made the HEC reprint the 'elaborate nine-volume presentation' in a newspaper style format for public release. It was 'the first time in the state's history that information concerning such a major scheme had been available so openly' (Lowe 1984:105).

[23] Lowe had promised a 'no dams' option on the referendum paper, but was outvoted by the Parliamentary Labor Party, and directed to change his position. Nevertheless, 44% of all voters wrote 'no dams' across their ballot papers (Southwell 1983:53).

Lowe's nomination for registration under the 1972 International Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage.

The South West was proclaimed World Heritage by the World Heritage Committee in December 1982, on the grounds of 'natural and cultural values' (Southwell 1983:57). By then, a federal election was in the wind, 'no dams' was appearing on ballot papers in by-elections around the country, 8,000 letters of protest had reached the Federal Government and conservationists had blockaded work on the Franklin.[24] The Liberal Prime Minister offered $500 million compensation to Tasmania for abandoning the dam and building a thermal power station, but was rebuffed by Premier Gray (Tighe 1992:166).[25] The Federal Labor Party undertook to save the Franklin if elected, and after its win in March 1983, (in which the National South West Coalition of conservationists was critical to securing marginal seats), Prime Minister Hawke passed the World Heritage and Properties Conservation Act that enabled the High Court in July 1983 to confirm his right to intervene to save the Franklin (Southwell 1983:61).

4.3.4 The Aftermath of Dispute

The Franklin victory was won in the High Court on the seven grounds argued by the Commonwealth against the Tasmanian Government. Four of these related to the world heritage significance of the region, with one of the most significant grounds being, (as conservationists had long argued in Tasmania), that the Commonwealth has the power to legislate

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[24] 1,400 protesters were arrested in the two and a half month blockade - the 'most sustained campaign of civil disobedience in Australian history' - attracting national and international attention (Southwell 1983:59; Bates 1983:12-14).

[25] This proved a costly error of judgement as Gray eventually had to settle for the $276.5 million in compensation offered by the Federal Labor Government after it won its right in the High Court to intervene to protect the South West World Heritage area.

on areas of distinctive Australian heritage, and that the Commonwealth's 1983 World Heritage Properties Conservation Act is therefore valid. The Commonwealth also proved in the High Court its right to acquire World Heritage areas 'on just terms', and to pass special laws to protect aboriginal sites (Southwell 1983:64).[26] Although the HEC's massive report on its Gordon-below-Franklin scheme claimed that there were no areas of archaeological significance to be flooded, excursions by archaeologists and speleologists established the astonishing find of caves indicating habitation between 15,000 and 20,000 years old, in the southernmost ice-age settlement known on earth (Southwell 1983:56). This find bolstered Lowe's nomination of the South West as World Heritage, and provided the Commonwealth with even greater grounds for intervention. Despite himself being a casualty of the Franklin dispute, ex-Premier Lowe then had proved the value of his fledgling attempts to establish due process for the evaluation of the intrinsic value of natural areas in Tasmania.

The great gain of the Franklin episode for conservationists was in the achievement of their immediate objective of saving the river. However, the dispute had also seen the quadrupling of the Tasmanian Wilderness Society's nation wide membership to 8,500 members, making it more subscribed and active than either state political party (Bates 1983:8). A 'green' foothold had also been gained in State Parliament with the resignation of Lower House Democrat Norm Sanders in 1983, in what was to prove his successful bid to run for the Federal Senate. Wilderness Society Director, Dr Bob Brown, who had stood as an independent at the previous state election, contested the recount after Sanders' resignation,

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[26] The other grounds of the Commonwealth's submission were: that the Commonwealth's World Heritage Act is not aimed at Tasmania, nor does it impair the State's constitutional functions; that the Hydro-Electric Commission is a trading corporation subject to Commonwealth regulation; and that the External Affairs power extends to all genuine international treaties entered into by Australia (Southwell 1983:64).

captured his preferences, and so assumed a seat in State Parliament. Dr Brown then followed ten years of grass roots activism that had helped build the state's conservation movement, with ten years of political activism, that was to consolidate green politics at the parliamentary level in Tasmania[27].

In the euphoria of the Franklin victory, however, it was not immediately apparent that for these gains, and in particular for the political exposure of the HEC and its backers, bi-partisan conservative forces would redouble their efforts to constrain the conservation movement. Later disputes, particularly over forestry, would subsequently bear out the vitriol felt at state level by the Liberal and Labor Parties against the conservationists. For its part, the Labor Party was destined for years in the political wilderness after the Franklin dispute, relegated to the sidelines in state development debates, as no more than 'a feeble opposition clawing vainly for a foothold in the headlines', leaving an oppositional policy vacuum that was eventually to be filled by the Tasmanian greens (Green 1981:51; Pybus & Flanagan 1990:18).

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[27] P. A. Walker notes that '[i]t is not a widely known fact that Sanders had stood on an Australian Democrat ticket and that Bob Brown had run as an independent. [It is alleged that] before Sanders resigned, he had ascertained whether Brown intended to contest the recount of distributed preferences to find the next candidate to be elected. Sanders wanted to ensure that Brown would *not* contest, so that Sanders' votes would flow to the next Australian Democrat on the ticket.

[It is alleged] that Brown had initially said that he would not contest [the recount] so Sanders resigned. Brown [then] "changed his mind" ... capturing Sanders' preferences and his seat before the next Democrat [who had been on the ticket]. For this, some Australian Democrats in Tasmania have never forgiven Brown' (Walker P. A. 1994, personal communication).

Nevertheless, it is unlikely that any other candidate would have matched Bob Brown in any way. His vigour, vision and dedication have propelled green concern in Tasmania into a viable political movement that eventually captured the balance of state political power, as we shall see.

4.4 The Electrona Dispute - development 'at-any-cost'

4.4.1 The Policy Context - the hydro-industrial legacy

Burton argues that the Franklin victory was followed in Tasmania by a period of polarisation and backlash against the environment movement (Burton 1987:21). The tension was palpable between conservationists who had demonstrated their preparedness to intervene in state development policy, and the bureaucrats and multinationals[28] who were determined to constrain them (Thompson 1982:14). After the dispute, Liberal Premier Gray was determined to show his backers that unlike the Labor Party, his Government was capable of taking on conservationists and winning. The paradoxically destructive effect of Lowe's consensus style was not lost on Premier Gray, whose own style in contrast was described by journalists as uncompromising, tough, aggressive, and indeed 'Reeconian' - modelled that is, upon ex-Labor Premier Reece (*Sunday Tasmanian* 20 December 1985; *Advocate* 27 August 1985; Stokes 1986:3). Gray was equally keen, in a bid to consolidate his newly won political power, to snatch from Labor its traditional role that Hay (1986:21) describes as 'industrial standard-bearer' in Tasmania. In April 1984, shortly before announcing plans for both the Henty-Anthony hydro-electric scheme in Tasmania's West, and mining exploration in South West protected areas, Gray shifted his economic focus to the attraction of multi-million dollar development projects to the State (Crowley 1989:52; Bates 1983:4, 5; Tighe 1992:166).

In 1984, the first of Gray's 'multi-million dollar' projects was announced as the $50 million, eighteen storey, international hotel for the historic low rise waterfront of Hobart's Sullivan's Cove area. At the same time, a $34 million silicon smelter was foreshadowed at the site of a failed carbide

[28] Thompson (1982:11) notes that foreign companies have been the major beneficiaries of hydro-power. To these the HEC has provided infrastructure, he claims, to the value of $1,700 million rent free. The prices paid by industry for HEC power remain confidential.

works adjacent to the Electrona village and the town of Snug on North West Bay, in Southern Tasmania [Liberal Party Press Release 16.4.85; P. A. Walker pers. com. (1994); Chapman *et al* 1986;126; see locality map 4.3]. Both projects sparked bitter opposition with the local community joined by the Tasmanian Conservation Trust in opposing the hotel, and the North West Bay residents joined by the Wilderness Society[29] in opposing the smelter. The legacy of a community still divided over the Franklin dispute heightened the antagonism that both projects generated. Liberal Premier Gray played on this by invoking the symbolic rhetoric of smelter opponents as 'greenies', and 'anti-anythingers' in a bid to shape public belief that concern for community and the environment is 'anti-development', and 'anti-Tasmanian' (*Mercury Editorial* 21 April 1986). On the other hand, the proponents of development were lauded as 'good corporate citizens'. The community polarisation this labelling inspired was used by the Premier to legitimate his own steamrolling confrontation of project opposition. To the evasion, denial, secrecy and exclusion tactics characteristic of the Pedder and Franklin disputes, Gray added fast track legislation that approved both the international hotel and the smelter, dismisse public rights of appeal, as well as overriding all other legislative and approval processes in what the local press called 'one of the worst public relations jobs ever seen in Tasmania' (*Mercury* 28 August 1985).[30]

If its rural-residential characteristics distinguish the Electrona dispute from traditional Tasmanian resource conflicts, its ecopolitical significance remains, as we shall see, in exposing the inadequacy of hydro-industrially driven regional development, and the ability of the state to misrepresent

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[29] After the Franklin victory, the Tasmanian Wilderness Society, with major branches now operating in each state, changed its name to the Wilderness Society.

[30] The relevant legislation is the 1985 International Hotel Development Act, and the 1986 Silicon Development Act. An October 1985 poll of 30 Hobart identities, incidentally found the International Hotel on its completion to be 'one of the most hated buildings in Hobart' (*Sunday Tasmanian* 25 October 1985).

and suppress such exposure. Massive injections of state funding to the carbide works from the late 1970s had left the Lowe Government in 1981 with a failed operation, lost employment prospects and a depressed regional community that had historically relied upon a large industrial employer.



Locality Map 4.3 - Electrona

(Scale 1:250,000. Source : Base Map Dept. of Environment & Land Management)

Aggregate public losses from the carbide works exceeded $14.5 million, and contributed to the growing lack of confidence in the ability of Labor to govern Tasmania. The carbide works was described as symbolic of all that was wrong with the state economy - its shrinking industrial base, its dependency upon external forces, the non-local control of its industry, and the inability of state governments to halt its economic decline (*Advocate* 10 July 1985). To the Federal Callaghan Inquiry into industry structure and employment in the state, this predicament was a distinctly 'Tasmanian problem', its only cure in the diversification of the state's industrial base away from exploitative, subsidised major industry, and

toward small and medium scale operations (Callaghan 1977:100-106). The troubled history of the carbide works should have been sufficient warning against the domination of a small regional community by a sole export industry dependent upon government subsidy. However, along with environmental and public health concerns, economic arguments such as these put by smelter opponents came to represent neglected debate in the Electrona dispute, ignored by a Government intent upon development 'at-any-cost', ruled beyond the terms of reference of the Environmental Protection Appeal Board, and eventually squashed by fast track legislative provisions (Crowley 1989:48-50).

4.4.2 The Electrona Dispute - up & down with subsidised industry

On his election in 1982, Premier Gray had declared the Electrona carbide venture by the previous Government the state's worst corporate disaster. Two years later, he announced that his Electrona 'revival' would recoup up to $4 million of lost state funding, 'making phoenix rise' from the ashes of his opponent's carbide works blunder (*TPD*, House of Assembly, April 1984). Gray's 1984 announcement was briefly that negotiations had begun with joint venturers concerning the feasibility of converting the old carbide works into a silicon smelting operation. A $770,000 feasibility study by the venturers was subsequently announced without elaboration by the Government (*Advocate* 3 January 1985). On the 16th of July 1985, Tasmanian Silicon Smelters (formed by joint venturers Pioneer Concrete, and the French firm Pechiney - later renamed Pioneer Silicon Smelters Pty. Ltd.), applied for a licence to operate a silicon smelter at Electrona, by which time environmentalists and local resident groups had begun expressing concern over the proposal[31] (Crowley 1989:47; *Mercury* 29.10.85;

[31] In July 1984, the Wilderness Society claimed that the joint venturers were being offered cut price electricity (*Advocate* 18 July 1984). The first resident fears were expressed by the Howden Progress Association in mid 1985, when it claimed that the areas affected would cover the North West Bay rural-residential settlements of Electrona, Margate, Howden, Oyster Cove, Sandfly and Snug (*Mercury & Examiner* 13 May 1985).

12.4.84; *Advocate* 9.7.85). 326 objections to the licence application were received by the Department of the Environment by the due date of August 16 1985, to be dismissed by the Premier as 'anti-Tasmanian', with the Wilderness Society accused by the Minister for the Environment of 'orchestrating a campaign designed to slow development of vital industry for the area' (*Mercury* 21.8.85; *Examiner* 21.8.85).

On August 25, the local Kingborough Council voted 5-3 to rezone the carbide industry site from general to light industry, in a clear indication to the Premier to 'peddle his proposal elsewhere' (*Examiner* 1.9.85). Residents advocated light 'enterprise industries' for North West Bay, claiming that the region's complex topography acted as a natural amphitheatre, and was therefore unsuitable for any silicon plant, even one meeting the most modern technical standards (*Examiner* 24.9.85). The Wilderness Society argued that Tasmanians would bear the enormous cost of government subsidy to the project, estimated in terms of power alone to be worth nearly $14 million over ten years, to achieve a mere 70 direct jobs for the region (Burton 1983 & 1985). However the joint venturers issued a writ against Council on September 14 1985, and a letter threatening to sue for breach of contract, thwarting the rezoning, gagging debate, and making a farce, Bob Brown claimed, of Tasmania's 1973 Environment Protection Act, (instituted after Pedder), and the first major industrial project to be reviewed under it[32] (*Advocate* 17.9.85).

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[32] This legislation was dubbed the 'toothless tiger' by Democrat Norm Sanders, who criticised the Tasmanian shield on its cover as symbolising the state's exploitation ethic.

Despite the preamble in the Act mentioning the Government's policy requirement for an environmental impact statement to be carried out 'before a decision is made to proceed with any future development which is likely to have an impact on the environment of the State', there is no actual legislative mention of this policy.

The HEC, for instance, has never been required to file environmental impact statement (Bell & Sanders 1980:81-87).

Although hydro-industrialisation was no longer overt policy at the time of the Electrona conflict, its hallmarks were recognisable, particularly in the narrowness of economic debate by industry proponents, and in the option for the region that eventually prevailed. The willingness of the State Government to disregard established policy processes in order to achieve its development objectives, as it had in usurping the role of the Scenery Preservation Board, and disregarding the national park status of both Lake Pedder and the South West, was also a feature of the silicon smelter dispute. Since the mid-1970s, the North West Bay region had been the subject of several strategic planning and natural area evaluation studies funded by the local Kingborough Council. The significant characteristics of the region include its aesthetic semi-rural appeal that is not expected to suffer development, nor urbanising influences until well into the next century, despite its location on the fringe of the Hobart metropolitan area. The region was also found to warrant inclusion on the National Estate for the scenic value of its strongly defined, and topographically complex, natural features - its shoreline, beaches, unique mud flats, amphitheatre of rugged, bush covered hills, and the narrow alluvial plains that border its waterways (Kingborough 1976:100). Council additionally found that noise emission and amplification across North West Bay, as well as water quality control, proximity to residential areas, and compliance with environmental regulations had each been problems with the siting and operations of the carbide works.

After the collapse of the works, Council then signalled its intentions for the future of the region by its first rezone of the Electrona industrial site away from heavy industry and towards a more regionally appropriate mix of tourism, water based activities and general industrial development[33]

[33] The rezone took effect in December 1983 when the 'Industry 1B Heavy' zone was redefined into four areas: Cottage Industry, Marine Zone, Port Zone, and General Industry. General Industry was restricted in size by the rezone to an area approximately one quarter

(Kingborough 1981; TCAE 1975). The Council attempted a further rezone from general to light industry, as mentioned above, as a clear indication of its desire not to have heavy industry revived at the old carbide site. Notwithstanding Council's views, and the specific concerns of residents about the health hazards of a silicon smelter situated without a buffer zone in the Electrona township, Premier Gray stressed the vital importance of the smelter for Tasmania, and warned that it would be disappointing if the issue were to become a 'political football' (*Mercury* 10 July 1985). A dispute had been brewing for at least twelve months before this remark over the proposal, and the air of inevitability surrounding its approval by the State Government. Both the Wilderness Society and Dr Bob Brown, who asked questions of the Premier in Parliament, could extract no details of the operation. On this basis, smelter opponents asked both for an extension to the period of public objection to the smelter licence application, and an environmental impact statement to be prepared and made available for public comment. The Government responded by refusing to extend the licence objection period, by urging smelter opponents to lodge their objections in the absence of an impact statement, and by introducing a $250 fee for the right to appeal against the issuing of environmental licences (*Mercury* 15; 20 & 23 August).

In July 1985, the joint venturers met the smelter objectors, indicating that they were intending to prepare an environmental impact statement, restricted in scope, however, to air, noise and water pollution. Shortly after this, local objectors formed the North West Bay Development Association to represent local concerns, and achieve a broadening of the environmental impact statement's terms of reference (*Examiner* 26

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of the prior heavy industrial zone, and included the land on which the Electrona factory is sited, the Electrona housing estate to the north, the entry road (Pothana road) and the residences lining this road (Stephens 1985:90).

August 1985; *Mercury* 12 September 1985).[34] By mid-August 1985, it was obvious that the Government would be facing a major campaign of opposition by the residents of North West Bay to the smelter, and that it would be backed by the resources of the tenacious Wilderness Society.[35] As the level of government closest to the people, the Council was already responding to anti-smelter pressure, although there were a minority of pro-smelter advocates within its ranks. The Government countered this by backing the formation of a pro-smelter group, the Kingborough North West Bay Progress Association, in late August.

The Labor Party slammed this tactic as 'an exercise in the use of rent-a-crowd' by a government indulging in 'transparent political trickery', and claimed that the inaugural meeting of the group was not only held by invitation only, but stacked with Government supporters and backers of the smelter project (*ALP Press Release* 26 August 1985). In the final weeks of August, the Electrona debate erupted into just the full-blown, heated controversy that Premier Gray had been endeavouring to avoid, and that would persist well into 1986. After the Council vote to rezone to exclude the smelter option, and the joint venturers' legal threats, the Federal Government was flooded with over two hundred requests for a federal environmental impact statement, and the Premier was himself warned by the developers that other projects were 'hanging' on the smelter's approval, and that the venturers may be entitled to compensation should the smelter not proceed (*Mercury* 11 October 1985; *Examiner* 13 October 1985).

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[34] A submission to the joint venturers from residents saw the inclusion in the statement of truck movements, solid wastes and dust, with some consideration to sociological effects, land and property values and aesthetic impact (*Mercury* 28 August & 12 September 1985).

[35] Besides subsidised power, the Wilderness Society's main grounds of concern were the economic aspects of the proposal, i.e. infrastructure subsidies, overt and covert government financial backing, and the insignificant number of direct jobs to be generated, as well as the environmental impact of silica quarrying, which alone could have thwarted the proposal (Burton 1983 & 1985).

In October 1985, the release by the joint venturers of a favourable environmental impact statement was taken by the Premier as a mandate to pursue the silicon smelter (*Mercury* 29 October 1985). Nevertheless residents found the document flawed and inadequate, with insufficient evidence to support the conclusions presented in each of the areas of: dust dispersion; noise emissions; ground level concentrations of dust and sulphur dioxide; traffic movements; socio-economic impacts; visual and aesthetic impacts; and water pollution - in fact in every aspect of the statement. Dr. Gerry Bates, advocate for the appellants in the appeal hearing contesting the granting of a licence to operate the smelter, claimed that the impact statement was riddled with mistakes and anomalies that were identified by the appellants but overlooked or ignored by the Department of the Environment (Environment Protection Appeal Board 1986:3, 111).

The Environment Protection Appeal Board heard evidence against the issuing of the smelter licence for 28 days over eight weeks in the state's longest running environmental appeal that produced a record 3,220 pages of evidence. On the pretext that the smelter project might be lost to the State by the appeal process delays, the Premier introduced a 'blanket' fast-track Development Control Bill, with provisions to control opposition to the smelter and to any other of its future projects. The Bill drew criticism from the conservative Tasmania Bar Council, which reacted with 'shock, horror and outrage' over its potential to take away civil rights (*Mercury* 19 April 86). The Legislative Council threw out the Bill, retaining only development controls specific to the smelter. The Silicon Development Act was passed by the Lower House following all night debate on 30 April 1986 (Bates 1986:190). Royal Assent was granted three weeks later, after the Environment Protection Appeal Board's (1986b) 13 May finding that the smelter licence was valid.

4.4.3 The Role of the State - federal non-intervention

Gray's uncompromising handling of the Electrona dispute betrayed a bi-partisan political instinct, following the Franklin dispute, that constraint of environmental demands was requisite to retaining political power. The $34 million Electrona smelter proposal, so swiftly following Gray's 1982 election, functioned as an implicit promise to reassert big business as the industrial priority in Tasmania. The Gray Government was prepared to see development at Electrona 'at-any-cost'. In practice, this saw it ride rough shod over local planning, environmental and community health concerns. The Labor Party protested, in a peripheral way, about fairness and equity in the smelter's approval and licence appeal process, without raising issues of environmental, economic, or social significance[36] (*ALP Press Release* 28 August 1985; *Advocate* 31 October 1985). Labor's criticism of the silicon smelter proposal would have been perceived as siding with environmentalists, who were believed to have destroyed the Party over the Franklin issue, and would have further alienated Labor from its own working class political constituency (Crowley 1989:52).

Smelter objectors were treated as outsiders just as conservationists had always been in policy terms in Tasmania. The refusal by the Premier and joint venturers to provide public detail of the silicon smelter proposal was also justified in the usual terms, that is - that the need for secrecy was on the basis of maintaining corporate competitiveness (*Mercury* 9 July 1985). The Silicon Development Act confirmed corporate privilege by ensuring that 'a person who is guilty of a serious breach of the law under the Environment Protection Act by way of polluting is not liable to even half the penalty to which a person who maybe standing in front of the gates of the silicon smelter would be subject' (*TPD*, House of

[36] It was however, largely due to Labor Party efforts that, by the end of August 1985, perceptions of the State Government's mishandling of the smelter issue were rife, not only in public, but significantly in the editorial columns of the conservative Tasmanian press.

Assembly, 30 April 1986:1,625-1697). There was no chance that the Federal Government would respond to smelter opponents' entreaties to intervene in the dispute.[37] Gray had threatened a high court challenge to federal intervention on both the smelter and the upcoming woodchip export licence renewals (*Liberal Party Press Release* 29 August 1986). The federal government accepted Gray's assurance on the environmental legitimacy of the smelter project, suggesting that the only grounds for its intervention would be if there was an adverse finding by the proponent's environmental impact statement (*Mercury* 31.8.86). It had been urged to take this position by the Tasmanian Labor Party, whose display of bi-partisan development politics provoked comment about the widening rift between Labor and environmentalists (*Examiner* 30 August 1986).

4.4.4 The Aftermath of Dispute

The successful reopening of the old carbide plant may well have proved a feather in the cap of the Gray government at the 1986 state elections had it not been for the escalation of conflict over the proposal, and Gray's heavy handed response. The 1986 state elections were more significant for the election of Dr. Gerry Bates as an independent in the House of Assembly ushering in a new era of green parliamentary politics. Dr. Bates joined Dr. Bob Brown in broadening the conservation agenda by complementing wilderness concerns with issues of environmental health and safety, state pollution, recycling, container legislation, public participation and appeal rights (Roberts 1988:8). Industrial development policy, meanwhile, had slipped from the HEC's hegemonic institutional control predominantly back into the political arena with Gray as sovereign leader. However, as the first of Premier Gray's 'multi-million dollar' subsidised industries,

[37] There were two potential mechanisms for intervention, firstly in ordering a federal environmental impact statement into the proposed silica-quartz quarry in the South West conservation area that was to supply the smelter, or secondly, by ordering one when Federal Cabinet was considering Foreign Investment Review Board approval for the export based project.

the Electrona silicon smelter could not have proved more disastrous, not only for the manner in which it was approved, but for the controversy that plagued its performance before its collapse and closure in mid-1991. The flaws in the policy approach of 'backlash' against environmentalism, manifest as the practice of development 'at-any-cost' by the Liberals, could not have been more apparent than in this final outcome of the dispute.

In its brief operations from July 1987 to August 1991, the arguments of the smelter's opponents were proven, confirming the undemocratic nature of fast-track development legislation and its exemptions; the inappropriate siting of heavy industry in the rural-residential setting of Electrona; and the dangers of state subsidisation of externally controlled export based industries. The Silicon Development Act prevented residents from objecting to the smelter operator's variation of the plant's original design, by which its licence had been issued and subsequently upheld by the Environment Protection Appeal Board. Smelter opponents had protested that the proponent's impact analysis had not considered the complex topography of the North West Bay area, which tends to promote noise reverberation, and to circulate and recirculate rather than disperse air pollutants. During its operations, residents reported vast quantities of silica dust issuing as they had feared from the plant's chimneys, and at times from the refurbished building itself. They reported disturbing 'roaring', 'rushing', 'thumpity-thumping', 'buzzing' and 'tonal whirring' sounds that were 'half felt-half heard' (*TPD* House of Assembly 22 Sept 1987:3, 034; 3 May 1988:1, 354-5). Without recourse to appeal, residents suffered the smelter operations until mid 1991, when it closed, having lost $22 million in just four years.[38]

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[38] In August 1987 the Government removed public right of appeal against the annual renewing of industry licences. Green parliamentarians were subsequently also refused details of loans, subsidies and financial incentives to the controversial smelter operations after its collapse.

4.5 The Wesley Vale Dispute- 'licence to pollute'

4.5.1 The Policy Context - the industrial imperative

There was no doubt, in the Pedder and Franklin disputes, that ecocentric values were being asserted by the opponents of hydro-industrialisation against the utilitarian values of development proponents. The Electrona dispute, although not a battle for the preservation of wilderness, was very much a battle over the ecocentric, intrinsic value of an aesthetic, natural environment threatened by industrial development. Nevertheless, the North West Bay residents and environmentalists had learnt from the Franklin experience to pitch a range of arguments against the smelter on aesthetic, planning, economic, health and environmental grounds, none of which made any impact upon state nor federal politicians. The Wesley Vale dispute was inspired by remarkably similar concerns, however over a proposal thirty times the size of the smelter, and with the potential to devastate prime agricultural land in Tasmania's conservative northern heartland (see locality map 4.4). If the Electrona dispute had drawn together a disparate group of residents and 'greenies' into an alliance of so-called 'anti-Tasmanians', Wesley Vale added primary producers, the scientific community and conservative northern land owners, to form a broad coalition of concern that defeated the pulp mill proposal, toppled the Gray Government, and prompted the return of a record number of green independents to State Parliament.

In terms of industrial policy, Wesley Vale was Electrona 'writ large', with all its failings as a development panacea. Just as the Pedder and Franklin disputes had exposed the hegemonic, development powers of the Hydro-Electric Commission, so Electrona and Wesley Vale saw the confronting and calling to account of major corporate consumers of hydro-power and state resources. The rights of major industry to pollute and consume

Tasmania's natural resources with minimal returns to the state, has been a privilege upheld by successive state governments in a 'cult of hydro-development' that has lasted almost a century (Sandercock 1983:13). The outcome of this policy, Burton (1986:19) argues, has been the corporate domination of Tasmania by a number of resource exploiting industries that dictate the terms of their privilege to a 'subservient state'.[39] Whilst industry attraction is routine state practice, the sole reliance upon hydro-policy as an industrial imperative has certainly distinguished Tasmania from other Australian states. By selling large subsidised blocks of power to very few industries, hydro-industrialisation has also created enormous limitations upon the state's future industrial options (Ramsay 1972:6; Thompson 1981:146). The flaws in this strategy are legendary following the alternate economic debate and project evaluation by conservationists during the Franklin dispute. Nevertheless the threat to corporate privilege in the Electrona and Wesley Vale disputes saw the pulp mill joint venturers respond with resistance, evasion, job and investment blackmail, collusion, secrecy, information denial, and pressure for legislative protection from public protest and accountability.

The proposal by joint venturers, North Broken Hill Holdings Ltd. and Canadian based Noranda Forest Inc., to build the world's largest bleached kraft pulpmill, was not only exactly the type of industry that the strategy of hydro-industrialisation was designed to attract, but one of a massive scale, beyond the wildest dreams of its political backers. Without the dedicated campaigning of the coalition of opponents, upon grounds of the pulp mill's likely environmental, health and community impacts, the proposal would have received state and federal approval. However,

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[39] Even as he battled bureaucratic development forces to save the Franklin, Australian Democrat politician Norm Sanders claims to have understood that the HEC was merely doing the bidding of its corporate masters to whom Tasmania was expected to give away labour, resources and power (Sanders 1981:155).

early federal enthusiasm for the pulp mill and its export income earning potential[40] was tempered, after the strategic lobbying of federal politicians by its opponents. McEachern explains that the project had the active support not only of the Tasmanian Government, but 'significant parts of the Federal Labor Cabinet', the ACTU and the business community. The Federal Government, he adds, was split between support of the project for its economic advantages, and opposition from those concerned about its potential environmental impact (McEachern 1990:63). Rather than resolve these differences, the Federal Government gave an undertaking that the mill would only proceed subject to the undertaking of proper base-line studies, and the enhancing of environmental controls, before Foreign Investment Review Board approval could be granted by Cabinet[41] (Economou 1992:464). Despite the state government's entreaties and its own back down on state environmental controls, this tightening of federal requirements saw the pulp mill joint venturers withdraw. The project collapsed with many unresolved environmental, economic and social issues that may well haunt future state pulp mill and 'down-stream processing' ventures in Tasmania (USERP 1988).

Foremost amongst the unresolved issues in the pulp mill debate was the question of natural resource exploitation and the depletion of old growth native forests. In 1985, the Federal Government refused to intervene in the Electrona dispute, but simultaneously it was signalling early approval for the renewal of Tasmania's export woodchip licence the following

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[40] As Economou notes, the proposal satisfied three major industry federal policy objectives: (i) the encouragement of state-of-the-art manufacturing technology in the down stream processing of raw materials; (ii) encouragement of industries capable of earning export income; and (iii) encouragement of industries capable of displacing importation of manufactured good (Economou 1992:464). In terms of Tasmania, McEachern notes that the mill seemed an obvious 'value-adding' project for a state short of manufacturing and living largely by exports of primary products (McEachern 1990:64).

[41] The call for further base line studies was a response to a Commonwealth Science and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) and Department of Primary Industries and Fisheries review of the Gray Government's relaxed guidelines (McEachern 1990:64).

year. In 1986, a memorandum of understanding between the State and Federal Governments delivered an export woodchip volume of 2,889,000 tonnes to Tasmania in return for its official recognition of 'the need for development to be balanced with environmental sensitivity' (Economou 1990:54). On the strength of its forestry expectations, which in defiance of this recognition were to fully exploit Tasmania's timber resources, the State proposed a woodchip mill in the Huon region to be supplied by southern forests, and commenced harvesting in both the Lemonthyne Central Tasmania, and Farmhouse Creek in the state's south, ignoring the National Estate listing of both these areas[42] (Wayte 1988:6; Economou 1990:54).

Conservationists blockaded the Farmhouse Creek operations prompting the ill-fated 1987 Federal Government's Helsham Inquiry into 'National Estate Values of the Lemonthyne and Southern Forests'. Following the Inquiry's surprise finding of only a fraction of the southern forests as worthy of protection, the Federal Government intervened. A *Forests Accord* was struck whereby the State and Federal Governments jointly nominated for world heritage listing, (to complement the existing world heritage region), an area in excess of Helsham's recommendation. In return, the State achieved a 790,000 tonnes per annum increase in the 1986 woodchip quota, and the closure of one, rather than two, existing mills (Economou 1990:55). Environmentalists were incensed, claiming that Tasmania's forests were already overcommitted and being logged unsustainably, with over 80% exported as woodchips. Even without the revised woodchip quota, old growth forests would be exhausted, at 1988 exploitation rates, by the year 2011. In addition, wasteful practices were

[42] Earlier protection of the Farmhouse Creek region of the southern forests had been lost when, immediately after his election, Premier Gray had lifted the moratorium upon industry operations imposed in there 1978 with the declaration of the Upper Picton Valley as part of the South West Conservation Area.

seeing two million tonnes of wood burnt each year on the forest floor. Sawlogs, the Helsham Inquiry was told, were being deliberately pulped, whilst rough and careless handling was degrading sawlogs to pulpwood and woodchip quality[43] (Mattingley 1988:6; USERP 1988; Wayte 1988:6). Against this background of conflict, and the green light that the 790,000 tonnes per annum increased woodchip quota had signalled to the forestry industry, the Wesley Vale dispute erupted.

4.5.2 The Wesley Vale Dispute - corporate politics & the public response

There had been talk of a multi-million dollar pulpmill at Wesley Vale from at least 1987, when Japanese backing of $100 million for such a project was rejected by North Broken Hill Holdings Ltd. In March 1988, Australian Pulp and Paper Mills released an environmental report about the siting of a mill at Wesley Vale, prompting the formation of the Concerned Residents against the Pulpmill Siting (CROPS) months before any project was confirmed. Spokesperson Christine Milne subsequently led a blistering attack against the pulpmill proposal for which she was lauded as the 'Boadicea from the Bush' in the local press (Flanagan 1989:11). In May 1988, North Broken Hill confirmed both a mill proposal, and its partnership in the venture with Canadian based Noranda Forest Inc., who would invest $500 million in the project and become a major customer of the pulp mill's products (Moore 1992). The project would create an estimated 200 direct jobs that critics claimed were unlikely to go to the unemployed on the North West coast (Murphy 1989:29). An announcement of the joint venturers' intention to proceed was delayed by royalties negotiations, however a compromise deal saw an agreement signed on 17 October 1988 between the Tasmanian Government, North Broken Hill and Noranda Inc. (Chapman 1992:50).

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[43] In the late 1970s, Tasmania's forestry practices were described as a 'deplorable', 'obscene', 'biological loss' by a Canadian economist advising the Lowe Government. They were, he advised, the world's most wasteful forestry operations (Bell & Sanders 1980:38).



Locality Map 4.4 - Wesley Vale

(Scale 1:250,000. Source : Base Map Dept. of Environment & Land Management)

The Wesley Vale proposal was for the joint venturers to build the world's largest bleached kraft pulpmill, costing $1 billion, on 16 hectares of prime farmland at rural Wesley Vale, in north-eastern Tasmania. The mill would consume two million tonnes of logs per annum, exacerbating unsustainable forestry practices and exerting enormous pressure upon National Estate areas such as the Great Western Tiers in the north, the Douglas Apsley on the east coast, and the disputed southern forests, as well as the unlisted north-eastern rainforests (Wayte 1988:6). It was estimated that eventually the pulp mill would consume one sixth of Tasmania's standing forests (Murphy 1989:28). The sheer size of the pulpmill's operations itself, with its 100 metre stack emitting 16.500 million litres each day of a variety of toxic gases, raised problems of environmental pollution that eventually torpedoed the venture, yet eclipsed important, resource based aspects of the debate (Avieson 1989:12). The expected returns of $300 million to Australia's terms of trade

annually in both taxes and balance of payments credits, led state and federal governments to initially welcome the proposal. Return to the joint venturers was expected to be $150 million, an 18% yearly pre-tax return on their investment, with a $350 million construction windfall and $11 million annually in royalties going to Tasmania (Wayte 1988:6; Murphy 1989:28).

The Wesley Vale dispute unfolded over five short, yet intense, months from the November 1988 passing of the State Government's Northern Pulp Mill (Agreement) Bill, to the Northern Pulp Mill (Doubts Removal) Bill in March 1989 (Chapman 1992:50). Concerned possibly by the early formation of CROPS, and conscious of the delay caused by Electrona opponents, Liberal Premier Gray ruled out appeals of the pulp mill to the Environmental Protection Appeals Board, and signalled his intention to finalise approval before Christmas 1988. In late November 1988, a week after the project had been unveiled, the joint venturers released an environmental impact statement, giving objectors four weeks to make public comments to be considered in state and federal approval processes. The scant information in the impact statement, and the unseemly haste with which the pulp mill proponents were moving towards approval of a major project, saw both the environmental impact statement and the State Liberal Government's fast-track decision making condemned by pulp mill opponents and primary industry groups, but particularly by the scientific community (Law 1988; USERP 1988).

In addition to concerns of the pulpmill unsustainably consuming native forests, destroying prime agricultural farmland and failing to provide the expected jobs 'bonanza', CROPS and the Wilderness Society argued that the project would massively consume water resources, pour millions of tonnes of toxic effluent daily into Bass Strait, and pollute the atmosphere

with tonnes of carbon dioxide daily.[44] The Liberal Government's fast tracking of approval under its own environmental guidelines, CROPS claimed, blatantly amounted to the awarding of a 'licence to pollute' (Milne 1989). The United Scientists for Environmental Responsibility and Protection (USERP)[45] found the project proponent's environmental impact statement a poor, inadequate document, riddled with serious errors, misleading through omission and quite unable to guarantee an environmentally safe operation (USERP 1988). The impact statement was dismissed by Dr Mary O'Brien, a visiting US pesticides expert, as an exercise in the '*elimination of information and science*'. Her charge against the joint venturers included the withholding of information on the effects of the pulpmill's chlorinated compounds or sediments on the agricultural and marine environment; the failure to present any known alternatives to the chlorinated process; and the further omission of any international studies on the environmental impacts of existing chlorine based pulp mills. Her summing up of the project was that it would leave Tasmania with outdated technology, pollute Bass Strait for decades to come, destroy marine life and local produce, and have as yet unknown effects on human health (USERP 1988).

The United Scientists for Environmental Responsibility and Protection campaigned relentlessly on the inadequacies, errors, and omissions of the pulpmill's environmental impact statement, claiming that to 'fast-track this development is not only an insult to democracy, [but] a crime against humanity' (Murphy 1989:30). However, comments were also leaked

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[44] Pulp mill opponents were particularly concerned over what they claimed would be the deadly dioxin emissions from the plant. Dioxin is a by-product of the chemical bleaching process, and the most toxic chemical known to science. Because there are no known safe levels of dioxin, which causes birth defects and cancer in humans, no dioxin emissions are considered acceptable in either the United States or Sweden (Wayte 1988:6).

[45] Murphy (1989:30) explains that 'USERP is a group of 60 expert Tasmanian scientists established in June 1988 in response to scientists' disenchantment with the Helsham Inquiry into the future of Tasmania's forests. Eleven scientists who gave evidence believed that their expert opinions had been blatantly over-ruled by political considerations'.

from various government quarters that demonstrated similar concerns. The State Department of Environment's questions to the joint venturers resulted in a 140 page impact statement *Addendum* (Chapman 1992:50). This failed to satisfy USERP, which called for a minimum further twelve months study on tidal currents, atmospheric pollution and pollution dispersal, as well as an assessment of forest usage. By this stage, the climate of public concern over the environmental impact of the mill had increased commensurate with the public profile achieved by a diverse range of vocal opponents under the umbrella of CROPS.[46]

As the Government attempted to rush the development past these difficulties, its own Inland Fisheries Commission leaked a scathing critique of the proponents' environmental impact statement, calling its consideration of the project's potential impact upon the marine environment 'superficial, unsubstantiated, untested and unacceptable' (Murphy 1989:31). A leaked report from the State's Tasmanian Development Authority found the pulp mill proponent's impact statement falling 'short of a soundly based EIS for a project'. Amidst its many failings, the TDA report noted that the impact statement fails to review alternative pulp technologies, forest uses or forest stocks; and that it ignores both the impact of excessive water usage on the Mersey River flow, and the potential for toxic sludge waste to leach into ground water (Murphy 1989:31). Against contentious public scientific debate fuelled by the leaked government critiques, Premier Gray attempted to regain control of the public debate with his undertaking that the project would

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[46] The unusual alliance of pulp mill opponents included CROPS, the Tasmanian Farmers and Graziers Association's local branch, the Tasmanian Abalone Divers Association, the Australian Conservation Foundation and the Wilderness Society (Wayte 1988:6).

In March 1989, 68 Hobart doctors joined the anti-mill campaign by signing an open letter of concern over pollution from waste-water discharges, solid wastes and gaseous emissions (*Mercury* 3 March 1989).

only proceed on the basis of environmental guidelines that would give Tasmania the cleanest pulpmill in the world (Economou 1990:57).

4.5.3 The Role of the State - federal intervention

Chapman argues that in early 1989, the pulp mill project 'hung in the balance', with Premier Gray talking tough on not having environmental terms dictated to his government by the mill proponents (Chapman 1992:34-35). This *volte face,* Economou (1990:57) notes, 'owed much to the ability of the CROPS campaign on the industrial pollution issue to counter regionally-based support for the mill'. Revised environmental guidelines were issued by the State on 5th January 1989, and although considered still inadequate by USERP, were generally seen as heading in the right direction by totally banning dioxin, reducing organo-chlorine waste, and requiring tertiary effluent treatment[47] (Economou 1990:57). The mill proponents then called the government's 'environmental bluff', and threatened to withdraw their proposal completely.

Initially, the State stood firm; however after a month of intense negotiations with the mill proponents, State Parliament was recalled on 27 February, extraordinarily on North Broken Hill Holdings' letterhead, to sanction an environmental back down by passing the Northern Pulp Mill (Doubts Removal) Bill. This relaxed the original pulp mill guidelines, allowing dioxin discharge, twenty four hour gaseous emissions, and exemption from environmental regulation throughout the plant's commissioning period. The Bill passed into law on 8 March 1989, and prompted street marches and rallies by the anti-mill lobby, with numbers up to 6,000 and with an intensity not seen in public since the

[47] These were issued after advice was received by the State Government on kraft mills such as proposed for Wesley Vale from the Swedish Environmental Protection Board (*Mercury* 16 March 1989).

days of the Franklin dispute (*Mercury* 16 March 1989; Chapman 1992:41; Kelly 1992:531).

Despite Prime Minister Hawke initially welcoming the Wesley Vale proposal as a blueprint for down-stream processing in Australia, pulp mill opponents began their lobbying of federal politicians in early 1988 with a certain amount of confidence given the damage, for example, that pulpmill effluents in Sweden and Canada had caused to local fisheries industries. In January 1989, Senator Richardson, Federal Minister for the Environment, met with USERP scientists to discuss his concerns over the lack of meteorological data and the impact of mill effluent. Subsequently, he described Premier Gray's back down as 'government by company', and added that all the best advice suggested caution on the project (*Age* 20 February 1989; *Mercury* 16 March 1989). In March 1989, Federal Cabinet agreed to withhold Foreign Investment Review Board approval for the project pending further scientific reports on aquatic effluent disposal, and announced that the pulp mill would only go ahead subject to further base-line studies and enhanced environmental controls (Economou 1992:464; McEachern 1990). On 16th March 1989, the proponents pulled out, dropping the pulp mill project completely (*Mercury* 17 March 1989).

4.5.4 The Aftermath of Dispute

Such was the resentment against the Gray Government and the support for the environmental cause after the Wesley Vale dispute that, on 13th May 1989, the Liberals were toppled from power. The results bore a direct relationship to the prominence of environmentalists in the pulp mill debate and the extraordinary failure of the State Labor Party to achieve any profile throughout the dispute. On the other hand, Christine Milne, Lance Armstrong, and Di Hollister joined Dr Bob Brown and Dr Gerry Bates as independent green parliamentarians. The Labor Party combined

its historically low numbers in the Lower House with the five green independents, to form the historic Labor-Green Accord Government. The Accord partners agreed to work together to create an innovative, open and responsive government, in contrast to Gray's bulldozing tactics.

The Accord agreement additionally achieved the Douglas Apsley National Park gazettal, a halt to the Huon Forests Products proposed woodchip mill, the ruling out of a pulp mill at Wesley Vale, the pegging of the state export woodchip quota at 2,889,000 tonnes per annum, National Estate forest protection, further park gazettal and the effective doubling of the existing World Heritage area (Larmour 1990:60-3). However, the Accord was to prove a short-lived, bitter experience that failed over irreconcilable differences, specifically on the essentially contested forestry issue (Hay & Eckersley 1993). Ironically, Ray Groom toppled Gray as opposition leader, and took the Liberals back to electoral victory in 1992 on the promise of three pulp mills (Moore 1992).

4.6 Conclusion - Ecopolitical Opportunities & Constraints

In each of the Pedder, Franklin, Electrona and Wesley Vale disputes, the achievement of environmental demands was constrained, not only by traditional development policy, but by bi-partisan political support for the unrestrained exploitation of the state's natural resources. Only federal intervention, achieved by the campaigning efforts of conservationists in the Franklin dispute, and by a broad based coalition of public support in the Wesley Vale dispute, managed to thwart state development plans. In 2.2.2, we saw that ecopolitics disrupts the linear model of the political universe by promoting non-material values, and cutting across the left-right divide of traditional distributional politics. In Tasmania, ecopolitics has often left traditional political opponents united in their opposition to environment groups, as the Labor and Liberal parties were united on

Lake Pedder's inundation, for example. Only Premier Lowe, and his reformist supporters in the Labor Party, tried to ideologically distance themselves from resource exploitation by embracing conservation to preserve at least the lower reaches of the Franklin River. In the Electrona and Wesley Vale disputes, however, the Labor Party kept a low profile, siding with development forces in a return to bi-partisan politics, but opposing Premier Gray's fast-track decision making - even though, ironically, the same tactics had been used to flood Pedder by Labor Premier, Eric Reece.

In *2.3.1*, we saw that environmentalists face considerable difficulties in seeking to influence policy processes, specifically because of the obstacle of the growth based paradigm, its political structures and its ideologically sustained legitimacy. Premier Lowe's consultation prior to passing alternative legislation to the Hydro-Electric Commission's Gordon-below-Franklin Bill was the sole attempt in any of the four disputes considered to consider conservationists as anything other than outsiders in the policy process. In the Pedder dispute, conservationists had been seen as meddlesome by Premier Reece. After their foray into state politics and their enlistment of nation-wide support, they were treated, in the subsequent Franklin dispute, as subversives by Liberal Premier Gray. Conservation was such an anathema to the Tasmanian development ethos, that the fight to save Pedder was also lost partly by the early conservationists who themselves hesitated to assert intrinsic wilderness values against the hydro-industrial imperative. Their 'last ditch' effort in forming the Lake Pedder Action Committee and the United Tasmanian Group, came twenty years behind hydro-industrial plans, and at least a decade too late to save Lake Pedder (see *4.2.1*).

The loss of Pedder had taught conservationists to become confident and indeed aggressive about flouting state development policy, but also to act pre-emptively - anticipating the HEC's own plans, and to treat state government assurances with the greatest of suspicion. The sophistication of the conservation movement's campaigning skills paid dividends in saving the Franklin, but saw the environmental cause vilified by the Gray Government as 'anti-Tasmanian' in the subsequent Electrona and Wesley Vale disputes. Gray saw constraint of the ecopolitical challenge to state development and industry privilege as requisite to the consolidation of his political power, and reflected this priority in the legislative approval and immunity provisions for both projects. Although Gray himself, as Davis (1993:122) observes, had reined in the hegemonic powers of the HEC, he was quite willingly held to ransom by the silicon smelter and pulp mill proponents. Community outrage at Gray's 'government by company', and its rejection of development 'at-any-ecological-cost' was manifest, after concerted campaigning by environmentalists, in its return of five green independents, and the ousting of the Liberal Government, at the May 1989 state election.

CHAPTER FIVE:

VALUES, POWER & THE STATE IN TASMANIA

5.1 Chapter Outline

In *2.2.1*, environmentalism was introduced as paradigmatically opposing dominant industrialism, and environmental demands as subversive and challenging to prevailing values, policy boundaries and capital interests. However, it is argued that paradigmatic analysis is overly simplistic, and, in *2.2.2*, that environmentalism in fact comprises many difficult shades of green. Whilst Porritt (1984:4) describes these shades as the most to least opposed to industrialism, Eckersley (1992b:160) argues for an ecopolitical characterisation informed by the anthropocentric/ecocentric cleavage. In *3.4.1*, we considered environmentalism in shades of 'light' to 'dark' green, with the deepest shade of green offering the greatest ecocentric challenge to dominant values, and most resistant to mainstream policy processes. It has been argued by Hay and Haward (1988:442) that environmentalism in Tasmania represents a deep green, ecocentric challenge to the wholesale destruction of Tasmania's remnant wilderness areas. In Chapter Four, we saw, in each of the Pedder, Franklin, Electrona and Wesley Vale disputes, the state development paradigm challenged by ecocentric demands that classically oppose prevailing values and policy boundaries. In Chapter Five, these disputes are reconsidered after Downey (1987:34) to explain the forces that have shaped policy - limiting the impact of environmentalists upon decision making, and influencing the state in its determination of policy outcomes.

As argued in Chapter Three, analysis of the policy response to ecological demands must consider the ideological nature of environmental values and conflict, the potential for the mobilisation of bias toward orthodoxy

to frustrate the realisation of ecopolitical demands, and the limited capacity of the state to distance itself from material goals and capital interests. In Chapter Four, we saw that hydro-industrialisation functioned, in Hall's (1992:91) and Downey's (1987:32) terms, as a 'policy paradigm', defining the limits and the legitimacy of state development policy in each of the Lake Pedder, Franklin, Electrona and Wesley Vale disputes. Chapter Five recognises the need in policy analysis to stand back from the detail of such disputes in order to ask what Ham and Hill (1984:17) describe as 'some of the bigger questions' about the role of the state, and the distribution of power in contemporary society. The four disputes will be analysed below initially in terms of the clash between dominant and environmental values, then in terms of the power of prevailing interests to thwart ecopolitical goals, and finally, in terms of the role of the state in privileging industrial demands. This approach was determined, in *3.4.5*, as a modification of Simeon's (1976:556) causality funnel, to examine both paradigmatic value conflict in environmental disputes, and power as the capacity in various dimensions to achieve a policy outcome. The utility of this approach is considered in Chapter Six, the conclusion of this thesis.

5.2 The Clash of Irreconcilable Values

5.2.1 Early History Behind Later Conflict

It had only been a matter of time before attempts to overcome Tasmania's economic isolation and vulnerability, discussed in Chapter One, clashed with attempts to preserve its natural magnificence. The inevitability of conflict has partly been, Hay (1987:4) suggests, that the smallness of the island itself 'virtually ensures that any given interest in the land will conflict with another'. However, Robson (1985:140) has also argued that as early as the 1930s, the ground was being laid for

confrontation between the proponents of exploitation and preservation in the state. The early history behind recent disputes is crucial to understanding contemporary environmental policy formation in Tasmania and the irreconcilable clash of values in the Pedder, Franklin, Electrona and Wesley Vale disputes. A brief historical survey of trends in resource exploitation and preservation since the turn of the century reveals a long established pattern of public agitation for natural area preservation in Tasmania, as we shall see. This is of interest for revealing the pre-history of the conservation movement, and for showing that its preservationist forebears were inspired as much by anthropocentric utilitarian, as by ecocentric preservationist, concerns.[1] But it also shows that constraint upon natural area preservation matches the emergence of hydro-industrialisation, which was championed by the Ogilvie Labor Government from the early 1930s as the centrepiece of his post-depression program of reconstruction. Successive Labor Premiers then expanded the program of hydro-industrialisation and the powers of the Hydro-Electric Commission, whilst reservations dwindled until the 1960s, when the Lake Pedder dispute saw conservation explode politically for the first time in Tasmania onto the agenda of public concern.

Lake (1974) finds three periods of natural area preservation. From 1890 to 1940, 324,000 ha of reserves were created in a distinctly preservationist period (including 64,000 ha for the Cradle Mountain Scenic Reserve and Wildlife Sanctuary[2]). From 1941 to 1955 a more constrained period ensued in which only 28,000 ha was reserved (primarily the Lake Pedder reservation, subsequently re-declared National Park). The period from 1955 to 1967 saw dwindling reservation totalling a mere 9,300 ha, and

[1] Robson discusses 'turn of the century' preservationists, and finds that they were inspired not just by Tasmania's spectacular landscape, but by concerns to protect endemic fauna, to promote the tourism industry, and the concept of 'healthy educational holidays', and to overcome Tasmania's image as a disease ridden penal colony (Robson 1990b:283).

[2] Declared Cradle Mountain-Lake St. Clair National Park in 1922 (Thompson 1981:60).

reflected pressure against conservation from the state's expanding program of hydro-industrialisation (Lake 1974:435-436). There is a direct correlation between each of these periods and the state political leadership of the time. In the early preservationist period, state political leadership was relatively unstable, the Labor party emerging and holding power only briefly in 1909, and again from 1914 to 1916, and the new Liberal Party already 'in a state of transition' (Townsley 1976:43). On the other hand, preservationist sentiment was strongly championed by the organisations[3] that emerged and lobbied successfully in these years, for example in achieving the declaration, in 1916, of Tasmania's first national parks, Freycinet Peninsula on the East Coast, and Mt Field, in the South West wilderness (Thompson 1981:60-61).

Successive Labor Premiers then consolidated their grip on state political power, beginning in the 1930s with Ogilvie's reconstruction program of 'public works, industrial and rural developments, roads, education, health services and, above all, hydro-electric expansion' (Townsley 1976:42-43). The success of this infrastructure program by Ogilvie and Cosgrove, his successor, was seen in the drop in unemployment, between 1933 and 1954, from 13.6 to 1.3 per cent, an achievement that outstripped all expectations of post-war recovery (Lowe 1984:14). The beginning of this period was marked, in 1932, by the first skirmish between conservation and hydro-industrialisation when the newly established Hydro-Electric Commission dammed Lake St. Clair in the Cradle Mountain National Park, flooding the 'charming' Frankland beaches on the shores of the natural central highlands lake to the outcry of local bushwalkers. The justification was the 1000 jobs that the dam construction would create (Southwell 1983:14; Robson 1990b:429). The

[3] The Tasmanian Tourist Association (founded in 1893), the Tasmanian Field Naturalist Club (1904), the National Parks Association (1913), the Southwestern Expeditionary Club (1924) and the Hobart Walking Club (1929) (Lake 1974:435-436; Thompson 1981:61).

hegemonic powers of the HEC had their genesis in these early years of state development, with 1944 legislation giving the HEC autonomy as a statutory authority answerable directly to State Parliament. Hydro-development of the central highlands throughout the 1940s was followed by the HEC's preliminary assessment of 'the hydro-electric potential of the west and south-west rivers', that was discussed in State Parliament in 1950. Following power shortages in the early 1950s, this period of constrained natural areas reservation concluded with the 1954 Industrial Development Act, further expanding the powers of the HEC, including its powers of land acquisition (Lowe 1984:8).

From the late 1950s to 1967, a period of dwindling reservation coincided with the transition from Cosgrove, upon his retirement after nineteen years as Labor Premier, to the reign of Eric Reece. Reece was to achieve political supremacy, in the tradition of State Labor leaders, by vigorously pursuing hydro-industrialisation and industrial investment in Tasmania, and by offering strong autocratic rule 'in his self styled role as political boss' (Lowe 1984; Townsley 1976). Reece's achievements were seen by Lowe as his enhanced control, via Cabinet, of the Parliamentary Labor Party, and his successful inducement of expansion programs from the major bulk consumers of hydro-electric power (Lowe 1984:20). Reece's loss of power from 1969 to 1972 fuelled his resolve to thwart the efforts of the fledgling conservation movement to save Lake Pedder from hydro-inundation. Reece was, in Hay's (1986b:21) terms, a 'purveyor of hydro-ideology', who sold 'a vision of industrial greatness underwritten by cheap and abundant hydro power' until he retired in 1975. His decades of virtually unbroken power were distinguished by his announcement, extension[4] and inundation of the Lake Pedder National Park.

[4] This was subsumed by the 1968 declaration of the South West National Park.

5.2.2 Value Clash From Pedder to Wesley Vale

In 1967, ecopolitical conflict erupted in Tasmania, as we saw in *4.2.2*, with the tabling by the Hydro-Electric Commission in State Parliament of its plans to flood Lake Pedder. Having exhausted the hydro-potential of all but the state's south-western rivers and catchment areas, the technocratic, utilitarian practice of hydro-industrialisation directly threatened, for the first time, the beauty, amenity and biological diversity of the state's vast undeveloped wilderness. In asserting the intrinsic value of Lake Pedder against its utilitarian value to the Hydro-Electric Commission and State Government, the early Pedder campaigners fell classically into Cotgrove's alternative environmental paradigm discussed in *2.2.1*. Opposing them were predominantly men like Reece, bewildered, as Kiernan says, by the growing wave of public feeling for the environment, and for whom the notion 'that aesthetic considerations should halt a dam were anathema to one who had struggled through the Great Depression' (Kiernan 1990:30-31). Equally, there were the senior bureaucrats within the HEC itself, to whom the valuing of wilderness for 'recreational, aesthetic, spiritual or even scientific reasons', Southwell (1983:18) notes, was seen as 'frivolous, preposterous or illusory'. Indeed, the HEC's senior engineers, who 'had at their disposal the ability to wall off and flood entire valleys, divert the age old course of rivers and send them through mountains of solid rock', saw the South West as their 'private domain' (Southwell 1983:66).

It is clear that conservationists, as the ideological opponents of resource exploitation in the Pedder dispute, 'raided', in Cotgrove's (1982:88) terms, their cultural repertoire of beliefs and values to justify their actions and to gain support for their cause. But it is less clear, following a review of the Pedder, Franklin, Electrona and Wesley Vale disputes in Chapter Four, that paradigmatic analysis in general accurately captures the

complexity of environmentalism in Tasmania. A range of environmental positions can be seen, particularly in the Pedder dispute, during which the early conservationists were certainly more politically timid than the later Lake Pedder Action Committee. In Porritt's (1984:4-5) terms, conservationists who would not oppose state power, but looked to common sense to prevail in policy making, were traditionalists afraid to oppose industrialism, but hoping to rescue Pedder from its worst excesses. Again in Porritt's terms, such conservationists tended not to be green. But the campaigners whose activism as the Lake Pedder Action Committee led to electoralism as a green political party, on the other hand, fit Porritt's radical libertarian environmentalists who do reject industrialism, and as such generally seek a 'greener' world order.[5]

Conflict was inevitable in the Pedder dispute between the irreconcilable views of wilderness as a utilitarian resource, on the one hand, and as a natural paradise, on the other. The aesthetic valuing of wilderness had proved to be such an alien concept to state decision makers, that Franklin campaigners argued to save the river as much on economic grounds, as on grounds of intrinsic worth (in *4.3.1).* Lohrey (1990:97) notes that this broadened the electoral support for the environmentalists, which it did federally, as many voters saw the dam as economically unjustifiable. However, it does not account, as Kellow (1989:145) observes, for the sweeping to power of the fiercely parochial, pro-dam Gray Liberal Government in the 1982 state election. The visual dialogue conveying the beauty of a wild river was as much resented by the majority of Tasmanians in the Franklin dispute as were the conservationists' utilitarian arguments. Smelter opponents bore the brunt of this

[5] The United Tasmania Group (1990:34-6) adopted a 'new ethic' in pursuit of social and cultural change, aimed at transforming institutions to broaden decision making, preventing human alienation, and creating communities based upon equality, freedom, and peaceful evolution living in harmony with Tasmania's natural landscape and its living resources.

resentment, as their planning, community health and environmental concerns were labelled 'anti-Tasmanian' by Gray in the Electrona dispute. The resentment was fuelled by conservationists' calls for native forest preservation, a fact that was eclipsed in the Wesley Vale dispute by Gray's incompetence in setting environmental guidelines and by his draconian approach to decision making.

5.3 The Power of Prevailing Interests

5.3.1 Explaining Ideological Constraint

In Chapter Two, it is argued that the ecopolitical challenge to established political order faces the constraining influence of industrialism. In *2.2.1*, we saw that the ecological paradigm is defined by ideological opposition to the dominant perceptions of ecology, polity, nature, knowledge and industrial society. In *2.3.1*, it is suggested that this opposition remains a significant obstacle to the realisation of environmental policy demands. In the event of a dispute between opposing value imperatives, such as we classically see in Tasmania, Cotgrove (1982) suggests that we could expect to see a routine favouring of the dominant ideology (discussed in *2.3.1, fn 26*). Certainly, in each of the Pedder, Franklin, Electrona and Wesley Vale disputes, we have seen a mobilisation of bias toward the imperatives of industrial development within the state. Hydro-industrialisation and its industrial legacies have imprisoned state development in Tasmania, just as Lindblom (1982:333) argues that the market imprisons policy generally and frustrates social change. Conflict was fuelled by the state's treatment, in the disputes considered, of environmental concern as illegitimate and subversive, and by the dominant political view of ecology as an irrational distraction from mainstream policy objectives. Only federal intervention thwarted state priorities in the Franklin and Wesley Vale conflicts,

legitimising in state political parlance, otherwise 'anti-Tasmanian' environmental concerns.

In *2.3.6*, the industrial imperative is seen to constrain environmentalism by frustrating the legitimation of ecological integrity as a policy concern within orthodox politics. In the Pedder, Franklin, Electrona and Wesley Vale disputes, there was a frustration by traditional bi-partisan political influences[6] within the state of motivating ecocentric concerns, and of the economic arguments constructed to justify them. Conservationists in the Pedder and Franklin disputes then pitched both sets of arguments at the national government, achieving a decisive outcome only in the latter case, however, gaining the benefit of experience in the former. As we saw in *4.3.1*, conservationists learned from the loss of Pedder to argue against the Franklin's inundation on economic grounds that were strategically interwoven with visual marketing of the river's intrinsic worth. The 'world heritage' argument was subsequently championed by the federal government, and upheld in the High Court, however the economic arguments failed to redirect Tasmania's industrial agenda.

Franklin campaigners had resumed the United Tasmania Group's argument that hydro-development was failing to prove the economic panacea that it had been in the post-depression, post-war years. However, the federal government's compensation package for the state following the Franklin High Court decision affirmed hydro-policy by including $180 million to dam the Henty-Anthony alpine catchment, to the west of the Cradle Mountain Lake St. Clair National Park (Southwell 1983:64). The consequences of the failed conservationist bid to redirect the state's hydro-industrial agenda in the short term were both the Electrona and

[6] Labor Premier Lowe's failed, reformist attempt to seek a compromise in the Franklin dispute discussed in *4.3.2*, was a move towards legitimising ecocentric concerns, though itself thwarted by the traditional, bi-partisan development lobby.

Wesley Vale disputes. In the longer term, persistence in pursuing an alternate economic direction for the state, and the bi-partisan political resistance it has provoked, has seen the conservation movement spawn a green political party that, in 1989, achieved the United Tasmania Group's vision of holding the balance of state political power.

As mentioned in the introduction to Chapter Four, we can identify two clear 'development' periods *pre* and *post* the 1983 Franklin victory. In the Pedder and Franklin disputes, conservationists fought the direct impact of hydro-industrialisation on the state's wilderness. In the later Electrona and Wesley Vale disputes, environmentalists and concerned citizens opposed the regional industrial impact of the state's hydro-development agenda. In the *pre*-1983 period, the challenge to state orthodoxy, and to legitimacy defined in terms of dominant growth based values, was clearly ecocentric. In the *post*-1983 disputes, the challenge to development was primarily on amenity grounds and the state's assertion of economic over regional concerns. Linking the four disputes was the assertion of intrinsic natural values and the importance of place against dominant industrial imperatives that invariably provoked routine state political constraint. Paradigmatic analysis indicates that ecocentric values and environmental imperatives triumphed respectively in the Franklin and Wesley Vale disputes after the lessons learned by conservationists and environmentalists by the losses in the Pedder and Electrona conflict. But it is necessary to look beyond paradigmatic analysis to overt, covert and latent policy influences, and the role of the state in determining the outcome of conflict, to consider whether the broadening of support for environmentalism in the Franklin and Wesley Vale instances equates to the legitimation of ecopolitical demands.

5.3.2 Overt, Covert & Latent Policy Influences

The *overt political arena* has been the most accessible to the opponents of both hydro-industrialisation and the legacies of industrial development. As we saw in *3.3.2*, however, the limitation of the pluralist policy focus upon overt political achievements is that it fails to explain ideological exclusion, symbolic decision making and the distortion of contentious ecocentric discourse by dominant policy processes. Nevertheless, the essentially pluralist accounts of the Lake Pedder, Franklin, Electrona and Wesley Vale conflicts in *4.2.2*, *4.3.2*, *4.4.2* and *4.5.2* each provide valuable, initial explanations of what is apparent in the disputes, such as the public behaviour of the various stakeholders. From the pluralist perspective, the loss of the Pedder and Electrona disputes could be attributed purely to timing. Campaigning by conservationists and silicon smelter opponents in these disputes was indeed reactive, with the state government well ahead of any opposition with its development plans. The tactics of the Franklin dam and Wesley Vale pulp mill opponents were not only more proactive, in thwarting state plans before their finalisation, but also more determinedly so. However, whilst there is no doubt that the pluralist political arena has been the key to the evolution of green political power in Tasmania, it is also an arena to which development proponents like to keep their opponents confined - entering themselves only as a last resort.

Conservationists encountered the influence of the *covert political arena* in their early attempts to save Lake Pedder. Political power in the covert arena need not, as *3.3.2* notes, be seen to be exercised; indeed inactivity by covertly influential stakeholders is often the key to their securing a policy outcome. Conservationists dubbed the stakeholders behind hydro-policy the 'cabal', claiming that, irrespective of whether the Labor or the Liberal Parties held power, the state 'was effectively ruled by a small but powerful clique of politicians, union bosses, industrialists and certain

press barons with a common interest in protecting the hydro-industrial complex' (Southwell 1983:17). Whilst Tasmanian state governments have always fronted for the interests of the 'cabal', one of the great achievements of conservationists and development opponents has been to provoke 'cabal' members into publicly retaliating after being attacked. The unmasked political influence of the Hydro-Electric Commission was subsequently rendered publicly accountable and eventually reined in, by the Gray Government, ending its era as the de facto state developer sustained by its 'cabal' protectors. The Electrona and Wesley Vale conflicts saw a similar confrontation and calling to account of major corporate consumers of hydro-power, exposing, as we saw in the conclusion to Chapter Four, 'government by corporation' in the latter dispute. However, there is no evidence that the corporate hold over the state has been diminished by the Wesley Vale victory, since the subsidised pulping of Tasmania's native forests remains a key plank of the bi-partisan political agenda.

As Lukes (1974; in *3.3.3*) explains, the pluralist view of the overt political arena is *one-dimensional*, beyond which the *two-dimensional* view adds the second, covert face of power by exploring influences that limit access to decision making arenas. Lukes' *three-dimensional* view, as we have seen, considers the means by which the mobilisation of bias may prevent the realisation of demands. For our purposes, the one-dimensional view reveals *what* is observable in ecopolitical conflict, the two-dimensional view suggests *how* dominant material interests are sustained, and the three-dimensional view explains *why* bias mobilises against ecopolitical demands. Taking three-dimensional analysis further as Gaventa (1980:15; in *3.3.5*) does, returns this discussion to its preoccupation with explaining ideological constraint and the legitimation of industrial imperatives in Tasmania. We could then follow Clegg's (1989:16)

suggestion of regarding ideological hegemony as discursive practice that forecloses the possibility, discussed in *2.3.3*, of the realisation of ecopolitical goals in a determinate way. To the detail of overt political conflict, and covert influence in the Pedder, Franklin, Electrona and Wesley Vale disputes, three-dimensional analysis adds latent influence, whereby hydro-policy is seen as an indirect mechanism of constraint, promoting an ideology of popular loyalty, shaped by the media, and defended from challenge by the invocation of symbolic rhetoric - such as the labelling of environmentalists and the opponents of state projects as 'greenies' and 'anti-Tasmanians'.

5.4 The Politics of Underwriting Industry

5.4.1 From Pedder to the Franklin Dispute - hydro-industrial hegemony

In Chapter One, we saw that Tasmania's 'hydro-response' to its enduring economic problems swiftly developed into an hegemonic ideology, with the advocacy and bi-partisan support of pragmatic politics and entrenched administrators. Hay observes that in the absence of any political doctrine, the 'deep-rooted ideology' of hydro-industrialisation went unchallenged for many decades 'as the central unquestionable plank in what passed in Tasmania for political thought', rendering 'oddly irrelevant' traditional Left/Right divides (Hay 1987:4; discussed in *1.4.3*). Hydro-vision was the key to thirty-five years of unbroken rule by the Labor Party, from 1934 to 1969, under its Premiers Ogilvie, Cosgrove and Reece. It was the key to Premier Reece's return to power from 1972 to 1975, and to the 1982 election of the Gray Liberal Government. Hydro-industrialisation was hegemonic in the sense that it sustained Labor's hold on state political power, until the Franklin dispute, and in the sense that state industrial development was controlled by the de facto planning powers of the Hydro-Electric Commission. For the decades that the hydro-political

formula had remained in place, Labor had been, in Hay's (1986b:21) terms, 'electorally unassailable'. It was usurped by Premier Gray in 1982, casting Labor into the political wilderness, as the conservation movement seized the role of de facto opposition on state industrial development.

The Pedder and Franklin disputes unmasked the politics of underwriting industry, revealing the hydro-industrial key to the consolidation of state political power. These hydro-industrial conflicts illustrate the limits to state action, noted in *2.4.1*, whereby ecopolitical demands are constrained to the extent of their conflict with established political goals. The early conservationists initially turned to the state government in the Pedder dispute anxiously hoping for it to respond impartially to their ecological demands. However, their scepticism about the state's impartiality was heightened, firstly by its failure to perceive intrinsic value in its own Lake Pedder National Park, and then by its exclusion of conservationists from the decision making process. Following the inundation of Lake Pedder, conservationists had virtually no faith left in the ability of the state government to fulfil any role other than as an entrepreneur and developer of Tasmania's natural resources. Franklin campaigners anticipated not only that their efforts would be treated by the state government as subversive, but also that they would be resisted and constrained by the influence of the greater 'cabal' of hydro-industrial proponents discussed in *5.3.2*.

Once the expansionary trend of hydro-industrialisation intruded into the South West, the state had shifted its reliance upon economic growth more firmly onto the depletion of the state's ecological capital. This caused a crisis of legitimation, or a loss of faith by conservationists in the actions of the state, that served as the catalyst for the formation of the

United Tasmania Group (in *4.2.2*). In the terms considered in Chapter Two, Tasmanian state governments have proven (in each of the disputes considered) unable to act autonomously in responding to ideologically challenging ecocentric imperatives. Here it is useful to apply the 'dual state' thesis (Blowers 1984:227 & *3.3.4 fn 27*) whereby the state government can be seen to have assumed the primary role of capital accumulator, leaving the federal government to assume the role of ecological protector, redistributing the benefits of capital in order to preserve wilderness as world heritage. In *2.4.5*, it is established that whilst economic imperatives routinely thwart the realisation of ecocentric demands, an enhanced democratic state is considered by various authors to be well suited to checking the influences of unrestrained economic growth. The Lake Pedder dispute saw Labor Prime Minister Whitlam unwilling to intervene in the environmental affairs of his state Labor Party counterpart, Premier Eric Reece. Yet the Franklin dispute saw Labor Prime Minister Hawke willing to intervene in the affairs of his state Liberal counterpart, Premier Robin Gray. An enhanced democratic state may well have ensured that party politics played no part in the resolution of these critical environmental disputes.

5.4.2 From Electrona to Wesley Vale - consolidating political power

Chapter Four finds that Tasmanian ecopolitics has often seen traditional political opponents united in their opposition to environmentalism. Hay (1986:21) observes that the transference of the 'role of standard-bearer of hydro-ideology' simply shifted from the State Labor to the Liberal Party with the 1982 election of the Gray Government. The Liberals had seen 'hydro-electoral' dividends falling to their political opponents for decades, yet had mounted only feeble attacks on hydro-policy or the operations of the HEC. Liberal Premier Bethune won office from Eric Reece in 1969, pledging no delays to hydro-projects. His short-lived

government subsequently failed to pursue alternate energy sources or to challenge the autonomy of the HEC in its short period of office,[7] and the Liberal Party subsequently backed hydro-policy strongly throughout the Lake Pedder and Franklin crises (Lowe 1984; Bates 1983:14; Tighe 1992:131). Once conservationists had propelled hydro-development into the public spotlight, the critique of state development policy was usurped from the party political domain, henceforth to be vilified as a 'green' issue of the 'anti-Tasmanian' variety. Just as hydro-industrialisation was supported by the State Liberal Opposition during the Pedder and Franklin disputes, so the accommodation of industry at Electrona and Wesley Vale was supported by the Labor Opposition against opponents of the projects. Bi-partisan bonding of political opponents against Tasmania's 'greening' deepens Hay's observation of the odd irrelevance of old political divides, casting ecopolitics as the new adversary common to traditional state political rivals.

The post-Franklin policy environment was very much one of facilitating the establishment of major industries, lending, as we saw in *4.4.1*, an air of inevitability to the approval of the Electrona silicon smelter. In terms of discussion in *3.3.6*, the actions of the Gray Liberal Government were distinctly corporatist, directly facilitating corporate activity whilst trying to neutralise the activities of environmentalists. As mentioned, Premier Gray modelled himself upon Labor Premier Eric Reece retaining, in Hay's (1986:22) terms, the technocratic, anti-democratic execution of industrial policy that had sustained the era of hydro-industrial political power. His period in power lasted from 1982 to 1989. In terms of ecopolitical issues, Gray rode to power on the back of 'pro-dam' sentiment, with the early

[7] Until the late 1960s, the Liberal Opposition had openly criticised, as indeed had ALP backbenchers, incessantly rising power prices, bulk deals secretly awarded to big business relocating in Tasmania, the government's failure to pursue alternate power sources, and the ethics of HEC advertising to promote public electricity consumption (Lowe 1984:19-23).

years of his government then dominated by planning conflicts and the Electrona silicon smelter dispute. His electoral mandate was renewed at the 1986 state election, despite his heavy handed tactics of securing legislative approval in the smelter dispute. The early years of Gray's second term were dominated by forestry protest and the Helsham Inquiry, and the final years by Wesley Vale, over which he resoundingly lost government.[8]

Although cheated by the Franklin victory of the routine hydro-industrial vehicle to consolidating his newly-won political power, Gray emphasised the industrial side of the hydro-industrial equation, extending to industry and prospective industry traditional state privileges, the details of which, in time honoured Tasmanian political practice, remained confidential.[9] Whilst development policy slipped from the autonomous control of the Hydro-Electric Commission, falling to some extent into the hands of the newly formed Tasmanian Development Authority, basically it returned to the political arena with Premier Gray as sovereign leader (in *4.4.4*). The politics of underwriting industry had long been a covert exercise in Tasmania, facilitated by cheap hydro-power and operating with implicit bi-partisan political support. In the post-Franklin political era, Gray pursued the 'development-at-any-cost' route to consolidating his political power, confirming corporate privilege, in the best 'hydro-tradition', with his efforts to accommodate industry at Electrona and Wesley Vale.

5.5 Conclusion - Power & Policy Analysis in Tasmania

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8 Detailed in *4.4.1* & *4.5.1*, the policy contexts of the Electrona and Wesley Vale disputes.

9 Hydro-industrialisation did not cease with federal intervention backed by the High Court decision to save the Franklin. Just after the decision, Premier Gray announced that the Henty-Anthony and King River hydro schemes, initially planned as post Franklin schemes, were to be brought on line immediately, and suggested that Parliamentary approval may be circumvented if necessary to minimise delay (Bates 1983:16; see *4.4.1*).

Chapter Five has discussed ideological, political and institutional forces that have shaped policy and limited the efficacy of environmental demands in the Pedder, Franklin, Electrona and Wesley Vale disputes in Tasmania. Chapter Four considered these in terms of the policy context from which they arose, the details of the disputes, the role of the state and federal governments in conflict resolution, and the aftermath of dispute. Chapter Five places these considerations within their broader ideological, political and institutional contexts, achieving the pragmatic holism that Walker (1992:14; see *3.2.1*) advocates in environmental policy analysis, and identifying the constraining influence of the hydro-industrial 'policy paradigm' upon environmental decisions in Tasmania. It finds the demands of conservationists in the Pedder and Franklin disputes, and of development opponents and environmentalists in the Electrona and Wesley Vale disputes, linked by the assertion of intrinsic ecocentric value against exploitative state hydro-industrial and industrial imperatives. It establishes the political influence of prevailing interests in routinely excluding ecopolitical opponents of state projects from the policy process, and in thwarting the legitimisation of ecocentric concerns and values. It concludes that the Tasmanian hydro-industrial tradition of underwriting industry ultimately prevailed in the state, to secure bi-partisan political support for each of the four development projects in dispute.

Ironically, the ideological, political and institutional constraints upon the realisation of environmental demands also explain the evolution and electoral success of Tasmania's green political movement. As Flanagan explains, the Liberal and Labor parties have scrambled to power on a common development doctrine - their common efforts being to thwart 'the green alternative of a future based upon environmental protection and an end to resource depletion' (Flanagan 1990:198). As we have seen in the disputes studied, the electoral impact of this has been to see Dr Bob

Brown take a seat in State Parliament during the Franklin dispute, Dr Gerry Bates gain a seat after representing the residents in the Electrona smelter dispute, and Christine Milne, Di Hollister and Lance Armstrong gain seats after campaigning against the Wesley Vale pulp mill.[10] Constraint upon ecopolitical values in these disputes has directly resulted in a greening of the state parliamentary arena that is testimony to the persistence of bi-partisan political resistance to environmental demands.

Chapter Five has shown, in the disputes studied, both the extraordinary resistance by dominant political interests in Tasmania to environmental demands, and the extraordinary determination of environmentalists to achieve their goals despite constraint. Ecopolitical demands contradicted traditional hydro-industrial and industrial objectives in the disputes, and provoked the ire of powerful development interests championed by successive state leaders. The Lake Pedder and Electrona outcomes were forerunner losses for conservationists and development opponents to their victories in halting both the Franklin dam and the Wesley Vale pulp mill. Whilst the Pedder and Electrona outcomes reveal the ability of industrial interests to evoke bi-partisan political support in resisting the ecocentric challenge, the Franklin and Wesley Vale victories demonstrate that strategic, activist campaigning can overcome the limited efficacy of environmental demands within the state policy arena. In conclusion, by examining the background to these disputes, Chapter Five confirms the ideological character of the environmental challenge in Tasmania, the potential for the mobilisation of bias toward orthodoxy to frustrate the realisation of ecopolitical demands, and the role the state has assumed of affirming and accommodating industrial development.

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[10] Dr Brown replaced Democrat Dr Norm Sanders (when Sanders stood down in his successful bid for the Federal Senate) - see *fn 27* in 4.3.4. Peg Putt (another active campaigner during the Wesley Vale dispute against the Huon pulp mill, and subsequent Director of the Tasmanian Conservation Trust) recently replaced a retiring Dr Brown, having also been his 'running mate' (see Ch. One *fn 3*, & Ch. Four discussion).

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS

6.1 Chapter Outline

The conclusions of this thesis are considered in three sections: the efficacy of environmental demands; the value of a broad contextual approach to environmental policy analysis; and reflections upon the future 'greening' of Tasmania. Chapter Six returns to the argument of this thesis that the realisation of ecopolitical values, interests and demands is inevitably constrained by material interests (in Chapter One). The Tasmanian policy environment, as we have seen, has affirmed the goals of industrial development when faced with ecopolitical challenge. The Tasmanian studies confirm the ideologically constraining influence of the dominant industrial paradigm upon the realisation of ecopolitical demands discussed in Chapter Two. Successive Premiers have employed a range of measures to thwart the legitimation of environmental values, and exclude their ecocentric opponents from the policy process. From the Pedder to the Wesley Vale disputes, constraint of ecopolitical demands was considered requisite to the retention and consolidation of state political power in Tasmania. Only appeal beyond the state by development opponents achieved sufficient legitimation of ecocentric concerns to halt the Franklin dam and Wesley Vale pulp mill by triggering federal intervention.

Chapter Six also discusses the utility of the framework of analysis adopted to consider the efficacy of environmental demands in Tasmania, before concluding with a review of the entrenched antipathy between 'greenies' and 'growthists' in Tasmania (Kirkpatrick 1986:312). As noted in Chapter Three, the analytic approach adopted is concerned to establish the ability of environmentalists to achieve their demands in circumstances of policy constraint. The outcomes of the disputes must then be discussed in their

broader context, i.e. with the understanding that state action and response to ecopolitical demands in the disputes studied was prescribed by hydro-industrial and industrial imperatives. The framework required is one that explains forces that limit and forces that extend the range of policy alternatives. These forces are determined to be the nature of the values in conflict, the power of prevailing interests, and the capacity of the state to act as an impartial mediator in the event of environmental dispute.

6.2 The Efficacy of Environmental Demands

The argument of this thesis that environmental demands are subject to the routine constraint of prevailing values relies upon the conception of these demands as ideologically contentious, not as single issues struggling in a pluralistic way for attention in the policy arena. Chapter Two finds that rather than 'jostling' as single issues, environmental demands reflect a range of 'light' to 'dark' green concerns, with the deepest green offering the greatest challenge to dominant values, most routinely resisted by the state. This hierarchy of concerns then defines the ideological territory between the paradigmatically opposing dominant material and alternate environmental worldviews described by Cotgrove (1982:27; in *2.2.1*). The case for environmentalism as single issue politics is dismissed in Chapter Two for its failure to appreciate the ecological worldview as an ideological reference point in all manner of light to dark green ecopolitical disputes. As Satterfield (1983:138) explains, environmentalism is preoccupied with historical, existential, destinational and ethical concerns that an ideology will inevitably seek to address (in *2.2.3*). The case for environmentalism as single issue politics is flawed, Hay (1993:8) argues, for failing to observe environmentalism as 'a competitor not with other *issues*, but with the other great ideological systems' (in *2.2.4 fn 18*).

The persistence of ecological concerns and the evolution of the politics of ecology into contemporary green political movements, if the Tasmanian experience is to serve as any guide, may have more to do with constraints upon the realisation of environmental demands than their incorporation into mainstream policy processes. As Porritt (1984:4-5) explains, radical libertarian environmentalists, or, in Eckersley's (1992b:159) terms, deep green ecocentric emancipists, reject industrialism, bureaucracy, hierarchy and technological fixes to environmental crises (discussed in *2.2.2 & 2.2.3*). The powerful interests that sustain industrial, bureaucratic, hierarchical and technological dominance then present a significant obstacle to the realisation of radical libertarian, or deep green, emancipatory, demands. In these terms, this thesis argues that the struggle for the realisation of environmental goals of the deep green variety is not a pluralistic jostling as some may claim, but a struggle for legitimisation that seeks to revise power relations between prevailing economic and contending ecocentric concerns. Chapter Two proposes a critique of environmentalism that pursues, in Cotgrove and Duff's terms, the dominant paradigm's ability to systematically repress the articulation of the ecocentric viewpoint (Cotgrove & Duff 1980:345).

As the Tasmanian studies clearly show, environmentalists may achieve key victories without these necessarily legitimising their core concerns, which in itself illustrates repression of the alternate ecological paradigm. The process of achieving legitimacy, as Solesbury (1976:388; in *2.2.6*) claims, involves the generalisation of an issue 'beyond a particular instance'. If the issue attracts political support through association with wider values sufficient to prompt a policy response, it may be seen as legitimised. The gaining of legitimacy then stimulates the evolution of new values. As we saw in Chapter Four, ecopolitical conflict in Tasmania has not prompted the legitimisation of environmental concerns within

the state. Instead it has prompted a plethora of anti-democratic legislative, policy exclusion and rhetorical tactics constraining conservationists, environmentalists and, in general, all opponents of state sponsored development projects. The practice of ecopolitics in Tasmania cannot, this thesis therefore concludes, be understood without appreciating the hegemonic nature of hydro-industrial ideology and its legacies in policy practice. The power of industrialism to constrain the realisation of environmental goals by mobilising bias against non-market interests is well documented by various case studies (in *2.3.2*). It is the use of such mechanisms that protect market interests, imprison policy and vigorously frustrate social change, as hydro-policy has done in Tasmania, that Lindblom (1982:333) argues must be identified in policy analysis.

Chapter Two finds that the capacity of the state to respond to ecological demands is dependent upon the extent to which the demands contradict economic rationales, undermine capital accumulation, or threaten either the viability of the growth economy, or the state's own legitimacy. The Lake Pedder, Franklin River, Electrona and Wesley Vale disputes reveal the extent to which state governments themselves may be beholden to industrial development proponents within a vulnerable island economy (also *5.3.2*). Neo-Marxist theory suggests (in *2.4.1)* that the state is caught in cleft roles of capital accumulation, or the creation of the conditions for private profit, and mass legitimacy, or the satisfaction of human need. It is argued in Chapter Two that the satisfaction of ecological expectations adds a further contradictory demand to the role of the state, namely the logic of ecological integrity, with its implied radical distancing of the state from capital interests. The emergence of political environmentalism in Tasmania with the Pedder campaign added just such a contradiction to the role of the state by redefining legitimacy to include the satisfaction of ecocentric as well as the satisfaction of anthropocentric needs. An

implication of this was that traditional stakeholders in the politics of distribution, namely the liberal proponents of capital accumulation and the politically opposing labour proponents of capital redistribution, found bi-partisan political cause in resisting conservationist demands.

Chapter Two's discussion traces ecological expectations of the state from the early 1970s 'limits-to-growth' demands to the more recent and unresolved 'sustainable' growth debate, observing that unrestrained economic growth today enjoys precisely the primacy sought for planetary survival by ecologists over twenty years ago. Over the same period in Tasmania, we have seen resistance initially to the demands of conservationists, and subsequently to the environmental, economic, community health and local planning objections of any opponents of state backed industrial development. This is not to deny, in Solesbury's (1976:388) terms above, the 'generalisation' of 'lighter green' environmental issues such as water quality, pollution control, recycling and landcare, which tend to be the issues least threatening to the state's economic development imperatives. But it does suggest that, despite the increasing efficacy of environmentalism, and claims of the abating of the idea of progress in western democracies (Cotgrove 1976; Berman 1981; Satterfield 1983; Paehlke 1985), there is yet to be a paradigmatic shift sufficiently away from dominant materialism to embrace environmentalism and legitimise its political imperatives.

6.3 The Value of Broader Analysis

The policy approach adopted in this thesis has been one that recognises ecopolitics as an ideological struggle between value contenders. After Simeon (1976) and Downey (1987), it has considered ideological, political and institutional constraints upon environmental policy demands. The approach has been informed both by ecopolitical theory, in explaining the

political challenge of ecological values, and power analysis, in addressing circumstances of policy constraint. This approach views environmental policy making not as a value free exercise, but as a process constrained, as this thesis argues, by the influence of the dominant industrial 'policy paradigm'. It is also an approach well suited to reviewing the nature of the ecopolitical challenge, in each of the Pedder, Franklin, Electrona and Wesley Vale disputes, to the hydro-industrial development tradition. It is plainly unhelpful to view these disputes as instances of 'single issue' politics, not least, as Chapter Five concludes, because linking them is the common assertion of alternate ecocentric values against exploitative state hydro-industrial and industrial imperatives. Furthermore, the loss of faith by conservationists in the actions of the state, (for its reliance, against economic vulnerability upon the depletion of ecological capital), served as the catalyst for the emergence of green politics in Tasmania. This was not single issue politics in action, subject to the vagaries of the 'issue attention cycle', but 'issue persistence' that has seen the conservation movement evolve into a sophisticated political and parliamentary force in the state.

The ideological contentiousness of ecopolitical demands has preoccupied environmental political theorists, as we saw in Chapter One. This thesis argues that it must also be the starting point of inquiry in environmental policy analysis if the significance of ecopolitics is to be appreciated. As Walker (1992:3) explains, the very practical reason for considering environmental problems in their broader context stems from ecological complexity itself. Natural ecosystems are sustained by a complexity, bio-diversity and self-regulation that is vulnerable to human interference. Ecocentric concern recognises ecological interconnectedness that prompts the consideration of environmental issues in broad, interdisciplinary contexts. If environmental policy analysis is concerned with the efficacy

of ecopolitical demands, it should identify the manner in which broad based ecocentric concern is accommodated or constrained in the policy process. As Walker (1992:4) argues, the complexity of ecological concerns is beyond many politicians, who simply fit ecology into their routine conceptual framework of 'widely accepted theories and world views'. In Rodman's (1980:64-65) terms, this is a blatant contradiction of ecological notions that amounts to an unquestioning acceptance of the modern industrial paradigm. Environmental policy analysis must guard against such 'linear, one dimensional' analysis that, Rodman suggests, merely reduces the study of environmentalism to policy process and the politics of who gets what (Rodman 1980:50).

Policy analysis must then identify the ideological basis of environmental policy demands, the interdependency of the issues at stake, and their place within the modern industrial paradigm with its commitment to the technological domination of nature (Rodman 1980:50; in *3.2.2*). It must also consider whether the pluralist study of political activity satisfactorily explains policy outcome in circumstances of paradigmatic constraint. As the studies of non-decision making by Crenson (1971) and, more recently, Hill *et al* (1989) (in *3.2.3* & *3.2.5*) suggest, the object of investigation may be, more appropriately, political inactivity. Non-decision making seeks to explain covert rather than overt political power, and is concerned with decisions that are not taken and why. Nevertheless, in Lukes' (1977) terms, as we have seen, studies of overt and covert political power, or power in the first and second dimension, are essentially behavioural studies. Lukes proposes a radical 'three-dimensional' study of power, that is concerned with power in a non-individualistic sense, and that seeks to explain the mobilisation of bias toward a policy outcome. In Sandbach's (1980:106; in *3.2.4)* Marxian terms, mobilisation of bias is concerned with objective influence, such as industrial capitalism, that

shapes and limits environmental policy choices. Whilst notions of influence proposed by the first, second and third dimensions of power are methodologically irreconcilable, Blowers (1984) argues that a descriptive synthesis of these approaches offers powerful insight into environmental policy formation.

To ideology, interdependency and paradigmatic domination, is added, in Chapter Three, the multi-layered tool of power theory that reviews overt, covert and latent influences upon environmental policy. Pluralist detail of overt political activity is then complemented by covert influence and activities of constraint, as well as latent influence such as dominant industrialism. After Simeon (1976:550), this approach avoids a too narrow focus upon decision making at the cost of failing to appreciate the assumptions, values and interests behind policy outcomes. Simeon's layering of explanation with his 'causality funnel' is recognition of the fact that policy outcomes emerge from a multiplicity of economic, social and political forces, that are very often contested, as we saw in *3.3.1.* The layering of policy explanation should not, however, be mistaken for a concession to the deterministic influence of ideology and paradigmatic dominance upon decision making. Hydro-industrialisation may have constrained environmental policy in a determinist fashion for many decades in Tasmania, but that did not preclude conservationist victories in the Franklin and Wesley Vale disputes. As Chapter Five concludes, ideological, political and institutional forces may have shaped policy and constrained environmental demands in the disputes studied, but they have also prompted Tasmania's political greening in protest.

6.4 The Greening of Tasmania?

Tasmanian environmental politics, particularly the Franklin and Wesley Vale disputes, have focused world attention on the revolutionary practice

of the new politics of ecology in this small island state. As victories for the environment, and inspirations to the state's green movement, the outcomes of these dispute have become internationally synonymous with the 'greening' of Tasmania. The election of five independent green parliamentarians after the Wesley Vale dispute in 1989, and the Labor-Green Accord these five struck to sustain a minority Labor Government in power, seemed, until its collapse, evidence of further greening. Indeed Hay argues that Tasmania has the only political system primarily focused upon 'issues of environment' in the world, and a green movement more visible than anywhere in the world. In turn, Hay observes, Tasmanian environmentalists have achieved 'tactical and ideological sophistication not matched anywhere else in the world' (Hay 1993:7). Inevitably, the green phenomenon has impacted in a multiplicity of positive ways upon environment policy formation, predominantly in terms of the adoption of lighter green 'ideas' least threatening to established industrial interests. But in terms of industrial development and natural resource exploitation acute bi-partisan political antipathy towards environmentalists remains an obstacle to the legitimation of ecocentric values and demands. Having considered each of the Lake Pedder, Franklin, Electrona and Wesley Vale disputes, there appear to be at least two key explanations for the likely persistence of this antipathy.

Firstly, the collapse of hydro-policy has not prompted diversification of Tasmania's narrow industrial structure, leaving the state rudderless in terms of economic development. This is partly because action to address the flaws in hydro-policy has been tainted 'green' and 'anti-Tasmanian' by the bi-partisan political backers of exploitative state development since the days of the Pedder dispute. The hydro-industrial notion of corporate privilege to Tasmania's largest industries has persisted, therefore, despite exacerbating the state's economic vulnerability, with all the problems of

external ownership, poor returns to the state, and incessant job shedding that were first identified by the green movement over twenty years ago. As we saw in Chapter Five, the green movement has persisted for over twenty years in advocating an alternate economic direction for the state. This paid electoral dividends after the collapse of the Labor-Green Accord. Although the 1992 state election returned the Liberals to power, ironically on the promise of three pulp mills, it also returned each of the five green independents to parliament on their ten point, ten year economic plan and jobs blueprint for Tasmania, whilst delivering a crushing defeat to Labor whose vote fell to an historical low. The Tasmanian Greens, as the independents renamed themselves, appeared not to have suffered from the Accord's collapse, but to have usurped Labor, at least in development policy terms, as de facto opposition to the Liberal Government[1] (Moore 1992; Green Independents 1991; *Australian Editorial* 3 February 1992, p. 8). This leads us to a further explanation for the persistent antipathy towards the green movement and environmentalism in Tasmania.

The electoral eclipse of the State Labor Party, once the natural ruling party of Tasmania, can be traced to the politically destabilising effect of the Lake Pedder dispute over twenty years ago. Hydro-policy had been the key to Labor's extraordinary grip on state political power that was first broken over Premier Reece's mishandling of the Pedder issue. The flooding of Lake Pedder was an exercise of solidarity achieved by the Labor Premier, the Labor Prime Minister, the Australian Council of Trade Unions and the Tasmanian Trades and Labour Council. However, the dispute had also seen Premier Reece briefly cast from office, breaking Labor's thirty five year hold on power, and prompting the rise of environmentalism in

[1] Though each of the five greens was returned at the 1992 election after Accord's collapse, it was with a reduced margin that may be considered some sort of electoral backlash. In fact, it was an unexpected achievement for all five to be returned, given the absence of any catalysing ecopolitical conflict, and the expected drift of votes back to mainstream parties after the resolution of the Wesley Vale dispute.

Tasmania. After Pedder's flooding, it was not only conservationists that sought to challenge the dominance of the hydro-industrial article of faith, but also, Hay (1986:20) observes, the younger members of the Labor Party. As Lowe (1984:24) also explains, younger members felt disenfranchised from the process of government by the superficial role they played at party forums in policy setting and review. Hydro-politics had always been an exclusive preserve that saw government and the party controlled to a large extent by executive power, and the 'centralised influence', Hay (1986:21) adds, of a 'small coterie' of party strongmen. For the younger members of the party, the subsequent Franklin dispute was as much an attempt to regain political control from the Hydro-Electric Commission, as it was to vet its hydro-industrial plans for state development. Reformist policies caused considerable friction within the party between old style trade unionists, who defended hydro-industrialisation as job creating, and younger middle class members, who backed the conservationist demand for an indefinite moratorium on the provision of large blocks of energy to capital intensive industries (Davis 1983:205; Davis 1983b:110; Crowley 1989:51).

The conservative right wing of the Labor Party, having eventually tossed Lowe from the Premiership for his consensual handling of the Franklin dispute, went on, under Harry Holgate, to lose the 1982 state election to Robin Gray, recording its lowest statewide vote - 36.9 per cent - since 1931 (Bennett 1983:86). The Labor Party was left bitterly divided. Divisions inspired by the Pedder and Franklin controversies were so fundamental and ideologically irreconcilable that they remained and were largely responsible for the party's vacuous stance on state development at Electrona and Wesley Vale (Crowley 1989:51). After the fall of the Gray Government over the Wesley Vale dispute, Labor again recorded its lowest ever vote, whilst the Greens achieved the electoral success of

returning five members to the Lower House of Assembly (see *fn 1*). The political gains of the Greens had been largely at Labor's expense, Flanagan argues. He suggests that it is Labor that must bear the responsibility for the emergence of the Greens, having itself forfeited 'the reservoir of ideas and idealism which is an essential ingredient in the chemistry of the ALP' (Flanagan 1989b:8). The Labor Party in Tasmania remains without a profile on either environmental issues or industrial development. It resents the Greens for thwarting its 'fanciful' hope, Warden (1990:15) argues, of 'reintegrating the breakaway green faction' of its own party. For as long as it sides with the Liberals against the green challenges now mounted routinely in State Parliament, Labor will remain consigned to a political irrelevance that fuels its antipathy to the Greens.

6.5 Conclusion

Despite the impressive achievements of over two decades, Tasmania's greening has seen antipathy entrenched between dominant materialist and alternate ecological interests in the state. Whilst this antipathy threatens the efficacy of future environmental demands, it remains a fillip both to the state's conservation organisations and to the efforts of the parliamentary greens. State politics has been assailed by green issues since the 1992 state election, the breadth of which bears testimony to the Tasmanian Greens' bid for government in their own right that featured in their 1992 election campaign. Meanwhile, hydro-industrialisation and the inundation of Lake Pedder, the issues that prompted the emergence of political environmentalism in Tasmania over two decades ago, are again on the political agenda. The *Pedder 2000* campaign, spearheaded by Dr Bob Brown and supported by the David Suzuki Foundation and the World Conservation Union, aims to see the restoration of Lake Pedder to its original state by the year 2000 (LPRC 1994). The campaigners argue that the hydro-industrial era has finished, leaving Tasmania saddled with its

legacies, an enormous hydro-generated state debt, an oversupply of power and a Hydro-Electric Commission that remains blinkered and inflexible. There were indications at the recent Energy Council Tasmania forum that this view is finally gaining legitimacy twenty years after it was first raised by conservationists (*Mercury* 6 May 1994). It remains to be seen whether or not this is so, and whether or not conservationists in the small island state of Tasmania, having launched global environmental politics with the formation of the world's first green party, will next launch a new era of ecological restoration with the 'rediscovery' of Lake Pedder.

Year	*Hydro-Development*	*Year*	*Hydro-Development*
1895	Duck Reach (closed 1955);	1964	Poatina - 300 mw
	built - Launceston City Council	1966	Tods Corner - 1.6 mw
1911	Great Lake - (privately built)	1967	Meadowbank - 40 mw
1914	Hydro-Electric Dept established	1968	Cluny - 17mw; Repulse -
1916	Waddamana		28mw; Rowallan - 10.4mw
1922	Miena	1969	Lemonthyme - 51mw;
1923	Liawenee		Devils Gate - 60mw
1930	Hydro-Electric Dept becomes	1971	Wilmot - 30mw; Bell Bay 1
	Hydro-Electric Commission		oil fired thermal - 120mw;
1934	Shannon (closed 1934)		Cethana - 85mw
1938	Tarraleah - 90mw	1972	Paloona - 28mw
	(extended 1943, 1945 & 1951)	1973	Fisher - 43mw
1951	Butlers Gorge - 12.2mw	1978	Gordon 1 - 288mw
1953	Tugatinah - 125mw		(to which Pedder was lost)
1955	Trevallyn - 80mw	1981	Macintosh - 80mw
1956	Lake Echo - 32.4mw	1983	Bastyan - 80mw
1957	Wayatinah - 38mw	1987	Reece - 240mw
1960	Liapootah - 84 mw	1992	King River - 143mw
1962	Catagunya - 48 mw	1994	Henty-Anthony - 83mw

Appendix 1 - A Century of Hydro-Industrialisation in Tasmania
(Source: Caples 1994:17)

Name	*Party*	*From*	*To*	*Mths*
Ogilvie A G	ALP	22.6.34	10.6.39	60
Gray E D	ALP	11.6.39	18.12.39	6
Cosgrove R	ALP	18.12.39	18.12.47	96
Brooker E	ALP	18.12.47	25.2.48	2
Costgrove R	ALP	25.2.48	26.8.58	126
Reece E	ALP	26.8.58	26.5.69	129
Bethune W A	Lib	26.5.69	3.5.72	35
Reece E	ALP	3.5.72	31.3.75	35
Neilson W A	ALP	31.3.75	1.12.77	32
Lowe D	ALP	1.12.77	11.11.81	47
Holgate H	ALP	11.11.81	26.5.82	5
Gray R	Lib	26.5.82	29.6.89	85
Field M	ALP	29.6.89	17.2.92	32
Groom R	Lib	17.2.92	-	-

Appendix 2 - Tasmanian Premiers - from 1934 to 1994
(Source: Newman 1985 & 1994)

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